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Abstract 
Volcanic eruptions produce a range of concurrent, sequential and recurrent hazards 
which can impact society and critical infrastructure. For daily activities, modern 
societies are reliant on dependable functioning critical infrastructure, such as electrical 
supply; water supply; wastewater; transportation; communication networks; buildings; 
air conditioning and ventilation systems; and electronic equipment. In addition, during 
volcanic eruptions these sectors are vital for effective emergency response and recovery. 
Despite the importance of critical infrastructure, the systematic quantification of their 
vulnerability to volcanic hazards, a key aspect of volcanic risk management, has 
received little research attention. Successful volcanic risk management and disaster risk 
reduction are cost effective investments in preventing future losses during eruptions and 
increasing resilience to volcanic hazard impacts. Effective volcanic risk management 
requires the characterisation of both hazards and vulnerabilities to the same level of 
detail. 
This thesis develops a methodological framework to quantitatively assess the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure sectors to volcanic hazard impacts. The focus is 
on fragility and vulnerability functions which provide quantitative relationships between 
impact (damage and disruption) and volcanic hazard intensity. The framework details 
how post-eruption infrastructure impact data, compiled in a newly established 
infrastructure impacts database, can be classified by hazard and impact intensity to 
derive vulnerability and fragility functions. Using the vulnerability framework, fragility 
functions for several critical infrastructure sectors for volcanic tephra fall impacts are 
derived. These functions are the first attempt to quantify the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure sectors using a systematic approach. Using these fragility functions, risk 
is estimated for the electrical transmission network in the North Island of New Zealand 
using a newly developed probabilistic tephra fall hazard assessment. 
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This thesis and framework provide a pathway forward for volcanic risk scientists to 
advance volcanic vulnerability assessments such that comprehensive and robust 
quantitative volcanic risk assessments are commonplace in infrastructure management 
practices. Improved volcanic vulnerability and risk assessments leads to enhanced risk-
based decision making, prioritisation of risk reduction investment and overall reduction 
in volcanic risk. 
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 – Introduction Chapter One
1.1 Volcanic eruptions 
Volcanic eruptions are powerful and uncontrollable natural phenomena. Eruptions 
produce a range of hazards depending on the style and explosivity, from effusive 
(passive lava flows) through to explosive activity (Lockwood and Hazlett, 2010). 
Rapid-onset hazards such as pyroclastic density currents (PDCs), lahars, ballistics and 
lava flows can be highly dangerous and damaging in proximal locations. Tephra falls 
and gas emissions are lower-impact hazards but can have effects hundreds of kilometres 
away from the vent (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Volcanic hazards can occur 
simultaneously or sequentially and over differing spatial and temporal (hours to 
decades) scales, with any one volcano exhibiting a range of possible hazards. See Table 
1.1 for descriptions of common volcanic hazards. 
There are an estimated 800 million people worldwide living within 100 km of active or 
potentially active volcanoes (Brown et al., 2015). These people, and their associated 
built environment, are exposed to the effects of potential volcanic hazards in the case of 
an eruption. As global population increases and communities expand into volcanic 
environments, as a result of development pressures or to take advantage of fertile 
volcanic soils, exposure and vulnerability to volcanic hazards will increase (Chester et 
al., 2000). While fatalities and economic losses associated with volcanic eruptions are 
small compared to earthquakes, floods and droughts, they are still significant. Between 
1600–2010 CE, volcanic eruptions have caused approximately 280,000 fatalities, with 
PDCs responsible for the largest proportion (33%) of these fatalities (Auker et al., 
2013). Economic losses are not as easily quantified as fatalities but are considerable 
(Sparks et al., 2013). This has been illustrated recently during the 2010 eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland, which forced the closure of European and North Atlantic 
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airspace for six days (Sammonds et al., 2010), resulting in global financial losses of 
approximately US$5 billion (Ragona et al., 2011). 
Table 1.1: Simplified descriptions of composition, occurrence and potential impacts 
(excluding impacts to people) of common volcanic hazards. 
 
Volcanic hazard Description 
Pyroclastic density 
currents (PDC) 
Mixtures of hot gas and pyroclastic particles which rapidly travel downhill and 
spread into the surrounding area.
a
 




Deposits can bury buildings, infrastructure and land. 
Lava flows Outpourings of molten rock from volcanic vents or fissures which flow downhill 
at moderate velocities and harden upon cooling.
c
 
Flows bury land and assets in their path and ignite combustible materials.
d
 
Lahars Gravity-driven volcanic mud- or debris-flows comprised of pyroclastic material, 
rock fragments and water which typically sweep down off volcano slopes.
e
 
Secondary lahars can occur for many years after an eruption. 
Cause damage and destruction to the built environment due to high dynamic 




Ballistics Large particles (>64 mm) ejected at high energy during explosive eruptions 
which can travel up to 10 km from the vent.
g
 
Cause damage to the built environment and can cause fires.
h
 
Tephra fall Pyroclastic particles (<64 mm; volcanic ash <2 mm) ejected during explosive 




Particles are coated in a range of soluble salts following interactions with 
volcanic gases in the plume.
k
 
Thick deposits can cause collapse of buildings from increased static load.
h
 
Abrasion damage occurs on components with moving parts and corrosion can 
occur on metal surfaces. 
Tephra can cause disruption due to its presence, the need to remove it from 
components or from electrical short circuits.
l, m
 
Gas emissions Emission and dispersal of different gas species during an explosive eruption or 
passive degassing at a vent.
n
 




 Wilson and Houghton (2000); 
b
 Baxter et al. (2005); 
c
 Kilburn (2000); 
d
 Peterson and 
Tilling (2000); 
e
 Parfitt and Wilson (2008); 
f
 Rodolfo (2000); 
g
 Steinberg and Lorenz 
(1983); 
h
 Blong (1984); 
i
 Lockwood and Hazlett (2010); 
i
 Heiken and Wohletz (1985); 
k
 
Witham et al. (2005); 
l
 Wardman et al. (2012); 
m
 T.M. Wilson et al. (2012); 
n
 Delmelle and 
Stix (2000); 
o
 Oze et al. (2013); 
p
 Watanabe et al.(2006). 
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Volcanic eruptions are difficult to predict (Brown et al., 2014). However, progress has 
been made in forecasting eruptions, undertaking pre-emptive hazard assessment, 
conducting volcanic surveillance and implementing crisis management in order to 
reduce the impact of volcanic eruptions on society (Sparks et al., 2013). One aspect of 
modern society that is commonly and sometimes severely disrupted and damaged by 
volcanic hazards is critical infrastructure (Blong, 1984; T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). This 
thesis addresses and investigates critical infrastructure vulnerability to volcanic hazards, 
an area which has received less research attention in the past as researchers have 
focused on loss of life aspects. 
1.2 Critical infrastructure and volcanic hazards 
Critical infrastructure are networks of man-made systems and processes that function 
collaboratively to produce and distribute essential goods and services for society 
(Rinaldi et al., 2001; Dunn et al., 2013). Reliable and resilient infrastructure are critical 
for sustainable development, business competitiveness and reputation (UNISDR, 2013). 
Critical infrastructure includes: electrical supply; water supply; wastewater; 
transportation; communication networks; buildings; heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning (HVAC) systems; and electronic equipment. 
Critical infrastructure is commonly and sometimes severely impacted by all volcanic 
hazards (Chapter 2; Blong, 1984; T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). The occurrence and 
intensity of infrastructure impacts is dependent on hazard characteristics and intrinsic 
infrastructure properties. Impacts range from service disruption through to complete 
destruction. Disruption typically occurs as a result of tephra fall or from low intensity 
volcanic flows. Destruction occurs in proximal areas as a result of high intensity 
volcanic flow and ballistic impacts. Infrastructure has also been observed to tolerate 
volcanic hazards and continue operating uninterrupted during eruptions (Chapter 2). 
Figure 1.1 previews volcanic hazard impacts to critical infrastructure sectors from 
research conducted in Chapter 2. 
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Figure 1.1: Preview of volcanic hazard impacts to different critical infrastructure sectors (see Chapter 2 for further discussion). 
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There is increasing global awareness of the need for societies to be resilient to natural 
hazard impacts (UNISDR 2015a). Critical infrastructure must also be resilient to 
hazards (NIU, 2011, 2014), including volcanic eruptions, as infrastructure is vital for 
disaster response and recovery and the overall resilience of society. The current 
approaches for increasing infrastructure resilience are related to land-use planning 
(Burby, 1998; Brody et al., 2007; Glavovic et al., 2010), hazard mitigation (Chang et 
al., 2014) and planning for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery (Berke and 
Campanella, 2006; Olshansky, 2006; CERA, 2012). To facilitate these approaches, 
some governments have established research programmes to assess infrastructure 
resilience. For example, the National Infrastructure Unit (NIU), a unit of the New 
Zealand Government, has identified increasing critical infrastructure resilience as one of 
six guiding principles which will contribute to increasing economic development and 
quality of life by 2030 (NIU, 2014). Infrastructure resilience is also being addressed as 
one of the challenges as part of the New Zealand Government’s National Science 
Challenges research programme (MSI, 2014). In addition to these research programmes, 
critical infrastructure operators are mandated by the New Zealand Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002 to operate to their fullest possible extent during and 
after a disaster (MCDEM, 2002). 
While these plans, research programmes and policies dictate what infrastructure 
operators should achieve with regards to infrastructure resilience, operators still face a 
complex task of characterising infrastructure vulnerabilities to natural hazards and 
setting priorities for mitigation strategies (Chang et al., 2014). This can be particularly 
challenging when considering volcanic hazards, as eruptions are infrequent events and 
there are limited vulnerability data available for robust quantitative volcanic 
vulnerability assessment of critical infrastructure. However, continued research, such as 
this thesis, of infrastructure vulnerability through volcanic risk assessment will lead to 
improvements in infrastructure resilience to volcanic hazards. 
1.3 Volcanic risk assessment and management 
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1.3 Volcanic risk assessment and management 
Volcanic risk assessment and management fits into the wider disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) framework promoted by the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015 
(UNISDR, 2007) and now by the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–
2030 (UNISDR, 2015b). Disaster risk reduction aims to: (1) identify the occurrence of a 
future disaster; (2) determine what the consequences will be and whether they are 
societally acceptable or not; and (3) implement proactive planning to mitigate likely 
impacts in a cost-effective manner. This thesis addresses aspects of aims 1 and 2 by 
developing a tephra fall hazard assessment for the North Island of New Zealand 
(Chapter 5) and assessing the consequences of volcanic eruptions on critical 
infrastructure (Chapters 2–4 and 6). These aspects are addressed in the context of 
volcanic risk assessment which comprises hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity 
assessments. 
Volcanic risk assessments determine risk posed to an area and provide information on 
risk reduction treatments to lower risk and increase resilience (Papathoma-Köhle et al., 
2011). Early volcanic risk and impact assessments in New Zealand (e.g., Patterson, 
1987; Johnston and Nairn, 1993; Daly and Wilkie, 1999) focused on using deterministic 
hazard scenarios to estimate impacts to critical infrastructure, buildings and agriculture. 
Based on the fixed hazard scenarios, impact to different infrastructure sectors was 
estimated based on qualitative estimates of impact type and likelihood. While these 
studies provide advancement in moving from hazard to impact (Daly and Johnston, 
2015), the resulting risk assessments are qualitative in nature. However, these studies 
provide a valuable basis for improved risk assessment in subsequent work (e.g., 
www.devora.org.nz; DEVORA, 2015) and this thesis. Presently there is an increasing 
desire for quantitative probabilistic risk assessments for volcanic risk management to 
overcome the limitations of deterministic approaches (e.g., Marzocchi et al., 2004; Neri 
et al., 2008; Schmidt et al., 2011; Jenkins et al., 2012a, b). Compared to qualitative 
approaches, quantitative approaches facilitate consistent and comparable assessments 
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and allow risk reduction treatments to be prioritised. Quantitative risk assessments also 
feed into, and are critical for, assessing the costs and benefits of public and private 
investments in risk mitigation and development (UNISDR, 2015a). Results of these 
assessments can be presented using qualitative descriptions to facilitate effective 
communication between various stakeholders (Uzielli et al., 2008; Jelínek et al., 2012). 
Comprehensive and appropriate volcanic risk assessments require that hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability and capacity aspects all be assessed to the same level of detail. 
A large focus of volcanology research has been on characterising the occurrence and 
dynamics of different volcanic hazards. Without a sound knowledge of volcanic hazards 
there is little point in planning and implementing risk reduction treatments (Brown et 
al., 2015). Hazard maps, which show hazard footprints based on geological or 
modelling evidence, are a common hazard assessment approach for many volcanoes 
(e.g., Parra and Cepeda, 1990; Artunduaga and Jiménez, 1997; Haynes et al., 2007; 
Alatorre-Ibargüengoitia et al., 2012; Leonard et al., 2014). Deterministic hazard 
scenarios, typically based on previous or analogous eruptions, are also commonly used 
for hazard assessments (e.g., Johnston and Nairn, 1993; Johnston et al., 1997; Schmidt 
et al., 2011). However, geological and deterministic approaches may not account for all 
possible future events, as not all events will be recorded in the geological record 
(Bonadonna, 2006; IAEA, 2013; Brown et al., 2015) or have occurred yet. Probabilistic 
hazard assessments (e.g., Chapter 5; Dalziell, 1998; Magill et al., 2006; Hurst and 
Smith, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2012a), which utilise sophisticated hazard models to output 
hazard extent and intensity, are increasingly used to overcome this limitation. 
Quantitative probabilistic hazard assessments reduce both aleatoric (intrinsic in the 
hazard) and epistemic (linked to scientific knowledge gaps) uncertainty by repeatedly 
modelling hazard outcomes with a large number of random model input variables. 
These assessments are still limited by the accuracy and relevance of the input data 
(Jenkins et al., 2012a). Probabilistic hazard assessments provide the probability that a 
site will experience a hazard of a particular intensity over a certain timeframe (e.g., 
tephra thickness of 1 mm at site x has a probability of 0.5 over 100 years). 
1.3 Volcanic risk assessment and management 
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Elements (e.g., people, agriculture, infrastructure and land) which are exposed to 
volcanic hazards need to be catalogued to estimate volcanic risk. To obtain the best 
possible risk and impact assessment, high quality and accurate exposure data are 
required. Data are typically obtained from existing asset inventories or population 
distributions held by authorities and infrastructure operators (Schmidt et al., 2011) or 
global datasets (e.g., OpenStreetMap). Specific data for new research projects are often 
obtained using standardised field survey methodologies (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2014a). 
Continued improvement in the systematic collection of exposure data should lead to 
improvements in volcanic risk estimation. 
Vulnerability assessments focus on the susceptibility of exposed elements to the 
consequences (impacts) of volcanic hazards and are the basis to move from volcanic 
hazard to risk. Vulnerability is an intrinsic property of exposed elements and can vary 
significantly in space and time (UNISDR, 2009). The vulnerability of exposed 
elements, in particular critical infrastructure, is based on data from post-eruption 
observations, laboratory experiments and expert interpretation of these data (Rossetto 
and Elnashai, 2003). Simplistic vulnerability assessments provide a qualitative 
assessment of the type (e.g., Chapter 2; Johnston and Nairn, 1993; T.M. Wilson et al., 
2012; Jenkins et al., 2014b) and likelihood (e.g., Daly and Wilkie, 1999) of impacts to 
infrastructure. These assessments  provide descriptions of infrastructure vulnerability 
based on volcanic hazard intensity thresholds (e.g., tephra will cover road markings 
with thicknesses between 2–50 mm) or the presence of a hazard (e.g., if lava is present 
it will completely destroy a road). More complex vulnerability assessments utilise 
fragility and vulnerability functions (e.g., Paton et al., 1999; Spence et al., 2005; 
Wardman et al., 2012; G. Wilson et al., 2012) which define quantitative relationships 
between impact level and volcanic hazard intensity. For example, at a given volcanic 
hazard intensity, a fragility function can provide the probability an asset will sustain 
different impact intensities. 
Chapter One – Volcanic hazard impacts to critical infrastructure 
Page | 9 
Vulnerability assessments are the least developed aspect of volcanic risk assessment, 
especially for critical infrastructure, where few quantitative studies are available (e.g., 
Kaye, 2007; Wardman et al., 2012; G. Wilson et al., 2012). There are a number of 
reasons for this: (1) volcanic hazards are not often considered in infrastructure hazard 
assessments; (2) volcanic hazards are rarely considered in catastrophe modelling; (3) 
there are no building or infrastructure design codes for volcanic impacts which would 
prompt the derivation of functions; and (4) volcanic eruptions are infrequent events 
(Chapter 2). There are however, a number of studies which have documented impacts 
and vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure from field observations following eruptions 
from Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 (e.g., tephra-induced building damage; Spence et al., 1996), 
Rabaul in 1994 (e.g., tephra-induced building damage; Blong, 2003), Montserrat in 
1997 (e.g., PDC-induced building damage; Baxter et al., 2005), Merapi in 2010 (e.g., 
PDC-induced building and infrastructure damage; Jenkins et al., 2013) and other case 
studies (e.g., T.M. Wilson et al., 2012; Jenkins et al., 2014a), increasing the research 
community’s knowledge. This thesis builds on early vulnerability research (e.g., 
Johnston and Nairn, 1993; Daly and Wilkie, 1999) and previous fragility studies to 
address the current research knowledge gap by developing a methodological framework 
to derive fragility and vulnerability functions for critical infrastructure impacted by 
volcanic hazards (Chapter 4). Quantification of vulnerability will lead to improved 
volcanic risk assessments which can inform risk reduction practices. 
Capacity is the combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available 
within an organisation or community to achieve agreed goals (UNISDR, 2009). In the 
DRR space, the goal is typically a reduction in natural hazard risk. Little can be done to 
control volcanic hazards (Lockwood and Hazlett, 2010) and therefore volcanic risk 
reduction is focused towards reducing exposure and vulnerability. Volcanic risk can be 
reduced through mitigation actions such as volcano monitoring, engineering techniques, 
hazard-resistant construction, land-use planning, government policies and education 
(UNISDR, 2009). Evacuations have been successfully carried out before and during a 
number of eruptions (Blong, 1984; Woo, 2008; Sparks et al., 2013; Sword-Daniels, 
1.4 Thesis aims and objectives 
Page | 10 
2014) to remove people from hazardous zones, reducing casualties. Land-use planning, 
which prevents or limits construction in areas of high volcanic risk, has been used to 
reduce volcanic risk to people and critical infrastructure, primarily though the 
establishment of parks around volcanoes (Becker et al., 2010; Glavovic et al., 2010). 
Incorporation of volcanic hazard and vulnerability information into land-use planning 
would lead to improvements in planning volcanic and risk reduction (Becker et al., 
2010). Physical mitigation treatments such as the construction of hazard-resistant 
infrastructure designs can increase the resilience of infrastructure to volcanic hazard 
impacts. For example, the Agoyan hydroelectric power station located 5 km east of the 
city of Baños in Ecuador is occasionally exposed to lahars and has a specially designed 
floodgate system in place so that the intake flow can be diverted away from generation 
components (Sword-Daniels et al., 2011). Infrastructure operational plans, which 
include volcanic hazard response and clean-up actions, can also lead to increased 
resilience through preparedness (Wilson et al., 2014). To develop and implement 
mitigation strategies which increase resilience to volcanic hazards, infrastructure 
operators need comprehensive quantitative infrastructure vulnerability and risk advice; 
this thesis addresses these aspects. 
1.4 Thesis aims and objectives 
The primary aim of this thesis is to assess and quantify the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure sectors to volcanic hazards. It is vital that critical infrastructure sectors 
remain operational and able to provide critical services to society during emergency 
response and recovery from a volcanic eruption. While the volcanological research 
community has a broad qualitative understanding of volcanic impacts to infrastructure, 
a detailed quantitative understanding is lacking in many instances. Quantitative 
infrastructure vulnerability assessments allow more robust, comparable and transparent 
risk assessments on which volcanic risk management and reduction decisions are made. 
My research builds on previous New Zealand and international studies and provides a 
greater quantitative understanding of infrastructure vulnerability to volcanic hazards, in 
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particular tephra fall, the most common and widespread hazard, as part of quantitative 
volcanic risk management. 
The primary aim of this thesis will be addressed in the following objectives: 
1. Review and identify known impacts to critical infrastructure sectors from 
volcanic eruptions within the last 100 years (Chapter 2). 
2. Identify volcanic hazard impact mechanisms and categorise infrastructure 
disruption and damage into standardised impact intensity classes (Chapter 2). 
3. Develop a database to store volcanic impact data and facilitate the collection 
of standardised post-eruption impact data for future eruptions (Chapter 3). 
4. Establish a methodological framework for the quantification of infrastructure 
vulnerability to volcanic hazards using vulnerability and fragility functions 
(Chapter 4). 
5. Derive vulnerability and fragility functions for tephra fall impacts to critical 
infrastructure using the volcanic vulnerability framework (Chapter 4). 
6. Utilise fragility functions to assess the tephra fall risk to the electrical 
transmission network in the North Island of New Zealand using a new 
probabilistic tephra fall hazard model (Chapters 5–6). 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The body of this thesis consists of five chapters comprising published, submitted or 
prepared manuscripts for scientific journals. A version of a published manuscript is 
contained in Chapter 2, which reviews known critical infrastructure impacts from 
historic volcanic eruptions. This chapter also identifies different impact mechanisms 
and defines impact intensity states for critical infrastructure sectors for four volcanic 
hazards (tephra fall, PDC, lahar, and lava flow). Chapter 3 presents a database which 
collates post-eruption impact data in a standardised format. This database, along with 
data collection guidelines, will facilitate the acquisition of post-eruption impact data 
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following future volcanic eruptions. In Chapter 4 a framework is established to derive 
vulnerability and fragility functions for critical infrastructure impacts from volcanic 
hazards. The volcanic vulnerability framework details data, methodology and 
documentation requirements for functions. Fragility functions for electricity supply, 
water supply, wastewater, transportation and critical components to tephra fall impacts 
are developed. In Chapter 5, a probabilistic tephra fall hazard assessment for the North 
Island of New Zealand is undertaken to assess tephra thickness exceedance from six 
volcanoes. Chapter 6 presents a quantitative risk assessment of the electrical 
transmission network in the North Island of New Zealand, using the probabilistic tephra 
fall hazard assessment from Chapter 5 and the fragility functions derived in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 is intended for submission as a manuscript to a scientific journal and 
therefore there is some repetition of vulnerability material from Chapter 4. Finally, 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a general summation of the main conclusions and 
highlights areas for further research. 
The appendices contain supplementary material and research undertaken by and co-
authors and me. Appendix A contains a review of existing volcanic fragility functions 
for critical infrastructure and is related to Chapter 4. Appendix B contains additional 
post-eruption infrastructure impact assessment guidelines from Chapter 3. Appendix C 
contains a submitted version of a co-authored GNS Science report documenting and 
analysing infrastructure, agriculture and human health impacts from the 14 February 
2014 eruption of Mt. Kelud, Indonesia. This is included to show evidence of a post-
eruption impact assessment by a collaborative research group. 
The methodologies, applications and results described in the chapters are a direct result 
of my own research; however, several co-authors have made invaluable contributions. 
Their specific inputs are described in the signed co-authorship statement forms at the 
beginning of this thesis. 
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Effective natural hazard risk assessment requires the characterisation of both hazards 
and vulnerabilities of exposed elements. Volcanic hazard assessment is at an advanced 
state and is a considerable focus of volcanic scientific inquiry, whereas comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment is lacking. Cataloguing and analysing volcanic impacts provide 
insight on likely societal and physical vulnerabilities during future eruptions. This paper 
reviews documented disruption and physical damage of critical infrastructure elements 
resulting from four volcanic hazards (tephra fall, pyroclastic density currents, lava flows 
and lahars) of eruptions in the last 100 years. We define critical infrastructure as 
including energy sector infrastructure, water supply and wastewater networks, 
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transportation routes, communications, and critical components. Common trends of 
impacts and vulnerabilities are summarised, which can be used to assess and reduce 
volcanic risk for future eruptions. In general, tephra falls cause disruption to these 
infrastructure sectors, reducing their functionality, while flow hazards (pyroclastic 
density currents, lava flows and lahars) are more destructive causing considerable 
permanent damage. Volcanic risk assessment should include quantification of 
vulnerabilities and we challenge the volcanology community to address this through the 
implementation of a standardised vulnerability assessment methodology and the 
development and use of fragility functions, as has been successfully implemented in 
other natural hazard fields. 
2.2 Introduction 
The aim of natural hazard risk assessment is to evaluate the extent and nature of risk in 
a particular area by evaluating potential hazards that together could harm people, 
property and services (UNISDR, 2009). Risk assessments are an integral part of the risk 
management process (Figure 2.1) and comprise hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
assessments (Marzocchi et al., 2012). Recent natural disasters such as the 
Eyjafjallajökull eruption in Iceland (2010), the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan 
(2011), Hurricane Sandy in the USA (2012) and Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines 
(2013) highlight the need for effective natural hazard risk management and sustainable 
development (UNISDR, 2014). Various studies have identified society’s increasing 
vulnerability to disasters as a consequence of population expansion in hazardous areas 
and increasing economic and environmental strain (Rougier et al., 2013). Risk 
assessment and management is essential for identifying, avoiding and minimising losses 
associated with natural hazard impacts. Using quantitative risk assessment provides a 
numerical estimation of risk which can facilitate comparisons between different natural 
hazards and locations and allow prioritisation of risk mitigation strategies to increase 
society’s resilience to these hazards. Risk mitigation strategies can be broadly classified 
as: 
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 Land-use planning (citing) used to decrease exposure of people, buildings and 
infrastructure to natural hazards. 
 System and component design to improve resilience if exposed to natural 
hazards.  
 Contingency planning (i.e., preparedness and response) used to reduce the 
impacts of natural hazards and decrease restoration and recovery times. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic description of components and process followed during natural 
hazard risk management. 
 
A challenge for volcanic risk assessment is the multi-hazard characteristic of volcanic 
eruptions (Sparks et al., 2013). Tephra falls, pyroclastic density currents (PDCs), lava 
flows and lahars can occur simultaneously or sequentially and over differing spatial and 
temporal scales, potentially adversely affecting society (see Table 2.1 for hazard 
descriptions). The threat to society is considerable: there are at least ~600 million 
people living in areas that could be affected by volcanic eruptions (Auker et al., 2013). 
As populations increase in volcanically active areas, exposure and vulnerability to 













Page | 24 
assessment, volcanic monitoring, early warning, crisis management and other mitigative 
strategies can reduce the impact on society (Sparks et al., 2013). For example, the 
number of likely fatalities was reduced by two orders of magnitude during the 1991 
eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, Philippines when thousands of people were evacuated prior to 
the climactic eruption (Sparks et al., 2013). The death toll since 1900 CE from volcanic 
eruptions is small compared to other natural hazards; for example, in that time period 
there were ~280,000 fatalities from volcanic eruptions (Auker et al., 2013) compared to 
>2 million from earthquakes (Holzer and Savage, 2013). However, disruption, damage 
and economic loss from volcanic eruptions is considerable, although hard to quantify 
(Sparks et al., 2013). One aspect of modern society that is commonly and sometimes 
severely disrupted and damaged by volcanic hazards is critical infrastructure (Blong, 
1984; T.M. Wilson et al., 2012), the focus of this paper. Critical infrastructure is defined 
as a network of man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively to 
produce and distribute essential goods and services (Rinaldi et al., 2001) which are 
heavily relied upon by society for daily function (Dunn et al., 2013). Critical 
infrastructure discussed here includes electrical supply networks, water and wastewater 
networks, terrestrial transportation networks and communications. We also consider 
buildings, heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and electronic 
equipment common to all infrastructure sectors. There has been a lack of systematic, 
quantitative collection and reporting of impacts to critical infrastructure, which has 
hindered quantitative risk assessment. 
In this review we build an evidence base of disruption and direct damage to critical 
infrastructure sectors from tephra falls, PDCs, lava flows and lahars, and distil common 
impact trends to contribute to improved quantitative volcanic risk assessment. Section 2 
of this paper places this review in the context of natural hazard risk assessment and 
summarises physical vulnerability assessments in volcanology and other natural hazards 
while also highlighting some of the challenges faced with adoption of robust 
quantitative volcanic vulnerability assessment. Section 2.4 summarises current 
knowledge of physical impacts to critical infrastructure from volcanic hazards 
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highlighting vulnerable infrastructure components and impact mechanisms from a range 
of international case studies. In Section 2.5 we discuss general trends in impact severity 
and at which hazard intensities disruption and damage may be likely to occur for each 
hazard. We also provide an approach to estimate vulnerability with impact states and 
fragility functions. We conclude in Section 2.6 with a discussion of future directions for 
continued development of quantitative physical vulnerability assessment with the goal 
to improve volcanic risk assessment. Definitions of terms used throughout this review 
are in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.1: Description of hazard origin, transport, composition, primary damaging characteristics and common hazard intensity metrics for 
tephra falls, pyroclastic density currents (PDCs), lava flows and lahars. 
 
Hazard Hazard characteristics Primary damaging characteristics Hazard intensity metric (HIM) definitions 
Tephra 
fall 
Origin: explosive volcanic 
eruptions or fire fountaining 
as a result of magma 
fragmentation. 
Transport: dispersed in 
convective eruption plumes 
up to 40–50 km vertically 




Composition: vitric (volcanic 
glass), crystalline and/or 
lithic particles. Blocks and 
bombs (>64 mm in 
diameter), lapilli (2–64 mm) 
and ash (<2 mm).
d
 
Loading: relates tephra thickness and bulk density. 




Thickness: similar to loading and generally 




Dispersal: tephra can be dispersed over wide 
extents. Tephra deposits may be eroded and 




Grainsize: smaller particles are dispersed further 
from the vent and can penetrate smaller openings 
than larger particles. 
Surface chemistry: tephra particles have surface 
coatings of soluble salts as a result of scavenging 
in volcanic plumes
h
. Salts may be released upon 
contact with water, resulting in water 
contamination.
i




Abrasiveness: tephra is highly abrasive due to the 




Thickness (common unit: mm): accumulated thickness 
of tephra fall. 
Static load (common units: kg/m
2
, kPa): mass of tephra 
per unit area on a surface. Indicates load on an 
object in the vertical direction. 
Particle density (common unit: kg/m
3
): the density of 
individual particles influences their mobility and 
settling rate in liquids. 
Surface chemistry (common unit: mg/kg dry weight for 
individual elements): concentration of soluble salts 
on the surface of tephra particles. 
Grainsize: particle size distribution of tephra at a 
particular site. 
Moisture content (common unit: vol. %): water content 
of tephra deposit. Influenced by plume dynamics, 
environmental conditions during and subsequent to 
deposition. 
Hardness: particle hardness influences abrasiveness of 
tephra deposits. 
Atmospheric concentration (common unit: µg/m
3
): 
concentration of tephra particles suspended in air. Is 
relevant for aircraft safety, visibility and health. 
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Hazard Hazard characteristics Primary damaging characteristics Hazard intensity metric (HIM) definitions 
PDC Origin: (1) collapse of an 
unstable eruption column, (2) 
directed blast, (3) low 
pyroclastic fountaining, and 
(4) lava dome collapse.
b, l, m
 
Transport: gravity-driven flows 
which accelerate down slope 
at velocities up to 300 m/s
n
 




Composition: mixtures of 




Dynamic pressure: relate the flows density to its 
velocity. Dynamic pressures can be on the order 
of tens of kilopascals
q
 enough to damage or 
destroy buildings and infrastructure. 
Run-out distance: PDCs can flow distances of tens 
of kilometres, are generally confined to valleys
o
, 
although overtopping can unpredictably occur.
m
 
Temperature: may reach 1100°C
m
, sufficient to 
burn common building materials.
r
 
Abrasiveness: pyroclastic material is highly 
abrasive and in combination with high flow 
velocity can cause significant abrasion to 
impacted surfaces. 
 
Dynamic pressure (common unit: kPa): the kinetic 
energy per unit volume of the flow which changes 
with flow density and velocity. Used to infer lateral 
impacts. 
Velocity (common unit: ms
-1
): velocity of the PDC 
during emplacement. Can be used instead of 
dynamic pressure if PDC density is unknown. 
Temperature (common unit: °C): temperature of the 
PDC at emplacement. 
Thickness of deposit (common unit: mm): thickness of 
the PDC deposit after emplacement has ceased. 
Lava 
flow 
Origin: outpourings of molten 
rock from volcanic vents or 
fissures. 
Transport: flows emplaced as a 
dynamically continuous unit 
elongated downslope. 
Lengths are typically <10 km 
and velocities ~10’s km/hr, 




Composition: the majority of 
flows are basaltic in 
Morphology: flows tend to travel along confined 
paths as cohesive, sometimes massive, units 
(10’s m thick) which impact and inundate 
objects in the flow path. Flows solidify on 
cooling. 
Temperature: are between 800–1200°C
s
 during 
eruption, sufficient to ignite fires. 
Presence of lava: whether lava is present at a particular 
location, regardless of flow depth. 
Depth of flow (common unit: mm): depth of the 
solidified lava flow. 
Dynamic pressure (common unit: kPa): the kinetic 
energy per unit volume of the flow which changes 
with flow density and velocity. Used to infer lateral 
impacts. 
Velocity (common unit: m/s): velocity of the lava flow 
during emplacement. Can be used instead of 
dynamic pressure if flow density is unknown. 
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Hazard Hazard characteristics Primary damaging characteristics Hazard intensity metric (HIM) definitions 
composition although high 




Temperature (common unit: °C): temperature of the 
flow. Ambient temperature around flow margins is 
equally important for infrastructure damage 
considerations. 
Cooling duration (common units: hours, days): time 
take for lava flow to cool sufficiently to reinstate 
infrastructure on top of flow. 
Lahar Origin: (1) eruption of hot 
pyroclastic material onto ice 
or snow, (2) eruptions 
through crater lakes, (3) 
breakout of crater lakes or 
other water bodies, and (4) 




Transport: gravity-driven flows 
which travel down slope at 




Composition: slurry of 
volcaniclastic material (i.e., 




Velocity: can travel at high velocities which can 
partially damage or destroy buildings and 
infrastructure in flow path. 
Erosive: commonly erosive which can destabilise 
structures (e.g., bridge piers and abutments) 
located in or near to flow channels. 
Run-out distance: can travel for long distances and 
inundate large areas. 
Depth: commonly up to tens of meters in valleys 
and thin veneers outside of valleys
w
 which is 
sufficient to bury infrastructure and sometimes 
inundate buildings and structure. 
Temporal: lahars may occur post eruption 
(“secondary”) for many years as rain remobilises 
pyroclastic material, prolonging hazard impact.
x
 
Dynamic pressure (common unit: kPa): the kinetic 
energy per unit volume of the flow which changes 
with flow density and velocity. Used to infer lateral 
impacts. 
Velocity (common unit: ms
-1
): velocity of the lahar 
during emplacement. Can be used instead of 
dynamic pressure if lahar density is unknown. 
Thickness of deposit (common unit: mm): thickness of 
the lahar deposit remaining after emplacement. 
Depth of flow (common unit: mm): depth of the lahar 
during emplacement. Depth of flow can be greater 
than deposit thickness. 
a
 Carey and Bursik (2000); 
b
 Parfitt and Wilson (2008); 
c
 Lockwood and Hazlett (2010); 
d
 Cashman et al. (2000); 
e
 Spence et al. (1996); 
f
 Johnston (1997); 
g
 
Wilson et al. (2011); 
h
 Óskarsson (1980); 
i
 Witham et al. (2005); 
j
 Oze et al. (2013); 
k
 T.M. Wilson et al. (2012); 
l





 Wilson and Houghton (2000); 
o
 Valentine and Fisher (2000); 
p
 Burgisser and Bergantz (2002); 
q
 Clarke and Voight (2000); 
r





 Griffiths (2000).; 
v
 Smith and Fritz (1989); 
u
 Waitt (2013); 
w
 Vallance (2000); 
x
 Gran et al. (2011). 
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Table 2.2: Definitions of terms used throughout this review. 
 
Term Definition Reference 
Natural hazard A dangerous natural phenomenon that may cause loss of 
life, property damage and disruption. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Exposure People, property, systems and other elements present in 
the hazard zone that are subject to potential loss. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Vulnerability The characteristic of an element that makes it 
susceptible to the effects of a hazard. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its 
negative consequences. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Risk assessment A methodology to determine the nature and extent of 
risk. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Risk management The systematic approach of managing uncertainty and 
minimizing potential loss through the implementation 
of mitigation strategies. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Resilience The ability of a system to absorb and recovery from the 
effects of a hazard. 
UNISDR (2009) 
Critical infrastructure A network of man-made systems and processes that 
function collaboratively to produce and distribute 
essential goods and services. 
Sectors include: electrical supply networks, water and 
wastewater networks, transportation routes, 
communications, electronics and air conditioning. 
Rinaldi et al. 
(2001) 
Impact Adverse consequence of hazards on the exposed asset. Jenkins et al. 
(2014b) 
Impact mechanism The different methods by which a natural hazard can 
impact infrastructure. 
This paper 
Impact severity The relative level of damage to elements.  This paper 
Disruption Impact caused to infrastructure prior to the onset of 
physical damage. 
This paper 
Physical damage General term to describe damage to infrastructure 
causing complete loss of function until repair or 
replacement is undertaken. 
This paper 
Hazard intensity The magnitude of a hazard at a particular site. We use 
the terms “low” and “high” to describe the end 
members of hazard intensity. 
This paper 
Hazard intensity metric 
(HIM) 
Different hazard properties which can impact 
infrastructure. These properties can be measured and 
are related to the level of impact. 
This paper 
Fragility function Equations which express the probability of differing 
levels of damage sustained for different infrastructure 
as a function of hazard intensity. 
Rossetto et al. 
(2013) 
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Mitigation The lessening of the adverse impacts of hazards through 
policy or structural strategies. 
UNISDR (2009) 
2.3 Natural hazard risk assessment 
Natural hazard risk assessments combine hazard, exposure, vulnerability assessments 
(Figure 2.1) in order to determine the risk posed to a site, area or region from single- or 
multi-hazard source. Risk assessment informs the development of mitigation strategies 
and effective risk management, reducing loss and increasing resilience (Papathoma-
Köhle et al., 2011). We provide a brief description of these assessments and refer the 
reader to Rougier et al. (2013) and Smith (2013) for in-depth reviews of natural hazard 
and risk assessments. 
Hazard assessment procedures are similar for all natural hazards and concern 
determining hazard occurrence frequency, the spatial extent (hazard footprint) and 
hazard intensities (e.g., tephra thickness) within the hazard footprint (Smith, 2013). 
Deterministic (scenario-based) or probabilistic (range of scenarios) hazard models are 
used, the choice of which is determined by data availability and the type of assessment 
required (Panza et al., 2011). Hazard assessment outputs are commonly in the form of 
hazard maps which show hazard intensity as a function of spatial extent or hazard 
curves which show exceedance probability of certain hazard intensities at a given 
location. Exposure assessments identify the number, typology and location of elements 
(e.g., buildings, infrastructure and people) which have the potential to be impacted by 
the hazard(s) of interest. Exposure assessments can be at any scale, from site specific to 
regional, although an inverse relationship generally exists between level of detail and 
spatial scale. These assessments commonly make use of existing asset inventory data 
sets (e.g., asset databases held by local and regional authorities: Schmidt et al., 2011), 
although project specific data sets may be obtained through field investigation or remote 
sensing (e.g., Foulser-Piggott et al., 2014; Jenkins et al., 2014a). Vulnerability 
assessments are concerned with the consequences of natural hazard impacts on exposed 
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elements and may be undertaken in physical, economic and/or social contexts (Fuchs et 
al., 2012) (see Section 2.3.1 for a detailed discussion). 
Risk assessments are the combination of hazard, exposure and vulnerability assessments 
(Figure 2.1) and determine the nature and extent of risk to a site, area or region of 
interest. Assessments can be qualitative (descriptive data) or quantitative (measurable 
data) or a combination of both, depending on the nature of available data and the 
purpose of the assessment (Jelínek et al., 2012). If possible, quantitative assessments are 
preferred because they can facilitate a more precise comparison between risks, although 
results can be expressed using qualitative descriptions such as ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ 
risk (Jelínek et al., 2012) to facilitate effective communication (Uzielli et al., 2008). 
There is increasing use of multi-hazard risk assessment (e.g., Schneider and Schauer, 
2006; Schmidt et al., 2011; Marzocchi et al., 2012; UNISDR, 2013) for particular sites 
or regions that may be impacted by more than one natural hazard as the combined effect 
of all hazards influences risk (Zuccaro et al., 2008). Hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
assessments for each hazard are combined to create a multi-hazard risk index or ranking 
for a particular area (Marzocchi et al., 2012). 
While in theory both hazard and vulnerability aspects of risk assessment should be 
advanced to the same level of detail, there is often discrepancy between the two, notably 
for volcanic hazards (Sparks et al., 2013). Quantitative assessments of various volcanic 
hazards and their processes are well advanced (e.g., Bonadonna, 2006; Wadge, 2009; 
Jenkins et al., 2012), with fieldwork, laboratory studies and numerical models providing 
qualitative outputs for the spatial and temporal extent and intensities of hazards, while 
taking into account uncertainties. Vulnerability assessments are less advanced. For 
tephra fall and PDC there has been steady progress in qualitative understanding of 
vulnerability for structures, agriculture and some critical infrastructure, however 
quantitative assessment of vulnerability over a range of hazard intensities is more 
sparse. This lack of comprehensive understanding can preclude robust quantitative 
volcanic risk assessment (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012; Jenkins et al., 2014a). Despite this, 
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risk assessment methodologies have been developed to assess volcanic risk to 
infrastructure. For example, the Auckland Engineering Lifelines Project (Daly and 
Wilkie, 1999; Daly and Johnston, 2015) developed a methodology using deterministic 
volcanic hazard scenarios and qualitative descriptions of impact type and likelihood as 
the basis for volcanic risk assessment in Auckland, New Zealand. This project set the 
groundwork for the development of subsequent volcanic management initiatives 
(Auckland Lifelines Group, the Volcanic Impacts Study Group and the Auckland 
Science Advisory Group) and research programmes (e.g., DEVORA, 2015) (Daly and 
Johnston, 2015) as well as for this paper. 
2.3.1 Natural hazard vulnerability assessments 
There are different types of vulnerability (e.g., physical, social, economic; see Fuchs et 
al., 2012); in this paper we restrict our focus to physical vulnerability, that is the 
susceptibility of an infrastructure system or component to impact from a natural hazard. 
There are three main approaches for physical vulnerability assessment: the use of 
vulnerability indicators, damage matrices, and fragility or vulnerability functions 
(Kappes et al., 2012). Figure 2.2 briefly summarises these approaches and provides 
examples of when they may be used in volcanic vulnerability assessment. 
Data for deriving physical vulnerability assessments come from empirical, analytical, 
expert judgment, and hybrid sources (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003). Table 2.3 presents 
some of the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. The most common data 
source for all natural hazards, including volcanic eruptions, is observational (empirical) 
data collected during or immediately after a hazardous event. These data are generally 
scarce due to the danger and limited access in impacted zones, the expense of collecting 
such data and the infrequent nature of some hazards (Jenkins et al., 2014a), although 
remote sensing techniques allow data collection in hazardous areas (e.g., Sanyal and Lu, 
2005; Mas et al., 2012; Dong and Shan, 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014a). The advantage of 
empirical data is that a range of hazard intensities and exposed element properties are 
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taken into account, which are often difficult to include in models. Empirical data can 
also be used to confirm and calibrate other data sources and assessments (e.g., Turner et 
al., 2013), although this is unfortunately rare (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003). In the 
absence of empirical data, other forms of data such as analytical (experimental), expert 
judgement or hybrid combinations can be sought (Table 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.2: Graphical representation and descriptions of the three most common 
approaches to assess natural hazard vulnerability: vulnerability indicators (Aspinall et al., 
2011); damage matrices and fragility functions (Zuccaro et al., 2008). 
 
A quick note on risk assessment in other natural hazard fields is warranted to place 
volcanic risk assessment in context. Earthquake risk assessment has well established 
quantitative vulnerability assessments that estimate damage, disruption and casualty 
impacts (Reitherman, 2012), which has informed establishment of robust seismic 
building codes; pioneering work began in the 1980s focusing on seismic safety of 
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nuclear power plants (e.g., Kennedy et al., 1980; Kennedy and Ravindra, 1984). The 
field has well-established methods for post-earthquake building assessments (Rossetto 
et al., 2010) and for deriving fragility functions to probabilistically estimate structural 
damage (Porter et al., 2007). Other natural hazard fields employ similar empirical 
approaches to earthquake vulnerability assessment but are less well defined. Analytical 
modelling approaches are also used to develop fragility functions (e.g., Vaidogas and 
Juocevičius, 2008; Koshimura et al., 2009; Quan Luna et al., 2011). As a field, 
volcanology trails behind earthquake risk assessments but is on par with landslide and 
tsunami risk assessment. 
Table 2.3: Advantages and disadvantages of the different methodological approaches used 
to develop fragility and vulnerability functions in natural hazard vulnerability assessment 
(modified from Schultz et al., 2010). 
 







Range of hazard and infrastructure 
characteristics taken into account 
Difficulties in replicating 
natural hazards in 
laboratory 
Site, region, structure specific 





Assess wide range of impacts, some of 
which have not been previously 
observed 
Not limited by impact data or models 
Can be used to refine other functions 
Quality depends on expert’s 
expertise and subjectivity 
Can be difficult to validate 




Increased reliability and repeatability 
and reduced bias 
Can be extrapolated to new situations 
Substantial computation 
Based on simplifications and 
assumptions 
Hybrid Combination of 
different 
approaches 
Reduce limitations by combining 
different approaches 
Reduce uncertainties in functions 
Limitations are the same as 
individual approaches 
2.3.2 Volcanic perspective on vulnerability assessments 
Volcanic risk assessment has typically focused on loss of life and therefore physical 
vulnerability assessments have primarily targeted building damage and occupant 
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exposure with limited analysis of other physical societally-relevant assets such as 
critical infrastructure. 
2.3.2.1 Data sources 
Observational data is the key data set for modern volcano risk assessment, and began in 
earnest with observations in the aftermath of the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens, USA 
which affected critical infrastructure, health and economic activities across Washington 
(Lipman and Mullineaux, 1981). A formative review of the effects of volcanic eruptions 
is presented by Blong (1984), who documents a wide range of volcanic hazard impacts 
on buildings, infrastructure, agriculture, economy and people. The Blong (1984) review 
is a significant contribution to the field and is the basis for current understanding of 
impacts to the built environment and still relied upon heavily today. Since the eruption 
of Mt. St. Helens, field observations following eruptions from Mt. Pinatubo in 1991 
(e.g., tephra-induced building damage; Spence et al., 1996), Rabaul in 1994 (e.g., 
tephra-induced building damage; Blong, 2003a), Montserrat in 1997 (e.g., PDC-induced 
building damage; Baxter et al., 2005), Merapi in 2010 (e.g., PDC-induced building and 
infrastructure damage; Jenkins et al., 2013) and other case studies (e.g., T.M. Wilson et 
al., 2012; Jenkins et al., 2014a) have strengthened the knowledge regarding volcanic 
impacts to society, particularly around building damage and occupant safety. In order to 
continue collecting high quality empirical data Jenkins et al. (2014a) proposes a 
standardised physical vulnerability survey methodology detailing minimum data 
requirements to ensure quantifiable data collection. 
Where observational data are lacking, experimental assessment (e.g., Spence et al., 
2004a; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Wardman et al., 2012c) have been used to estimate 
vulnerability. Experimental data are sparse due to difficulties accurately replicating 
some volcanic hazard properties in the laboratory (Jenkins et al., 2014a). Theoretical 
calculations (e.g., Petrazzuoli and Zuccaro, 2004; Jenkins et al., 2013) and expert 
elicitation (e.g., Coppersmith et al., 2009; Aspinall and Cooke, 2013) can also be used 
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to produce both qualitative and quantitative vulnerability assessments that can be 
applied to a range of element typology and hazard properties. 
2.3.2.2 Quantifying vulnerability 
Quantifying vulnerability of buildings is more common within the literature as volcanic 
risk assessment is primarily concerned with loss of life. Jenkins et al. (2014b) suggest 
that vulnerability assessments of buildings can also be undertaken to: (1) identify 
buildings that may benefit from mitigation measures; (2) quantify potential damage and 
loss of buildings following successful evacuation; and (3) support development of 
improved construction guidelines for new buildings. As such, numerous studies (Spence 
et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2007; Marti et al., 2008; Zuccaro et al., 2008) and field 
observations (Spence et al., 1996; Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) have 
quantitatively estimated building vulnerability for volcanic hazards, particularly tephra 
falls and PDCs. The outputs of these studies are similar to those of earthquake risk 
assessment and describe building damage as a function of hazard intensity using hazard 
intensity thresholds, damage matrices and fragility and vulnerability functions. See 
Appendix A for a brief review of fragility and vulnerability functions derived for 
volcanic hazards. The majority of these studies have assessed vulnerability to European 
buildings with a large focus on buildings in Naples, Italy and those surrounding Mt. 
Vesuvius. The primary reason for the focus on these buildings is because there is a large 
population living close to or on the flanks of one of the most dangerous volcanoes in the 
world (Baxter et al., 2008). As such, these assessments apply only to European building 
typologies would need to be re-evaluated and refined for other areas of interest. 
In contrast, vulnerability assessment for critical infrastructure systems and components 
is not well established, with the majority of assessments qualitative in nature (e.g., 
Patterson, 1987; Johnston and Nairn, 1993; Daly and Wilkie, 1999). However, damage 
or disruption to critical infrastructure is likely to have a higher magnitude impact on 
society than building damage (Jenkins et al., 2014a) due to the interconnectedness of 
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these infrastructure (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). The New Zealand Volcanic Impacts 
Study Group (NZ VISG) has over the past 15–20 years systematically assessed tephra 
fall impacts to critical infrastructure through post eruption impact assessment and semi-
structure interviews with critical infrastructure managers (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012; 
Wilson et al., 2014). These studies (e.g., T.M. Wilson et al., 2012) have built on early 
New Zealand volcanic vulnerability studies (e.g., Patterson, 1987; Johnston and Nairn, 
1993; Daly and Wilkie, 1999) and provide a large amount of qualitative data describing 
the likely impacts and points of vulnerability for each critical infrastructure sector as a 
result of tephra fall. Some studies have attempted to quantitatively relate infrastructure 
disruption and damage to hazard intensity using intensity thresholds (e.g., Jenkins et al., 
2014b) and fragility functions (Table 2.4 and Appendix A). However, these quantitative 
relationships have been based on few empirical data and therefore are associated with 
sizeable uncertainty. There is a need to refine infrastructure vulnerability estimates for 
tephra fall and volcanic flow hazards in order to have robust volcanic risk assessments, 
hence the need for this review and continued and standardised research in this field. 
Table 2.4: Existing critical infrastructure fragility and vulnerability functions developed for 
different volcanic hazards. We found no published peer-reviewed fragility functions for 
water supply, communication networks or lava flows. See Appendix A for a review of these 
functions. 
 
Infrastructure sector Tephra fall PDC Lahar 
Electrical supply a   
Wastewater networks b   
Transportation networks b   
Buildings b, c, d, e, f d, g, h g 
Critical components i   
a
 Wardman et al. (2012c); 
b
 Kaye (2007); 
c
 Spence et al. (2005); 
d
 Zuccaro et al. (2008); 
e
 Jenkins and Spence (2009); 
f
 Maqsood et al. (2014); 
g
 Zuccaro and De Gregorio (2013); 
h
 Spence et al. (2007); 
i
 G. Wilson et al. (2012). 
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2.3.2.3 Challenges in assessing physical vulnerability 
There are a number of aspects when assessing physical vulnerability in regards to 
volcanic hazards which make fully-quantitative approaches difficult to achieve. Douglas 
(2007) attributed this to a number of challenges, including: 
 Volcanic eruptions are multi-hazard events and therefore critical infrastructure 
sites can by impacted by multiple sequential or simultaneous hazards. This can 
lead to a range of different impact mechanisms to be considered, again adding 
complexity. 
 Individual volcanic hazards can cause different types of damage to the same 
asset depending on the hazard properties. For example, tephra fall can damage 
a metal roof by increasing the static load causing it to collapse, in addition to 
damaging it through corrosion and abrasion. 
 There are no widely adopted volcanic building codes or building performance 
guidelines which regulate infrastructure design in volcanic hazard zones and 
prompt vulnerability assessment and fragility function development. 
 There is a diverse range of infrastructure system design, configuration and 
components which make it difficult to assign generic vulnerability assessments 
for all infrastructure sectors. 
 Time scales leading up to volcanic eruptions can be long compared to 
earthquakes (discrete events). Long eruption lead up times can allow pre-event 
warnings, resulting in evacuations which remove the danger to life. Given the 
focus on loss of life vulnerabilities, the mitigative measure of mandatory, 
encouraged, or self-evacuations reduce social pressure to evaluate building 
fragility. 
 Volcanic episodes with multiple hazardous events can take place over a long 
time, adding complexity to vulnerability assessments. 
 Difficulties in accurately measuring hazard intensity (e.g., bulk densities of 
lahars, dynamic pressures of PDCs, tephra thickness). Often PDC and lahar 
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parameters are inferred from deposits due to personal safety concerns and 
destruction of measuring instruments during flow emplacement. Deposits, 
especially tephra fall, may be reworked by erosional processes and thus 
incorrectly measured (Engwell et al., 2013). 
 Volcanic eruptions are infrequent events, resulting in a lack of quantitative 
observational impact data. Volcanic post event assessments are primarily 
focused on the hazard itself and not the impacts. 
2.4 Historically observed impacts to critical infrastructure 
In order to estimate vulnerability to critical infrastructure during future eruptions, 
insights can be gained from analysing past impacts. In this section we review the 
literature to provide a semi-qualitative overview of disruption and damage to critical 
infrastructure by volcanic hazards. We consider impacts from tephra falls, PDCs, lava 
flows and lahars (see Table 2.1 for hazard descriptions) to electrical supply networks, 
water supply and wastewater networks, terrestrial transportation networks, 
communications, computers and air conditioning. As buildings and critical components 
(HVAC and electronic equipment) are widely used as key components in each 
infrastructure sector we finish with a dedicated section for critical components and 
building impacts (Section 2.4.6 and 2.4.7, respectively). Table 2.5 tabulates documented 
impact occurrence per decade for the past century for each infrastructure sector 
indicating the prevalence and occurrence of impacts over time. Table 2.6 summarises 
impacts to critical infrastructure from recent eruptions in New Zealand to provide 
context for Chapters 5 and 6. Table 2.7 summarises the main vulnerabilities for each 
infrastructure sector and summarises mitigation actions based on site exclusion, 
infrastructure design and operation and response planning. 
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Table 2.5: Summary table of documented volcanic impacts to critical infrastructure 
grouped by decade indicating the prevalence and occurrence of impacts over time. Symbols 
are: × Pre 1980s; # 1980s; * 1990s; § 2000s; and + 2010s. 
 
Sector Impact Tephra falls PDCs Lava flows Lahars 
Electrical 
supply 
Flashover  # * § +                
 Abrasion – dry  #   +                
 Abrasion – wet   *               *   
 Corrosion     +                
 Gravel 
contamination 
    +                
 Physical damage 
to lines 





 # *  +                
 Pipe, channel 
blockage 
× # *  +           ×  *   
 Pipe ruptures        * §  ×   §     §  
 Intake & filter 
blockages 
×  *  +           ×     
 Water quality 
decrease 
× #  § +         §       





× #                   
 Pipe blockage × #  §                 
 Infill of tanks    § +                
 Filter blockage    §                 
 Treatment 
disruption 
 #  §                 
Transportation Road damage       #  §  × #  §   # *  + 
 Road 
burial/closure 
  * § +    §   #  §      + 
 Vehicle damage  # * § +  # *    #    × #    
 Traction/visibility 
reduction 
 # * § +       #         
 Airport closure or 
damage 
× # *  +   *      §     §  
 Aircraft damage × # *  +                
 Railway closure or × #   +      × #    × #    
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Sector Impact Tephra falls PDCs Lava flows Lahars 
damage 
 Port closure or 
damage 
×    +      ×          
 Ship damage    §  ×               
Communication Physical damage  #  §    *             
 Signal interference  # * § +                
Buildings Lateral impact 
damage 
     × # * § + × # * §   # * § + 
 Roof damage/ 
collapse 
  * § +  #              
 Fire      ×  *  +  #  §       
 Corrosion   *                  
 Gutter damage   * §                 
 Burial ×   §   #  §  × #  §   # *   
Critical 
components 
Computer damage  #  §                + 
 HVAC damage   *                  
 




Description of impacts References 
Mt. Tarawera 1886 Thick tephra and mud deposits collapsed roofs and 




Mt. Ruapehu 1945 Prolonged eruptions produced tephra over the North 
Island causing reduced visibility on roads (primary 
and remobilised tephra fall), contaminated tank 
water supplies, blockage of water filters, 
difficulties in pumping water and disrupting 
electrical supply to the Chateau Tongariro at the 
base of the volcano. 
Johnston (1997) 
 1953 Lahar weakened the Tangiwai rail bridge which 
collapsed when the train crossed killing 151 
people. 
O’Shea (1954) 
 1969 Lahars damaged and infilled a ski field building on 
the volcano. The eruption blast destroyed Dome 
Shelter and its near the vent. Tephra increased 
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Volcano Eruption 
year 
Description of impacts References 
Whakapapa and Iwikau villages. Wastewater 
treatment at Whakapapa was disrupted. Tephra 
caused corrosion of roof paint. 
 1975 The eruption severely damaged Dome Shelter and 
Glacier Hut was damaged by ballistics. Lahars 
destroyed a ski field building, damaged ski lift 
foundations, washed away two small pedestrian 
foot bridges, overtopped State Highway 48 and 
filled the tunnel and aqueduct of the Tongariro 
Power Development Scheme which was still under 
construction. 
Nairn et al. (1979) 
 1995–96 Lahars destroyed a footbridge, caused damage to an 
aqueduct access ford. Remobilisation of tephra 
and secondary lahars caused significant and 
ongoing abrasion damage to the turbines at the 
Rangipo Power Station causing approximately 15 
years of wear in seven months. The turbines were 
shut down and repaired. Tephra fall caused 
widespread disruption to aviation due to airspace 
restrictions and closure of airports across the 
North Island. During and after tephra falls 
visibility on roads was reduced and roads were 
closed. Tephra caused insulator flashover on high 
voltage transmission lines at the base of the 
volcano with tephra being cleaned manually. 
Tephra caused damage to roof paint and gutter 
systems. Some ski lift towers on the volcano 
suffered corrosion damage. 
Johnston (1997); 
Johnston et al. 
(2000) 
Tongariro 2012 The Tongariro Alpine Crossing track was damaged 
by ballistics and pyroclastic surge. Ballistics also 
caused damage to a hut. Tephra fall caused a short 
duration closure of the Rangipo Power Station as a 
precaution. There were no impacts to the 
transmission lines surrounding the volcano. State 
Highways 1 and 46 were closed due to low 
visibility. Some flight delays at Napier Airport due 
to trace tephra. Rangipo Prison water supply 
automatically shutdown due to increased turbidity. 
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Table 2.7: Summary of the main vulnerabilities for critical infrastructure sectors for impacts from tephra falls, PDCs, lava flows and lahars 





Tephra fall PDC Lava flow Lahar 
Electrical supply Vulnerability: Flashover of 
insulators, abrasion of HEP 
turbines, line breakage, 







 Increase insulation 
and use of anti-pollution 
strategies to minimise 
flashover. Strengthen 
structures or use tephra 
shedding designs to 
minimise tephra loading. 




clean-up operations and 
methods. Use of backup 
generators. 
Vulnerability: Breakage of 
towers, poles and lines, 
damage to other structures, 
abrasion of HEP turbines. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Strengthen some 




up operations and methods.  
Vulnerability: Breakage of 
towers, poles and lines, 
damage and inundation to 
other structures. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
known flow paths. 
Design: Locating services 
underground. Construction 
of embankments around 
critical components. 
Contingency planning: – 
Vulnerability: Breakage of 
towers, poles and lines, 
damage to other structures, 
sedimentation in HEP 
storage reservoirs, abrasion 
of HEP turbines. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Locating services 
underground. Construction 
of embankments around 
critical components. Use of 
hardened materials to limit 
abrasion. 
Contingency planning: Use of 
early warning systems, rain 
gauges and flow sensors. 
Clean up operations and 
methods. 
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turbidity, decreased water 
quality, increased water 
demand, clogging of filters, 
abrasion of moving parts in 
motors and pumps, 
corrosion of metals. 
Site exclusion: No 
Design: Strengthen structures 
to minimise tephra load 
damage. Cover open filter 
beds, clarifiers and pumps. 
Consider the use of 
groundwater sources in 
increase resilience. 
Contingency planning: Tephra 
clean-up operations using 
dry methods (brooms, 
shovels). Anticipate 
increased water demand and 
possible contamination. 
Increase maintenance 
frequency. Close water 
intakes until turbidity 
decreases. 
Vulnerability: Lateral loading 
damage to tanks, well heads 
and pipes. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Strengthen all 
structures at treatment 
facility. Strengthen pipes 
crossing flow paths or locate 
them deep underground. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations and methods. 
Anticipate possible water 
contamination. 
Vulnerability: Burial of 
underground access points, 
rupturing of pipes. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
known flow paths. 
Design: Construction of 
embankments around critical 
components. 
Contingency planning: – 
Vulnerability: Lateral loading 
damage to tanks, well heads 
and pipes, erosive damage to 
underground pipes, abrasion 
damage to river intake 
structures. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Use of abrasion 
resistant materials for intake 
structures in rivers. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations and methods. 
Anticipate possible water 
contamination. Close water 
intakes until turbidity 
decreases. Use of early 
warning systems. 
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damage to components with 
moving parts, blockage of 
filters and screens, ingress 
into pipe network and 
treatment facility. 
Site exclusion: No 
Design: Strengthen structures 
to minimise tephra load 
damage. Cover exposed 
equipment, tanks and 
pumps. Limit tephra ingress 
by utilising separate 
stormwater system. 
Contingency planning: Tephra 




pumping stations and 
treatment facilities to protect 
against further equipment 
damage. 
Vulnerability: Lateral loading 
damage to structures and 
equipment, ingress into pipe 
network. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Strengthen all 
structures at treatment 
facility. Strengthen pipes 
crossing flow paths or locate 
them deep underground. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations and methods. 
Vulnerability: Lateral loading 
damage to structures and 
equipment. Burial of 
underground access points. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
known flow paths. 
Design: Construction of 
embankments around critical 
components. 
Contingency planning: – 
Vulnerability: Lateral loading 
damage to structures and 
equipment, ingress into pipe 
network. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Construction of bunds 
around oxidation ponds to 
prevent lahar ingress. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations and methods. 
Use of early warning 
systems. 
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visibility and traction, 
covering of road and runway 
markings, abrasion and 
corrosion damage to 
vehicles, jamming of rail 
switches, and disruption to 
airspace. 
Site exclusion: No 
Design: Strengthen buildings 
(airports, train stations) and 
increase roof pitch to 
minimise tephra load 
damage. 
Contingency planning: Tephra 
clean-up operations and 
methods. Road, rail and 
airport closure protocols. 
Established tephra 
avoidance guidelines for 
aircraft.  
Vulnerability: Burial of roads, 
rail networks and airport 
runways, increased 
sedimentation into harbours, 
erosive damage and 
destruction of bridges, 
extensive damage to 
vehicles. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all routes should be 
located away from valleys 
and known flow paths. 
Design: Raise bridge decks 
over valleys and strengthen 
piers and abutments. 
Contingency planning: Identify 
alternate routes if primary 
routes are damaged. 
Anticipate the need for 
temporary bridges. Clean up 
operations and methods. 
Vulnerability: Burial of roads, 
rail networks and airport 
runways. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all routes should be 
located away from known 
flow paths. 
Design: Construction of 
embankments around critical 
parts of the network. 
Contingency planning: – 
Vulnerability: Burial of roads, 
rail networks and airport 
runways, increased 
sedimentation into harbours, 
erosive damage and 
destruction of bridges, 
extensive damage to 
vehicles. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all routes should be 
located away from valleys 
and known flow paths. 
Design: Automated barriers to 
close road and rail routes 
when lahars occur. Raise 
bridge decks over valleys 
and strengthen piers and 
abutments. 
Contingency planning: Use of 
early warning systems. 
Identify alternate routes if 
primary routes are damaged. 
Anticipate the need for 
temporary bridges. 
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Tephra fall PDC Lava flow Lahar 
Communications Vulnerability: Signal 
interference and attenuation, 
corrosion of metal surfaces. 
Site exclusion: No 
Design: Strengthen structures 
or use tephra shedding 
designs to minimise tephra 
loading. Sealing of 
equipment to prevent tephra 
ingress. 
Contingency planning: Tephra 
clean-up operations and 
methods. Use of different 





interference and attenuation, 
damage of towers, poles and 
masts, burial of equipment. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Locate services 
underground or inside 
strengthened buildings. 
Strengthen all equipment, 
especially those crossing 
flow paths. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations. Increase 
maintenance frequency. 
Vulnerability: Damage of 
towers, poles and masts, 
burial of equipment. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
known flow paths. 
Design: Construction of 
embankments around critical 
parts of the network. Locate 
equipment inside 
strengthened buildings. 
Contingency planning: – 
Vulnerability: Damage of 
towers, poles and masts, 
burial of equipment. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Locate services 
underground or inside 
strengthened buildings. 
Strengthen all equipment, 
especially those crossing 
flow paths. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations. Increase 
maintenance frequency. Use 
of early warning systems. 
Critical 
components 
Vulnerability: Clogging of air 
filters, overheating, short 
circuits, abrasion of moving 
parts, corrosion of metal 
surfaces. 
Site exclusion: No 
Vulnerability: Destruction and 
transportation of equipment. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
Vulnerability: Destruction and 
burial of equipment. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
known flow paths. 
Vulnerability: Destruction and 
transportation of equipment. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all equipment 
should be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
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Tephra fall PDC Lava flow Lahar 
Design: Seal equipment and 
locate equipment inside 
sealed buildings to prevent 
tephra ingress. Install air 
filters designed for fine 
particles. Install hoods over 
HVAC air intakes. 
Contingency planning: Tephra 




Design: Relocation of 
equipment into strengthened 
buildings. 
Contingency planning: Clean-
up operations and methods. 
Increase maintenance 
frequency. 
Design: Relocation of 
equipment into strengthened 
buildings. 
Contingency planning: – 
paths. 
Design: Relocation of 
equipment into strengthened 
buildings. 
Contingency planning: Use of 
early warning systems. 
Clean up operations and 
methods. Increase 
maintenance frequency. 
Buildings Vulnerability: Blocked and/or 
damaged gutters, tephra 
ingress, corrosion of metal 
surfaces, structural damage 
to roof. 
Site exclusion: No 
Design: Strengthen roofs, 
increasing roof pitch to 
reduce static load. 
Contingency planning: Sealing 
of building to prevent tephra 
ingress. Removing tephra 
from roof to prevent 
Vulnerability: Damage to 
windows and doors, 
structural damage to whole 
building, inundation and 
burial, ignition of fires. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all buildings should 
be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Strengthen walls and 
avoid having them 
perpendicular to flow path to 
reduce dynamic load. Use of 
Vulnerability: Structural 
damage to whole building, 
burial, ignition of fires. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all buildings should 
be located away from known 
flow paths. 
Design: Strengthen building 
walls. Use of non-flammable 
materials. 
Contingency planning: – 
Vulnerability: Inundation and 
burial, structural damage to 
walls, float building off 
foundations. 
Site exclusion: Yes – where 
possible all buildings should 
be located away from 
valleys and known flow 
paths. 
Design: Strengthen walls and 
avoid having them 
perpendicular to flow path to 
reduce dynamic load. Fix 
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Tephra fall PDC Lava flow Lahar 
collapse. shutters on openings to 
prevent ingress. 
Contingency planning: 
Evacuation planning and 
implementation. 
buildings to foundations. 
Contingency planning: Use of 
early warning systems. 
Evacuation planning and 
implementation. 
a
 A ‘yes’ for site exclusion indicates that infrastructure development should be avoided at a particular site as damage from a hazard cannot be mitigated. 
b
 Design considerations include altering the design of components and infrastructure sectors to lower their vulnerability to disruption and damage from 
volcanic hazards (e.g., strengthen building roof) and the design of site protection measures for flow hazards (e.g., construction of diversion barriers). 
c
 Contingency planning involves making decisions and plans in advance about the management and response to volcanic eruptions to minimise impact 
severity and decrease recovery time (e.g., evacuation plans, clean-up plans and availability of resources). 
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2.4.1 Electrical supply networks 
Electricity is essential for a functioning modern society and the continued operation of 
other critical infrastructure. Electrical equipment and apparatus used in power 
generation, transmission and distribution is typically located above ground, comprising 
of a series of nodes (power stations, substations) connected by extensive corridors 
(transmission and distribution lines) which can stretch thousands of kilometres (Figure 
2.3A). The ubiquitous scope of the electrical supply network increases its level of 
exposure making the network particularly vulnerable to volcanic hazards (Wardman et 
al., 2012c). Volcanic hazards affect the electric supply network in a number of ways 
(Figure 2.4), the most common being temporary outages caused by insulator flashover 
as a result of tephra accumulation (Wardman et al., 2012c). Many of the impacts 
discussed below can occur at any location within the network as similar equipment is 
located throughout the network (Figure 2.3A). See Wardman et al. (2012c) for a review 
of tephra fall impacts and mitigation strategies for the electrical supply network. 
2.4.1.1 Insulator flashover 
The most common tephra fall impact on the electrical supply network is insulator 
flashover (Wardman et al., 2012c). A flashover is an unintended electrical discharge 
(short circuit) around the insulator and typically leads to a line fault. Dry tephra has 
high resistivity but in the presence of moisture resistivity becomes very low (Wardman 
et al., 2012b). So when tephra is deposited on insulators, in the presence of moisture, a 
flashover may result. It may only take one insulator to suffer flashover for an entire line 
of potentially hundreds of kilometres to be disrupted. Tephra, in this case, can result 
from direct falls, PDCs or from wind remobilisation of unconsolidated tephra deposits. 
Flashover has been observed worldwide after volcanic eruptions where tephra 
accumulations exceed ~3 mm (Figure 2.4). However tephra moisture content is the 
critical factor controlling flashover occurrence, as dry tephra has very low electrical 
conductivity (Wardman et al., 2012b). Insulator and system design also influence 
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flashover susceptibility. Wardman et al. (2012c) found that tephra accumulations on the 
underside of insulators are equally important as accumulations on the topside in 
assessing vulnerability. Electrical supply providers can minimise tephra induced 
flashover by increasing insulation, using anti-pollution designs and cleaning strategies 
(Wardman et al., 2012c). 
 
Figure 2.3: Schematic of (A) an electrical supply network showing generation at different 
power stations and then transmission and distribution to consumers (modified from 
Wardman et al., 2012c) and (B) a water supply network from water source, water treatment 
through to distribution to consumers. Components vulnerable to volcanic hazards are 
indicated in italics. 
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Tolerance to flashover faults and continued operation of electrical networks has been 
documented in some cases (Figure 2.4), although Wardman et al. (2012c) suggests that 
may be under-reported as it is more common to document failures. Tolerance is 
observed over a wide range of tephra fall thicknesses ranging from 2 to 300 mm. 
Differences in tolerance values are due to different component designs, tephra 
properties and environmental conditions, as these parameters influence how tephra 
affects insulators. 
2.4.1.2 Damage to electrical lines 
Volcanic flows have snapped poles and damaged electrical lines, resulting in supply 
disruption, during volcanic eruptions of: Heimaey, Iceland in 1973 (lava flows: Morgan, 
2000); Mauna Loa, Hawaii in 1984 (lava flows: Associated Press, 1984; Hawaiian 
Volcano Observatory, 1998a); Nyiragongo, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
in 2002 (lava flows: Baxter and Ancia, 2002); Chaitén, Chile in 2008 (lahars: Wilson et 
al., 2009); and Merapi in 2006 (PDCs: Wilson et al., 2007). Figure 2.5 shows that these 
impacts tend to occur at low hazard intensities although the scarce evidence suggests 
any presence of volcanic flows is likely to cause disruption to electrical infrastructure. 
Tephra accumulations on lines may cause them to break as occurred in the 2008 
eruption of Chaitén, although here snow added to the load on the lines (T.M. Wilson et 
al., 2012). Flow deposits, especially solidified lava flows, will restrict access to buried 
services (e.g., underground cables) limiting future serviceability. 
2.4.1.3 Damage at generation sites 
Hydroelectric power (HEP) turbines at generation sites are particularly vulnerable to 
abrasion after tephra material (either from direct fall or PDCs and lahars) is deposited 
into storage reservoirs. Tephra suspended in reservoirs may pass through turbines 
causing abrasion to them and other auxiliary components over time (Figure 2.6A). 
Abrasion reduces the performance and life span of turbines leading to turbine 
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replacement (e.g., Meredith, 2007). For example, four turbines at the Agoyan HEP 
station, Ecuador have been replaced in the last 21 years as a result of abrasion damage 
from ongoing tephra fall from Volcán Tungurahua being deposited in the Pastaza 
catchment (Sword-Daniels et al., 2011). Tephra properties (e.g., particle hardness and 
morphology) and exposure time are the primary controls on abrasion occurrence with 
longer exposure times leading to increased abrasion severity. Although turbine design, 
materials, protective coatings and maintenance will also influence abrasion damage. 
Wind turbines and blades are also at risk of abrasion by tephra particles and may result 
in damage and reduced performance similar to that caused by sand particles (e.g., 
Khalfallah and Koliub, 2007; Dalili et al., 2009). 
The only known example of a geothermal power generation site being impacted by 
tephra fall is the Amatitlán plant located 3 km north of Volcán Pacaya, Guatemala. 
During the 2010 eruption of Pacaya, the plant received 200 mm of coarse tephra and 
bombs up to 250 mm in diameter. The upward facing uncovered steam condenser fans 
suffered abrasion damage and denting from falling blocks, rendering them non-
operational (Wardman et al., 2012a). Minor denting of intake and outlet pipe cladding 
also occurred. The plant was shut down for three weeks while cleaning was undertaken 
(Wardman et al., 2012a). 
Lahars have been documented impacting river water intake systems used for generation 
site cooling. After the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption, lahars filled the Columbia River 
with sediment, the same river where the now decommissioned Trojan Nuclear Power 
Plant had a water intake system. Fortunately the water intake was located in an area 
with less sedimentation and the plant was off-line at the time of the eruption for fuel 
replacement (Schuster, 1981). 
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Figure 2.4: Summary of documented tephra fall impacts and disruption to the electrical 
network as a function of tephra thickness for (A) generation, (B) substations and (C) 
transmission and distribution (modified from Wardman et al., 2012c). Note: only data 
where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted. 
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Figure 2.5: Summary of documented critical infrastructure impacts from (A) PDCs, (B) 
lava flows and (C) lahars as a function of hazard intensity. Note: only data where tephra 
thickness is known or derived are plotted. 
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New renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaic (PV) panels may be impacted 
by volcanic hazards as they are open to the atmosphere; however there is limited 
empirical observation of this occurring. One instance occurred during the 2011 eruption 
of Shinmoedake, Japan, when tephra accumulated (<2 mm) on PV panels at the 
University of Miyazaki, 50 km east of the vent. PV panel performance was reduced by 
~60% (Ota et al., 2012) but recovered after rainfall removed the tephra a few days later. 
2.4.1.4 Clean-up disruption 
Deposition of unconsolidated tephra deposits either from direct falls or flows (PDCs 
and lahars) at electrical supply sites may require removal to restore function. Tephra 
clean-up operations have been used by electrical supply operators worldwide to 
minimise ongoing flashover faults and prevent future tephra induced impacts (e.g., 
corrosion, abrasion) to their components and network (Figure 2.4). Documented 
thicknesses of when cleaning occurs is varied; ranging from 1 mm after eruptions at 
Tungurahua (1999–2010) to >100 mm after the eruption of Pacaya in 2010 (Figure 2.4). 
This range in thickness can be attributed to infrastructure design, tephra properties and 
the operational practices of the particular electrical supply providers. In some instances 
cleaning can be undertaken while components are energised, reducing the need to shut 
down and limiting disruption (Wardman et al., 2012c), however, controlled shutdowns 
may be necessary in order to protect equipment and personnel (Sword-Daniels et al., 
2011) (Figure 2.4). Controlled shutdowns will cause supply disruptions unless there are 
redundant networks capable of supplying electricity while cleaning is undertaken. 
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Figure 2.6: (A) Abrasion damage to a turbine removed from the Agoyan hydroelectric 
power station, Ecuador as a result of exposure to tephra laden water derived from the 1999–
2010 eruptions of Volcán Tungurahua (Photo: Johnny Wardman). (B) Houses covered with 
a thin layer of tephra after the eruption of Mt. Kelud on February 14, 2014 (Photo: Dwi 
Oblo). (C) personnel cleaning tephra from the Bariloche, Argentina water treatment plant 
after the June 4, 2011 eruption of PCCVC (Photo: Carol Stewart). (D) laboratory 
experiments to determine settling rate of tephra in water. Each beaker contains a different 
tephra and shows the turbidity after one hour of settling (Photo: J White). 
2.4.2 Water supply networks 
Water supply networks are comprised of water source, water treatment and storage sites 
as well as a vast distribution network of mostly underground pipes. There are numerous 
vulnerable components throughout the network that can be impacted by volcanic 
hazards (Figure 2.3B). The majority of documented impacts to water supply are due to 
tephra falls causing disruption and minor damage (Figure 2.7A). The less frequent 
volcanic flow impacts tend to cause physical damage (Figure 2.5). Stewart et al. 
(2009b) groups impacts to water networks into three categories: (1) direct physical 
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damage; (2) changes in water quality; and (3) water demand issues which are very much 
controlled by system design. We follow this structure here. 
 
Figure 2.7: (A) Summary of documented tephra fall impacts and disruption to (A) the 
water supply network and (B) the wastewater network as a function of tephra thickness. 
Note: only data where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted. 
2.4.2.1 Physical damage 
Physical damage to water supply networks tends to be caused by volcanic flows, heavy 
tephra falls and prolonged exposure to tephra. Volcanic flows have caused complete 
destruction of water supply infrastructure as a result of increased lateral loading 
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(Figure 2.5). Groundwater well heads, springs, reservoirs and pipes were damaged 
around Montserrat by PDCs (Howe, 2003) and lahars (CDERA, 2006) during the 1995 
eruption of Soufrière Hills volcano. Water pipes have been damaged and buried by 
lahars around Mayon volcano, Philippines (Nasol, 2001; Smithsonian Institution, 2002) 
and by lava flows in Goma, DRC after the 2002 eruption of Nyiragongo (Smithsonian 
Institution, 2001; Baxter and Ancia, 2002). These examples show that water supply 
infrastructure located above ground in or near flow paths (i.e., river valleys) are 
vulnerable to damage from volcanic flows at low hazard intensities (Figure 2.5). 
Direct tephra falls or exposure to tephra-water slurries (such as those in pipes) can cause 
minor physical damage in the form of abrasion of moving parts (e.g., pumps, motors) 
and corrosion of metals. Damage of this nature is documented after numerous eruptions 
(Stewart et al., 2006; T.M. Wilson et al., 2012) and is attributed to tephra thicknesses 
exceeding 30 mm (Figure 2.7A), however duration of exposure is the primary control 
on this type of damage, which is difficult to establish in these cases. Tephra-induced 
damage reduces pumping efficiency which leads to reduction in production and 
distribution capacity and increased maintenance and/or repair of pumps and pipes. 
2.4.2.2 Disruption to water treatment 
Disruption and increased maintenance from tephra falls is more common than physical 
damage (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Treatment disruption occurs when there is partial to 
complete blockage of water intakes, filters and pipes, as these have to be cleaned before 
normal operation can resume (Figure 2.6C). These impacts can occur at tephra 
thicknesses >1 mm (Figure 2.7A). This can be illustrated from a case study from the 
2011 eruption of Puyehue-Cordón Caulle volcanic complex (PCCVC), Chile. During 
this eruption the town of Bariloche, 100 km from the vent, received 30–45 mm of tephra 
and the town of Jacobacci, 240 km from the vent, received 50 mm of tephra (Wilson et 
al., 2013). The Bariloche plant was designed for low levels of suspended solids and raw 
water passed directly through the sand filters. During the eruption, tephra laden water 
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blocked filter pore spaces requiring additional daily cleaning to return filter 
functionality and water treatment capacity (Wilson et al., 2013). In contrast, in 
Jacobacci water supplies were resilient to disruption as all pump houses were enclosed 
and water is sourced from groundwater wells (Wilson et al., 2013). This example 
illustrates that system design will affect impact occurrence and severity (Stewart et al., 
2009b). 
2.4.2.3 Water quality impacts 
Raw and treated water within water supply networks can also be impacted by volcanic 
hazards and requires consideration in vulnerability assessments. We refer the reader to 
Stewart et al. (2006; 2009a, b) and T.M. Wilson et al. (2012) for in-depth reviews. 
Water quality impacts occur when tephra, from either tephra falls or PDCs, enters water 
source areas or treatment facilities (Figure 2.3B). Tephra will cause an increase in 
turbidity (cloudiness of water caused by suspended particles) at tephra thicknesses >2 
mm (Figure 2.6 and 2.7A) (Stewart et al., 2006). Chemical contamination of water 
occurs as soluble surface coatings on fresh tephra particles dissolve readily upon contact 
with water, releasing a range of ions (Witham et al., 2005; Delmelle et al., 2007). 
Increased ion concentration may breach drinking water standards, however this is 
usually only for short time periods (Stewart et al., 2009a). Chemical contamination of 
water supplies from tephra fall is difficult to predict prior to an eruption due to 
variability in soluble salt and water chemistry, however can occur at tephra thicknesses 
>1 mm (Figure 2.7). Turbidity and chemical contamination is commonly controlled 
though management practices (Stewart et al., 2009b), however if turbidity becomes too 
high to treat effectively, the treatment plant may have to shut down. This occurred at the 
Ship Creek treatment facility in Anchorage which received 3 mm of tephra was shut 
down for 30 hours as a precaution following the 1992 eruption of Mt. Spurr, Alaska 
(T.M. Wilson et al., 2012).  
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2.4.2.4 Water shortages 
After tephra falls, clean-up is commonly undertaken by washing away unconsolidated 
deposits placing large demands on water resources (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). In 1992 
Anchorage, Alaska was covered with 3 mm of tephra from the eruption of Mt Spurr. 
After residents began cleaning tephra deposits, there were severe water shortages and 
loss of pressure in some parts of the city (Stewart et al., 2009b). In contrast, successful 
management of water supply occurred in Esquel, Argentina during the eruption of 
Chaitén volcano in 2008. During residential clean-up supply exhaustion was avoided as 
authorities advised residents to use alternative ‘dry’ clean-up methods such as use of 
brooms and shovels (Stewart et al., 2009b). 
 
Figure 2.8: Schematic of (A) wastewater and stormwater collection and treatment network, 
(B) typical components used within communication networks and (C) air, rail, sea and road 
transportation networks and vehicles. Components vulnerable to volcanic hazards are 
indicated in italics. 
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2.4.3 Wastewater treatment networks 
Wastewater networks comprise an underground network of pipes and pumps and above 
ground treatment facilities (Figure 2.8A). Wastewater networks may be combined with 
stormwater systems or the two may be completely separate. Combined wastewater and 
stormwater systems are more vulnerable to impacts than separate systems because 
unconsolidated material can easily enter the network through stormwater drains 
(Barnard, 2009). 
2.4.3.1 Physical damage 
There is limited documented evidence of volcanic flows directly impacting wastewater 
treatment facilities, except for the case of Plymouth, Monserrat in which the entire town 
was destroyed by pyroclastic flows from Soufrière Hills volcano in 1997 (Rozdilsky, 
2001). Abrasion damage to pumps, pipes, sediment scrapers, filtration components and 
debris screens may occur as tephra laden slurries pass through these components 
(Blong, 1984; Johnston, 1997; Barnard, 2009) again occurring over extended periods of 
time. Eruptions from Mt. St. Helens (1980), El Reventador, Ecuador (2002) and Pacaya 
(2010) show abrasion damage occurring over a range of tephra thicknesses from 4–50 
mm (Figure 2.7B). 
2.4.3.2 Treatment disruption 
Wastewater treatment can be disrupted if tephra is deposited directly onto treatment 
facilities as the capacities of open ponds, reactors and clarifiers will be reduced 
(Figure 2.7B) (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). For example, disruption occurred during the 
2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano when a combined sludge and sedimentation tank in 
Guatemala City filled with 4–5 m of tephra and had to be cleaned before continued 
operation (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Tephra can form large hardened and unpumpable 
masses within the pipe network which require manual removal (T.M. Wilson et al., 
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2012). Figure 2.7B suggests pipe blockage occurs with tephra thicknesses >3 mm 
however accumulations larger than this may occur in pipes. Blockages are likely to 
occur at distinct points and not throughout the entire network. 
If treatment disruption and/or damage become excessive, wastewater might have to 
bypass the system and be discharged in to the environment as untreated waste. This 
decision was made at the Yakima waste treatment facility, USA after it received 10 mm 
of tephra from the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption (Blong, 1984). Tephra caused damage 
to most of the treatment facility including the biofilters and a decision was made four 
days after the eruption to bypass treatment and discharge waste, after chlorination, into 
the Yakima River (Blong, 1984). The decision was made because continued operation 
of the plant would have caused greater damage and more periods of discharge would 
have occurred in the future. 
2.4.4 Transportation networks 
Transportation networks can be vast and cover large expanses of the landscape, 
increasing their exposure to volcanic hazards similar to electrical networks (Figure 
2.8C). Volcanic hazards have been documented adversely affecting all transportation 
systems (e.g., road networks, vehicles, rail tracks, trains, ports, ships, airports; Figure 
2.5 and 2.9A). Additionally, a number of cascading impacts may occur, not discussed 
here, affecting other sectors which rely on transportation, as well as possible evacuation 
and emergency response during a volcanic crisis. 
2.4 Historically observed impacts to critical infrastructure 
Page | 64 
 
Figure 2.9: Summary of documented tephra fall impacts and disruption to (A) the 
transportation network and (B) critical components and communication equipment as a 
function of tephra thickness. Note: only data where tephra thickness is known or derived 
are plotted. 
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2.4.4.1 Road networks and vehicles 
Physical damage 
Volcanic flows can cause physical damage to road networks (Figure 2.5). Perhaps the 
best known example of this was after the 1980 eruption of Mt. St. Helens where lahars 
and PDCs caused extensive damage or destruction to 300 km of road and 48 bridges in 
the valleys draining the volcano (Blong, 1984). Bridges are particularly vulnerable as 
they generally cross flow paths and can be damaged by scouring around abutments and 
piers and lateral loading (Nairn, 2002). Roadways located on flow channel banks are 
vulnerable to undercutting by lahars. For example, three months after the 2010 eruption 
of Merapi volcano, Indonesia, a lahar eroded a 60 m section of a major highway causing 
its closure (Smithsonian Institution, 2011). 
Lava flows, regardless of depth, cause irreparable damage to roads around the world by 
simply crossing them (Figure 2.5B). Since the early 1900s, numerous roads in Hawaii 
have been covered by lava from eruptions of Mauna Loa and Kilauea (Blong, 1984; 
Hawaiian Volcano Observatory, 1998b, 2000). Thin (<1 m) flows buried a main road in 
Goma during the 1977 Nyiragongo eruption, DRC (Blong, 1984) and again during the 
2002 eruption (Baxter et al., 2003). Sections of roads along the western and southern 
flanks of Mt. Etna, Italy have been buried numerous times by lava flows (Smithsonian 
Institution, 1999; Andronico et al., 2005). These examples indicate that lava flows 
conform to a binary impact model based on the presence or absence of lava. 
PDCs can move, overturned, burn and/or impact vehicles located in flow paths. For 
example, vehicles within 15 km of Mt. St. Helens were totally destroyed by the 1980 
eruption (Blong, 1984). During the September 1991 Unzen, Japan eruption, a vehicle 
sustained extensive panel damage, was burnt and transported 120 m by PDCs (Fujii and 
Nakada, 1999). Lahars are also likely to completely damage vehicles as they are carried 
downstream whilst being impacted by debris (Blong, 1984); however reports are 
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limited. Tephra particles can damage vehicles by abrading moving parts and blocking 
air and oil filters (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Windshields and paintwork are highly 
susceptible to abrasion from tephra, which can be made worse by attempting to clean 
these surfaces. Despite possible damage, resilience has also been documented. For 
example, in Yakima, USA, after the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption, 30 police cars which 
were used during tephra falls suffered no long term damage, other than increased oil 
change frequency (Blong, 1984). 
Disruption 
Decreased road drivability in the form of traction loss, covered road markings and poor 
visibility (Figure 2.10) can result from tephra fall or remobilised unconsolidated tephra 
deposits (Nairn, 2002; Leonard et al., 2005; T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). These impacts 
start to occur at thin (~2–3 mm) tephra thicknesses (Figure 2.9A). Disruption may 
increase as authorities close roads, limit the number of circulating vehicles or lower the 
speed limit to decrease the likelihood of traffic accidents and limit tephra 
remobilisation. Clean-up operation following tephra fall will restore road drivability 
although it may be possible to drive on thick tephra deposits as they become compacted 
over time. 
 
Figure 2.10: A sequence of photos, from left to right, showing the remobilisation of tephra 
and decrease in visibility from a passing car as the car travels towards the observer (Photos: 
G Leonard). 
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2.4.4.2 Rail network and trains 
Physical damage 
Rail bridges are vulnerable to lahar damage as they are likely to cross lahar paths. In 
1953, a lahar travelled down the Whangaehu River on the slopes of Mt. Ruapehu, New 
Zealand and collapsed part of the Tangiwai rail bridge minutes before the a passenger 
train arrived (O’Shea, 1954; Scott, 2013). The train derailed and plunged into the river; 
151 people were killed. Valentine (1998) studied damage from nuclear weapon blasts 
and inferred PDC damage to trains and rail tracks will occur at dynamic pressures >10 
kPa. Lava flows have blocked, covered and damaged railway lines numerous times in 
the 1900s around Mt. Etna and Mt. Vesuvius, Italy rendering them unusable (Blong, 
1984). It is likely that railways lines covered by lava flows of any depth will result in 
complete localised damage. 
Disruption 
Disruption to the rail network is most likely from tephra fall. The best documented 
example of tephra fall impacting rail networks is the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption in 
Japan. Here 168 km of track and 48 stations were impacted by tephra, causing delays 
and cancellations (Smithsonian Institution, 2010; Magill et al., 2013). The main issues 
were the mechanical failure of track switches and loss of electrical contact between the 
track and train (Figure 2.9A), which in this rail network is how communications are sent 
to the train operator. Problems did not begin at a particular critical threshold, and 
therefore a zero tolerance policy was adopted with services cancelled until tephra was 
removed (Magill et al., 2013). Track ballast (crushed gravel used to support tracks) was 
infiltrated by tephra, reducing its cushioning properties and required frequent 
replacement. Tephra also infiltrated train carriages, requiring additional cleaning. 
Damage was minimised by suspending services in ashy conditions (Magill et al., 2013). 
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2.4.4.3 Ports and ships 
Lahars and PDCs can affect harbours or water bodies due to increased sedimentation. 
The most notable example occurred in the Columbia Shipping Canal, USA after the 
1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption. Lahar deposits filled it and reduced its capacity by 85%, 
rendering the canal effectively unusable (Blong, 1984), effecting the economy in the 
Pacific Northwest. Lava flows have also affected ports, the best known event is the 
1973 Eldfell eruption in Heimaey, Iceland. Lava threatened to block the harbour 
entrance, however, an extensive lava cooling operation successfully prevented this from 
occurring (Williams and Moore, 2008). 
Ships may sustain damage, such as abrasion of moving parts and clogging of air filters 
and water intakes during tephra falls (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Vesiculated tephra 
(pumice and scoria) can float on water creating a pumice raft, which may be ingested 
into ships water intakes (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012) and/or disrupt shipping routes. There 
are instances of resilience, for example, during the 2008 eruption of Okmok Volcano, 
Alaska several boats received minor tephra fall with no impacts other than damage to 
one air filter (Neal et al., 2011). 
2.4.4.4 Airports 
Physical damage to airports 
Volcanic flows can completely destroy airports if they are located near river valleys or 
flood plains. During the 1997 eruption of Soufrière Hills volcano, Montserrat, the W. H. 
Bramble Airport was overrun and completely destroyed by PDCs (Guffanti et al., 2009) 
(Figure 2.11). Likewise, after the 2008 eruption of Chaitén volcano, lahars completely 
buried the Chaitén airport runway and inundated many associated buildings; the airport 
subsequently closed (Pallister et al., 2010). A temporary airport runway was established 
on a widened road to restore flights to the area. The runway at Goma International 
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Airport, DRC was inundated by lava during the 2002 Nyiragongo eruption, reducing the 
runways length by 1 km, however it is still usable for smaller sized aircraft (Baxter and 
Ancia, 2002). 
Damage to aircraft in flight is well documented and includes: loss of engine thrust as a 
result of tephra ingestion and adherence to turbine blades; and abrasion of turbine 
blades, windshields, leading edges, protruding probes and sensors. We refer the reader 
to Casadevall (1994), the International Civil Aviation Organization (2007), Guffanti et 
al. (2010), Dunn (2012) and Drexler et al. (2011) for comprehensive reviews of tephra 
related damage to aircraft. 
Disruption to aviation 
Trace (~1 mm) quantities of tephra deposited on runways, taxiways and aprons can 
reduce visibility, cause loss of traction, interrupt ground services and damage parked 
aircraft (Guffanti et al., 2009) (Figure 2.9A). When these impacts occur, airports 
typically close due to flying safety regulations leading to widespread disruption. 
Because such thin tephra deposits can close airports, airports located in distal areas may 
also be affected resulting in widespread airport closure and travel disruption. In 
addition, the presence of tephra in the atmosphere can force the closure of airspace or 
the re-routing of travel routes. For example, during the 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano, Iceland, European and North Atlantic airspace was closed for six days in April 
2010 to prevent potential aircraft damage and limit risk to life (Sammonds et al., 2010). 
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Figure 2.11: Burial and destruction of the runway and terminal building at the W. H. 
Bramble Airport, Montserrat by a PDC during the 1997 eruption of Soufrière Hills. The 
runway has since been completely buried and abandoned (Photos: Brian Digital). 
2.4.5 Communication networks 
Communication networks are typically expansive and comprise a wide range of 
components in a many different network configurations (Figure 2.8B). 
2.4.5.1 Physical damage to communication equipment 
Volcanic flows are likely to cause considerable damage to communication infrastructure 
(e.g., tower, poles, lines) if they are situated in flow paths or in areas close to the 
volcano, however evidence is scare. During the 1991 Unzen eruption, numerous utility 
poles were broken at their bases after being impacted by PDCs (Clarke and Voight, 
2000). 
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2.4.5.2 Disruption to communication equipment 
Theoretically tephra particles may cause communication signal attenuation and 
interference as it is known that dust storms cause this type of disruption (e.g., Saleh and 
Abuhdima, 2011). A review by Wilson et al. (2009) suggest tephra induced signal 
attenuation may preferentially affect low frequency (30–300 kHz) services. Signal 
interference has been reported during tephra falls from Pacaya volcano, Guatemala 
(Wardman et al., 2012a), Tungurahua volcano, Ecuador (Sword-Daniels et al., 2011), 
Mt. Hudson, Chile (Wilson et al., 2011) and Merapi volcano, Indonesia (Wilson et al., 
2007) (Figure 2.9B), however these occurrences are poorly documented. In contrast, 
cellular and ultra high frequency networks and telemetered sites operated without 
interruption in Futaleufú, Chile, which received >150 mm of tephra during the 2008 
Chaitén eruption (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). 
2.4.6 Critical components 
We define critical components as those that are integral to most critical infrastructure 
sectors such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems and electronic 
equipment. HVAC systems are used in most critical infrastructure sectors for internal 
environmental control, and to also keep equipment within normal operating 
temperatures (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). 
2.4.6.1 Physical damage to critical components 
The majority of HVAC and computing systems are physically small and therefore very 
likely to be completely destroyed and carried away by volcanic flows. In addition, the 
high temperatures of PDCs and lava flows will likely melt plastics and the wet nature of 
lahars will cause electrical short circuits. The only documented case that specifically 
mentions volcanic flow impacts to electronics is de Bélizal et al. (2013) who describe a 
lahar from Merapi volcano destroying a house in which all electronic equipment was 
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lost and/or destroyed. Tephra particles can cause abrasive damage to moving 
components such as cooling fans, potentially resulting in fan failure. Abrasion is more 
likely to occur with fine tephra particles that can penetrate fan bearings and will occur 
over a long period of time (Barnard, 2009; G. Wilson et al., 2012). 
2.4.6.2 Disruption to critical components 
Filters and fans are particularly vulnerable to blockage from tephra fall as these 
components are in direct contact with the atmosphere (G. Wilson et al., 2012) (Figure 
2.9B). These impacts may result in overheating and shutdown of HVAC and electronic 
equipment, causing disruption to services. During the 1992 Mt. Spurr, Alaska eruption, 
tephra fall (3 mm) blocked a number of HVAC system filters. Fortunately no electronic 
equipment overheated due to the cool ambient temperatures in Anchorage at the time 
(T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Computers may also suffer from jamming of mechanical 
components and keyboards and overheating under a thick covering of tephra (Gordon et 
al., 2005; G. Wilson et al., 2012). Generally disruption appears to be temporary as once 
tephra has been removed from the components, functionality is restored (G. Wilson et 
al., 2012). 
2.4.7 Buildings 
Buildings and other similar structures can be impacted by all volcanic hazards 
considered here. Buildings may experience no or light physical damage through to 
complete destruction. We review structural damage from increased lateral and static 
loads, fire, abrasion and corrosion. We refer the reader to Baxter et al. (2005) and 
Jenkins et al. (2014a) for a detailed review of building impacts for tephra fall and PDC 
hazards. 
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2.4.7.1 Physical damage from lateral loads 
Volcanic flows cause extensive damage to buildings located in and near flow paths 
(e.g., de Bélizal et al., 2013) (Figure 2.5). Historic eruptions at Vesuvius (79 CE) and 
Mt. Pelée, Martinique (1902) and recent eruptions at Mt. St. Helens (1980), Unzen 
volcano (1991) and Merapi volcano (1994, 2006, 2010) demonstrate that PDCs cause 
substantial damage to buildings and structures (Figure 2.5A). Lahars generated during 
and after the eruptions of Mt. Pinatubo (1991) and Chaitén (2008) flowed into 
populated areas, causing considerable destruction and burial of buildings (Janda et al., 
1996; Pierson et al., 2013) (Figure 2.12) and large economic losses (Mercado et al., 
1996). The principal damaging mechanism of these flows is increased lateral loads. If 
lateral loads are greater than the strength of a building’s walls and roof (depending on 
the flow height) structural damage will result and in the worst case the building will 
collapse. Windows and doors are the most vulnerable components in a building as they 
have low resistance to lateral loads and are easily damaged by entrained debris impacts 
(Baxter et al., 2005; Spence et al., 2007). Shielding of buildings by topography and 
other buildings can affect damage distribution (Zuccaro and Ianniello, 2004). 
Lava flows are less energetic than PDCs and lahars and cause damage to buildings due 
to their considerable mass and ‘bulldozing’ action (i.e., lava flows can push building 
over) (Figure 2.5B). Weaker buildings and those located in lava flow paths or on the 
flanks of the volcano are most vulnerable and sustain the highest degree of damage. 
Numerous volcanoes have produced lava flows that have caused damage to buildings, 
including Mt. Vesuvius, Mt. Etna, Nyiragongo volcano, Kilauea, Sakura-jima and 
Heimaey (Blong, 1984). Attempts have been made to lessen the impacts of lava flows 
through water cooling of flows (e.g., Heimaey, 1973: Williams, 1997) and by diverting 
flows with barriers (e.g., Mt. Etna, 2001: Barberi et al., 2003) with varying levels of 
success. 
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2.4.7.2 Physical damage from static loads 
Tephra falls can cause damage to buildings by increased static load as a result of tephra 
accumulation (Figure 2.13). High intensity tephra falls (>100 mm) can increase the 
static load on a building’s roof and if it exceeds the load carrying capacity, damage or 
collapse may occur (Spence et al., 1996) (Figure 2.13). Damage and indeed tolerance to 
damage is dependent on building typology and maintenance, tephra density, thickness 
and moisture content, as water will increase bulk density and therefore tephra load 
(Johnston, 1997). During the 1973 Heimaey eruption numerous houses with flat roofs 
suffered collapse following accumulation of ~1 m of dry tephra (Blong, 1984). In 
contrast, during the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, ~200 mm of wet tephra was sufficient 
to cause severe roof damage to ~50% of the building stock in the town of Castillejos, 
while the remaining 50% of buildings sustained no or minor damage (Spence et al., 
1996). Tephra removal may exacerbate roof damage due to increased static load from 
people on the roof (Jenkins et al., 2014a). Buildings in close proximity to the volcano 
are most vulnerable to structure damage as this is commonly where high intensity tephra 
accumulations occur. 
Non-structural components such as gutters and roof overhangs are vulnerable to 
increased static loads. Because these elements are not design to withstand large loads, 
they will sustain damage first during low intensity tephra fall. 
2.4.7.3 Other impact mechanisms 
Fire can also cause damage to buildings following PDCs, lava flows and hot tephra 
particles. PDCs comprise of hot gases and particles and if these infiltrate a building fires 
can be ignited. In addition, lava flows have temperatures above the ignition point of 
common construction materials and therefore can ignite fires causing damage to many 
buildings. In most cases if buildings are not destroyed by lava flow impact, they will be 
destroyed by fire (Blong, 1984). Flow deposits may also bury buildings causing further 
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damage and preventing access (Figure 2.12). Abrasion of exterior elements such as 
windows and cladding may occur as a result of tephra falls, PDCs or lahars however 
damage is likely to be aesthetic. In addition, prolonged tephra exposure, in the presence 
of water, may cause corrosion damage to metal roofs and gutters (Oze et al., 2013). 
 
Figure 2.12: Extensive damage to a school in Chaitén town, Chile from a lahar after the 
2008 eruption of Volcán Chaitén. Two exterior walls have been completely removed and 
the ground around the foundations has been scoured. (C) Burial of a building, up to window 
level, in Chaitén town from a lahar after the 2008 eruption of Volcán Chaitén. A power 
pole is also damaged. (D) A building in Chaitén town, inundated by a lahar after the 2008 
eruption of Volcán Chaitén (Photos: G Leonard). 
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Figure 2.13: Summary of documented tephra fall impacts to buildings as a function of 
tephra thickness. Note: only data where tephra thickness is known or derived are plotted. 
2.5 Characteristics of impacts to critical infrastructure 
Empirical data of impacts to critical infrastructure presented above (Section 2.4) 
suggests that primary impacts occur on a continuum from causing disruption to 
complete damage (Figure 2.14). The hazard intensity window over which disruption and 
damage occurs is dependent on hazard type and characteristics, infrastructure design 
and any preparedness and response actions (Figure 2.14). However, disruption resulting 
from tephra fall, PDC and lahar hazards tends to occur at low hazard intensities where 
there is insufficient intensity to cause damage. Physical damage results at higher hazard 
intensities. In contrast, lava flows rarely cause disruption to critical infrastructure 
systems and tend to cause damage at all intensities (Figure 2.5). Secondary disruption 
will also result from physical damage to infrastructure components. A semi-quantitative 
analysis of infrastructure impacts (Figure 2.15), which draws upon impact data from 
Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13 shows that tephra falls tend to cause disruption type 
impacts and less damage, while volcanic flows cause high levels of both damage and 
associated secondary disruption. The solid line in Figure 2.15 shows the 1:1 relationship 
between disruption and damage, with those infrastructure that plot above or below this 
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line showing their tendency to preferentially cause one impact type over the other. A 
limitation of Figure 2.15 is that it assumes generic infrastructure design. There are 
numerous different components, designs and network configurations for such 
infrastructure systems which may vary within and between cities, regions and countries. 
Each different infrastructure design can influence vulnerability as each design will be 
tolerant to different hazard intensities. 
In the following subsections we discuss the characterisation of impacts as causing 
disruption (Section 2.5.1) or damage (Section 2.5.2) based upon hazard types and 
intensities and infrastructure design. We explore how clean up, exclusion zones, 
infrastructure design and different hazard properties influence impact type and severity. 
We finish by developing impact scales, based on hazard intensity thresholds, to estimate 
vulnerability (Section 2.5.3.2). 
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Figure 2.14: (A) Conceptual model of the continuum of impacts to critical infrastructure observed as a function of hazard intensity. 
Boundaries between impact severities (tolerance, disruption and damage) will occur at different hazard intensities for different volcanic 
hazards and for different critical infrastructure components and system designs. Generalised examples of the range of each impact severity 
(tolerance, disruption and damage) as a function of hazard intensity for (B) tephra falls, (C – following page) lahars and PDCs, and (D – 
following page) lava flows assuming generic infrastructure design. 
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Figure 2.15: Relationship between critical infrastructure disruption and damage for 
investigated eruptions (1973–2011) as a result of tephra fall (blue), PDC (red), lava flow 
(orange) and lahar (purple). Black line shows an idealised 1:1 relationship between 
disruption and damage, where disruption are impacts that occur prior to the onset of 
physical damage and damage are impacts that occur as a result of direct physical damage 
(Section 2.4). 
2.5.1 Disruption impacts to critical infrastructure 
Disruption to critical infrastructure can occur as a result of direct interaction with 
volcanic hazards (Section 2.5.1.1), as a result of hazard clean-up operations (Section 
2.5.1.2) and from restricted access with the implementation of emergency management 
exclusion zones (Section 2.5.1.3). 
2.5.1.1 Critical infrastructure disruption from direct hazard impacts 
Examining observed impacts (Section 2.4) and hazard intensity relationships (Figures 
2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13) it is evident that most infrastructure sectors can be disrupted 
by direct impact of tephra fall, PDCs and lahars. As Figure 2.14 shows, disruption tends 
to occur at low hazard intensities. 
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During low intensity tephra falls, there appears to be insufficient accumulated tephra 
mass to induce any increased static loading damage on these infrastructure components 
and tephra will simply accumulate on exposed components (Figure 2.6B). Likewise, for 
low intensity regions of PDCs and lahars (i.e., flow peripheries) there is insufficient 
dynamic pressure to cause physical damage to critical infrastructure (Baxter et al., 2005) 
and deposition will occur. The deposition of unconsolidated tephra in or on components 
will cause disruption and reduce function by causing blockages (e.g., air and water 
filters) or limiting access and preventing use of certain infrastructure such as buildings 
and transportation networks. 
In addition, the presence of tephra particles in the atmosphere can cause significant and 
prolonged disruption for some infrastructure, particularly transportation networks as 
suspended tephra will reduce visibility and cause abrasion damage. For example, the 
2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull, Iceland and subsequent closure of European and 
North American airpace for six days to prevent aircraft damage (Sammonds et al., 
2010). 
Infrastructure component and system design will also influence disruption. Components 
with no or few moving parts are unlikely to be damaged at low hazard intensities as 
tephra particles will not be lodged between moving parts; a primary cause of abrasion 
damage. However, these components will become covered in tephra limiting access and 
causing disruption. Systems with electrical components (e.g., insulators and electronic 
devices) may sustain short circuit faults in the presence of wet tephra (Wardman et al., 
2012c), disrupting their operation. In addition, some infrastructure systems and 
components, such as road transportation and electrical insulators, are resilient to damage 
at all tephra hazard intensities and are likely to be disrupted at high hazard intensities 
(Figure 2.4 and 2.8A). 
Some disruption may only affect the infrastructure operators. For example, after the 
2011 PCCVC eruption, sand filters at the Bariloche water treatment plant required 
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increased maintenance time for cleaning however during this time there were no water 
outages and services continued as normal (Wilson et al., 2013). In these instances, 
increased maintenance requirements will incur additional costs and may prevent 
operators from undertaking other tasks. 
2.5.1.2 Critical infrastructure disruption during clean-up operations 
Tephra falls, PDCs and lahars produce unconsolidated deposits that require removal and 
clean up to avoid ongoing and prolonged disruption or to reinstate critical infrastructure 
services (T.M. Wilson et al., 2012). Proper clean-up will reduce tephra remobilisation, 
minimise the potential for future damage (e.g., abrasion and corrosion) and human 
health effects which can result from inhalation of tephra particles (Horwell and Baxter, 
2006). While it is possible for some infrastructure sectors to clean deposits from their 
equipment and sites without causing disruption (e.g., live cleaning of electrical 
networks), many sectors will have to partially or completely shut down (a controlled 
shut down) to undertake cleaning. Performing controlled shutdowns of all or parts of an 
infrastructure network will cause further disruption and prevent society from using these 
services. In many cases however, this is unavoidable as continued operation may result 
in physical damage of components leading to further disruption. Controlled shutdowns 
for cleaning purposes have been documented for electrical supplies to prevent continual 
flashover (Figure 2.4), water supplies to prevent water shortages and plant damage 
(Figure 2.7A) and at airport runways to prevent aircraft damage and tephra 
remobilisation (Figure 2.9A). Ultimately the decision to clean up unconsolidated 
deposits and/or initiate controlled shutdowns will be dependent on hazard intensity but 
also on the operational practices of the particular infrastructure operators. 
2.5.1.3 Critical infrastructure disruption in exclusion zones 
Disruption to critical infrastructure can occur without the presence of any volcanic 
hazards through the implementation and enforcement of evacuation and exclusion zones 
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by emergency management authorities. Generally these zones will be developed for 
flow hazards, as these are more dangerous that tephra fall. Zones may be implemented 
prior to the onset of an eruption or during an eruption to prevent loss of life in 
dangerous areas. If infrastructure networks or sites are located within these zones, 
services are likely to be disrupted as personnel will not be able to access these areas. For 
example, during the eruption of Montserrat (1995–ongoing) and the subsequent 
destruction of Plymouth, the water utility had to move some of the springs and wells 
which were located inside the exclusion zone (Sword-Daniels et al., 2014). If 
infrastructure within an exclusion zone is damaged it is unlikely that personnel will be 
able to enter to perform repairs unless an agreement is made with emergency 
management officials. 
2.5.2 Physical damage to critical infrastructure 
All volcanic hazards considered here can cause physical damage to critical 
infrastructure sectors and components. Physical damage has been observed occurring at 
all intensity levels for PDCs, lahars and lava flows (Figure 2.5) and at high intensity 
tephra falls (Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13). 
Abrasion damage can occur to any exposed element as a result of contamination with 
tephra particles or from passing PDCs and lahars. Components with moving parts such 
as water and wastewater pumps, electrical switches, cooling fans are more vulnerable as 
tephra particles may become lodged between moving surfaces. Abrasion damage to 
pumps has been documented for water supply and wastewater networks at tephra 
thicknesses of >30 mm and >4 mm, respectively (Figure 2.7). While these reports 
document the tephra thickness at which damage occurred, hazard exposure time, which 
is a primary control for abrasion severity, is not documented. Likewise, corrosion of 
metal surfaces, particularly building roofs (Figure 2.13), also occurs over time. In 
addition, increasing tephra thickness will increase corrosion severity as more acidic 
tephra leachates will be delivered to the roof surface (Oze et al., 2013). 
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At higher tephra fall intensities structural damage can occur due to increased static 
loading. Most observed tephra-induced structural damage has occurred to buildings 
(residential and commercial) and their roofs (Figure 2.13), as research has tended to 
focus on occupant safety. However, tephra accumulations on other exposed 
infrastructure components (e.g., electrical substation gantries, water storage and 
treatment tanks) are likely to cause structural damage if the load exceeds the structure’s 
strength. Damage severity is influenced by tephra density and moisture content as these 
parameters increase so does the static load on the structure (Macedonio and Costa, 
2012; Jenkins et al., 2014a). Damage to non-structural elements is likely to occur first as 
they are inherently weaker than engineered structural components. 
PDCs, lahars and lava flows cause physical damage at all hazard intensities (Figure 
2.5). The primary damage mechanism is increased dynamic pressures which overcome 
structural design causing structures to fail. PDCs and lahars become rapidly less 
energetic with increasing distance from vent and flow axis (Spence et al., 2004b; 
Jenkins et al., 2013) and higher damage severity is expected in flow paths and river 
valleys and in proximal areas (Baxter et al., 2005). However, damage assessments of 
Baxter et al. (2005) and Jenkins et al. (2013) suggest that dynamic pressures can vary 
between ~1–5 kPa within tens of meters, resulting in non-uniform building damage. For 
most infrastructure sectors there is a lack of data (Figure 2.5) regarding gradations in 
damage severity and therefore as a first order approximation, we assume a binary 
impact model, where damage is predicated on the presence of a volcanic flow(s). 
However for building damage there is sufficient impact data (e.g., Spence et al., 2004a; 
Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) to assess gradational damage. 
Lava flows and sufficiently hot PDCs will cause fire damage to combustible structures 
and materials. Once a structure is ignited it will generally be completely destroyed by 
fire; for most structures, the benefit of extinguishing the fire is far outweighed by life 
safety concerns that would be encountered in an attempt. Buildings, structures and 
infrastructure (e.g., transportation routes) will become inundated and covered by 
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volcanic flows, resulting in disruption or permanent damage, especially for lava which 
will solidify once cooled. 
2.5.3 Estimating critical infrastructure vulnerability 
Estimating vulnerability of critical infrastructure to volcanic eruptions can be difficult 
due to the number of facets that influence vulnerability and resilience. By reviewing 
empirical data (Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13) relationships between disruption 
and/or damage and hazard intensity (Section 2.5.3.1) can be estimated and presented 
using impact scales (Section 2.5.3.2). When assessing vulnerability, consideration must 
also be given to the interactions between multiple volcanic hazards (Section 2.5.3.3). 
2.5.3.1 Hazard intensity metrics 
Volcanic hazards have a number of different hazard properties which can cause 
disruption and damage. This is in contrast to other natural hazards where there are 
generally few hazard properties which contribute to disruption and damage. For 
example, the principle damaging property of earthquakes is ground shaking, commonly 
assessed by peak ground acceleration, whereas PDCs can cause damage through lateral 
loading (dynamic pressure) and fire (temperature). We define these properties 
collectively as hazard intensity metrics (HIM). When assessing vulnerability a single 
HIM may not accurately capture all of the impactful attributes a hazard has to a 
particular infrastructure sector. To this end, Tables 2.8–2.11 present the relative 
relevance of different HIMs for each volcanic hazards and infrastructure sector and 
provide an indication on whether these are strong empirical relationships or theoretical. 
Selection of a HIM for vulnerability and risk assessment should consider: (1) the HIMs 
appropriateness to accurately describe a range of impact severity; (2) the ease of HIM 
measurement in the field or laboratory; and (3) the applicability of the HIM to hazard 
model outputs. The most appropriate and commonly used HIM candidates are thickness 
or mass loading (tephra fall), dynamic pressure (PDC), flow height (lava flow) and flow 
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velocity (lahar), however different HIMs can be used depending on the impact(s) and 
infrastructure sector(s) of interest. 
2.5.3.2 Disruption and damage states 
To classify and categorise impacts to critical infrastructure a common impact scale can 
be used (Blong, 2003b) which includes disruption and damage states. In volcanology, 
impact scales are available for building damage from tephra fall (e.g., Spence et al., 
1996; Blong, 2003a) and PDC impacts (e.g., Spence et al., 2004b; Baxter et al., 2005). 
Here we expand impact scale coverage to include critical infrastructure sectors 
examined in Section 2.4 for tephra fall, lava flow, PDC and lahar hazards (Tables 2.12–
2.15). We define four common impact states (IS): IS0, no damage; IS1, cleaning 
required; IS2, repair required; and IS3, replacement or financially expensive repair. Four 
levels were chosen because empirical impact data across a range of ISs was lacking for 
most infrastructure and therefore further subdivision was not justified. Separate 
descriptions for disruption and physical damage are provided to reflect impact 
dichotomy presented in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. For each impact scale (Tables 2.12–
2.15) the most diagnostic HIM, based on its relationship with empirically observed 
impacts, was used, these are: thickness (tephra fall); dynamic pressure (PDC); flow 
depth (lava flow); and flow velocity (lahar) (Tables 2.8–2.11). Intensity thresholds were 
derived by categorising empirical impact data in Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13 and 
Section 2.4 and by using expert judgement to indicate anticipated impacts where data 
was lacking, primarily at high hazard intensities. 
For tephra fall (Table 2.12), different intensity thresholds were derived for each critical 
infrastructure sector because each sector responds differently given a specific hazard 
intensity. For example, ~1 mm of tephra will close an airport while this tephra thickness 
will not cause any damage to a building. Differences in how infrastructures respond to 
tephra fall precluded the use of generic tephra fall thresholds which would be applicable 
to all infrastructure sectors. In contrast, for PDCs and lahars (Tables 2.13 and 2.15) we 
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consider impacts to be binary for all infrastructure sectors except buildings. While there 
may be gradational infrastructure impacts from PDCs and lahars at flow margins (see 
Section 2.5.2) we found insufficient empirical evidence to derive hazard thresholds for 
intermediary impact states. Intermediary impact states for building damage are included 
and are drawn from the existing scales of Baxter et al. (2005) and Spence et al. (2004b). 
For lava flow hazards we consider impacts to be binary for all infrastructure sectors 
(Table 2.14) based on the destructiveness of lava flows. 
Caution is urged when using our impact scales (Tables 2.12–2.15) as a number of 
assumptions have been made, such as: generic infrastructure design and typology, one 
discrete hazard occurrence and no mitigation actions taken by infrastructure operators. 
These scales should only be used either as guides or at regional scale vulnerability and 
risk assessment. Whenever possible, local vulnerability studies which account for each 
system’s vulnerability characteristics should be undertaken first. 
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Table 2.8: Relevant tephra fall hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector. Abbreviations are: E – strong empirical bases 
(numerous post-eruption and analytical data); e – weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T – strong theoretical bases (likely to be 





Tephra fall hazard intensity metrics 
Thickness Static load Particle density Surface 
chemistry 




Electrical supply         
Generation E   E e e E  
Transmission E e  E e E  t 
Water supply network         
Source E  T E e  T  
Treatment E T E E E  E  
Buried network t  t  t  E  
Wastewater network         
Treatment E T E e E  E  
Buried network t  T  t  E  
Transportation network         
Road E t  e e  e e 
Air E t  t e  E E 
Rail E t  t e  T e 
Sea e t E t e  e T 
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Buildings E E  e T e T  
Communication systems e T      e 
Critical components         
HVAC E   T E e e T 
Electronics E   e E E e T 
 
 
Table 2.9: Relevant lava flow hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector. Abbreviations are: E – strong empirical bases (numerous 
post-eruption and analytical data); e – weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T – strong theoretical bases (likely to be relevant but no 
post-eruption data); and t – weak theoretical bases (may be relevant). Refer to Table 2.1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics. 
 
Critical infrastructure Lava flow hazard intensity metrics 
Presence of lava Depth of flow Dynamic pressure Velocity Temperature Cooling duration 
Electrical supply       
Generation T T T T   
Transmission e e T T   
Water supply network       
Source T t t t   
Treatment T t t t   
Buried network e E     
Wastewater network       
Treatment  T T T   
Buried network t      
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Transportation network       
Road E E    T 
Air E E    T 
Rail  E     
Sea E E     
Buildings E E E E E  
Communication systems T T T T   
Critical components       
HVAC T T t t   
Electronics T T  t   
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Table 2.10: Relevant PDC hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector. 
Abbreviations are: E – strong empirical bases (numerous post-eruption and analytical data); 
e – weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T – strong theoretical bases (likely to be 
relevant but no post-eruption data); and t – weak theoretical bases (may be relevant). Refer 
to Table 2.1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics. 
 
Critical infrastructure sector PDC hazard intensity metrics 
Dynamic pressure Velocity Temperature Thickness of deposit 
Electrical supply     
Generation T T  T 
Transmission E E t t 
Water supply network     
Source E E  T 
Treatment T T  t 
Buried network e  t  
Wastewater network     
Treatment T T  t 
Buried network     
Transportation network     
Road E  T e 
Air E  T t 
Rail T   t 
Sea t   t 
Buildings E E E e 
Communication systems E E  t 
Critical components     
HVAC T T  T 
Electronics t T T T 
 
Table 2.11: Relevant lahar hazard intensity metrics for each infrastructure sector. 
Abbreviations are: E – strong empirical bases (numerous post-eruption and analytical data); 
e – weak empirical bases (few post-eruption data); T – strong theoretical bases (likely to be 
relevant but no post-eruption data); and t – weak theoretical bases (may be relevant). Refer 
to Table 2.1 for definitions of hazard intensity metrics. 
 
Critical infrastructure sector Lahar hazard intensity metrics 
Dynamic pressure Velocity Thickness of deposit Depth of flow 
Electrical supply     
Generation T T T  
Transmission E E t e 
Water supply network     
Source T T T  
Treatment T T t t 
Buried network e e   
Wastewater network     
Treatment T T t t 
Buried network t t   
Transportation network     
Road E E E  
Air T T E  
Rail E E T  
Sea t t e  
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Buildings E  E E 
Communication systems T T t t 
Critical components     
HVAC T T T  
Electronics e e e  
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Table 2.12: Proposed impact states (IS) for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of tephra fall thickness (mm). Disruption 
and damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Italicised threshold values 
indicate where expert judgment was used to derive theoretical estimates of when disruption and damage would occur. Disruption and damage 
at higher intensities (IS3) include those at lower intensities (IS1). 
 
Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
 Description No damage Cleaning required Repair required Replacement or financially 
expensive repair 
Electrical supply Threshold 
(mm) 
<3 3–10 10–100 >100 
Damage No damage Possible abrasion to some 
moving parts, infiltration of 
tephra into substation 
gravel. 
Damage to exposed 
equipment especially those 
with moving parts, possible 
electrical line breakage. 
Structural damage to some 
equipment at generation and 
transmission/distribution sites, 
irreparable damage to moving 
parts (e.g., hydro power turbines). 
 
Disruption No disruption Temporary disruption to service caused by insulator 
flashover, cleaning and repair. 
Widespread disruption to electrical 






<1 1–20 20–100 >100 
Damage No damage Possible clogging of filters 
and some abrasion to 
moving components. 
Damage to pumping 
equipment, other moving 
parts and infilling of tanks. 
Collapse of reservoir roofs and 
infilling of open reservoirs and 
tanks. 
Disruption No disruption Normal operation with 
increased frequency of 
filter cleaning and 
increased turbidity. 
Contamination of water and 
increased treatment required. 
Possible water use 
restrictions. 
Severe contamination of water 
supply and exhaustion of supply 






<3 3–10 10–50 >50 
Damage No damage Possible minor abrasion to 
pumps, clogging of filters 
Large amounts of 
sedimentation in network 
Widespread sedimentation 
throughout entire network causing 
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Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
and possible interference 
with chemical treatment 
process. 
some causing blockages, 
some damage to treatment 
plant components and 
possible infilling of open 
tanks. 
some blockages, irreparable 
damage to pumps and extensive 
structural damage to treatment 
plant components. 
 
Disruption No disruption Reduced capacity, 
operation with increased 
cleaning of filters. 
Temporary disruption to 
service to unblock network 
and clean tanks possibly 
resulting in discharge of 
untreated sewage. 
Long term to possible permanent 
disruption to service. Unable to 




<1 1–30 30–150 >150 
Damage No damage Possible abrasion of 
runway and apron markings 
and possible abrasion of 
paved surfaces. 
Moderate abrasion of paved 
surfaces and landing lights. 
Complete burial. 
Disruption Airport open Airport closure, reduced visibility. Possible permanent closure. 
Road Threshold 
(mm) 
<2 2–50 50–150 >150 
Damage No damage Possible abrasion of road 
markings and possible 
abrasion of paved surfaces. 
Moderate abrasion of paved 
surfaces, weak bridges may 
experience structural damage. 
Complete burial, structural 
damage to some bridges. 
Disruption No disruption Reduced visibility, loss of 
traction, covering of 
markings and possible road 
closure. 
Roads impassable for 2WD 
vehicles. Dangerous driving 
conditions. 
Roads impassable if tephra is 
unconsolidated, compacted tephra 
may be driven on by 4WD 




<1 1–30 30–150 >150 
 No damage Possible abrasion and/or corrosion of railway tracks and 
signals, jamming of mechanical signals and contamination of 
Complete burial 
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Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
track ballast. 
 No disruption Reduced visibility, signals 
and communications 
disrupted. 





<1 1–30 30–150 >150 
 No damage Possible abrasion of paved 
surfaces. 
Moderate abrasion of paved 
surfaces, pumice rafts 
covering the water surface. 
Complete burial of paved surfaces. 
 No disruption Reduced visibility on land 
and sea. 
Ship movements obstructed 




<3 3–30 30–100 >100 
Damage No damage Possible abrasion and/or 
corrosion to windshields, 
paintwork, aircraft leading 
edges, moving parts and 
clogging of air filters. 
Extensive abrasion of moving 
parts and possible seizing of 
engines. 
Extensive damage that is 
uneconomical to repair. 
Disruption No disruption Infiltration of tephra into 
personal compartments. 
Frequent fluid and filter 
replacement and possible 







<5 5–30 30–100 >100 
Damage No damage No damage Blockage and shutdown of 
cooling systems and damage 
to exposed components (e.g., 
dishes, towers, lines). 
Structural damage to 
communication components (e.g., 
dishes, towers, lines). 
Disruption No disruption Overloading of Temporary disruption to Permanent disruption. 
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Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
communication network 
from high demand and 
possible signal attenuation 
and interference. 




<10 10–100 100–500 >500 
Damage No damage Light roof damage and 
gutter damage and possible 
abrasion to windows and 
cladding. 
Severe roof damage, damage 
to vertical structure, possible 
partial collapse. 
Complete roof collapse and severe 
damage to rest of building. 
Disruption Occupied Infiltration of tephra into 
building and able to be 
occupied. 
Large volumes of tephra 
inside building as well as 
parts of the structure, 
uninhabitable. 






<1 1–10 10–50 >50 
Damage No damage No damage Abrasion of moving parts and 
blockage of filters. 
Extensive damage to most 
components. 
Disruption No disruption Reduced function until 
cleaned. 
Reduced function and 
temporary shutdowns until 
cleaned. 
Uneconomic to repair, disruption 
to service until replaced. 
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Table 2.13: Proposed impact states (IS) for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of PDC dynamic pressure (kPa). 
Disruption and damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Impacts to most 
infrastructure are considered binary (See Section 4.2) thus there are no descriptions for IS1 or IS2 except for buildings where there is 
additional empirical data. Italicised threshold values indicate where expert judgment was used to derive theoretical estimates of when 
disruption and damage would occur. 
 
Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
 Description No damage Cleaning 
required 
Repair required Replacement or financially expensive repair 
Electrical supply Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Destruction of transmission and distribution lines, 
poles, towers and substations and damage to generation 
sites. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Water supply 
network 
Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment facilities and above-ground pipes 
and infilling of uncovered water sources. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Wastewater 
network 
Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment facilities and above-ground pipes, 
infilling of ponds and blockage of drains. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Transport Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete burial and heat damage of paved surfaces 
and railways. Destruction of some bridges. Infilling of 
harbours. 
Disruption No disruption – – Roads and rail impassable and widespread closures. 
 
2.5 Characteristics of impacts to critical infrastructure 
Page | 98 
Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
Vehicles Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Vehicles buried, extensively damaged by pressure and 
heat and swept away. 
Disruption No disruption – – Completely inoperable. 
Communications Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage  – – Destruction of ground level components (e.g., lines, 
cabinets, exchanges). 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption and signal interference caused by 
pyroclastic surges. 
Buildings Threshold (kPa) <1 1–10 10–25 >25 







walls and some 










Complete damage to building with few structural 
elements remaining. 
Disruption Occupied Infiltration of tephra, missiles and 
building material into building and fire 
damage making it uninhabitable. 
Beyond economic repair and uninhabitable. 
Critical 
components 
Threshold (kPa) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete destruction of exposed electronic equipment 
with most being swept away and/or buried and melting 
of plastic components. 
Disruption No disruption – – No functionality and uneconomic to repair. 
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Table 2.14: Proposed impact states (IS) for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of lava flow depth (m). Disruption and 
damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Impacts to all infrastructure are 
considered binary (See Section 4.2) thus there are no descriptions for IS1 or IS2. 
 
Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 




Replacement or financially expensive repair 
Electrical supply Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Destruction of transmission and distribution lines, poles, towers 
and damage a burial of substations and generation sites. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Water supply 
network 
Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment facilities and above-ground pipes and 
infilling of uncovered water sources. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Wastewater 
network 
Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment facilities and above-ground pipes, infilling 
of ponds and burial of drains. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Transport Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete burial heat damage to paved surfaces and railways. 
Disruption No disruption – – Transportation routes impassable resulting in permanent 
closure. 
Vehicles Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Vehicles buried and burnt. 
Disruption No disruption – – Completely inoperable. 
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Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
Communications Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Destruction and burial of ground level components (e.g., lines, 
cabinets, exchanges). 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption. 
Buildings Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete fire damage to building and burial. 
Disruption Occupied – – Beyond economic repair and uninhabitable. 
Critical 
components 
Threshold (m) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete destruction and burial of exposed electronic 
equipment and melting of plastic components. 
Disruption No disruption – – No functionality and uneconomic to repair. 
 
  
Chapter Two – Volcanic hazard impacts to critical infrastructure 
Page | 101 
Table 2.15: Proposed impact states (IS) for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of lahar velocity (m/s). Disruption and 
damage descriptions and threshold values are subject to uncertainty and assume generic infrastructure design. Impacts to most infrastructure 
are considered binary (See Section 4.2) thus there are no descriptions for IS1 or IS2 except for buildings where there is additional empirical 
data. Italicised threshold values indicate where expert judgment was used to derive theoretical estimates of when disruption and damage 
would occur. 
 
Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
 Description No damage Cleaning 
required 
Repair required Replacement or financially expensive repair 
Electrical supply Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Destruction of transmission and distribution lines, poles, 
towers and substations and damage to generation sites 
(e.g., abrasion to hydro power turbines). 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Water supply 
network 
Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment facilities, above-ground pipes and 
water intake structures and infilling of uncovered water 
sources. 




Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Damage to treatment facilities and above-ground pipes, 
infilling of ponds and blockage of drains. 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption to service. 
Transport Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete burial and erosion damage to paved surfaces 
and railways. Destruction of some bridges and scour of 
embankments. Infilling of harbour. 
Disruption No disruption – – Transportation routes impassable resulting in permanent 
closure. 
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Sector Level IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 
Vehicles Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Vehicles buried, extensively damaged by pressure and 
swept away. 
Disruption No disruption – – Completely inoperable. 
Communications Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Destruction of ground level components (e.g., lines, 
cabinets, exchanges). 
Disruption No disruption – – Permanent disruption. 
Buildings Threshold (m/s) <1 1–3 3–5 >5 













Complete damage to building with few structural 
elements remaining and/or swept off foundations. 
Disruption Occupied Infiltration of debris and building 
material into building making it 
uninhabitable. 
Beyond economic repair and uninhabitable. 
Critical 
components 
Threshold (m/s) <0 – – >0 
Damage No damage – – Complete destruction of exposed electronic equipment 
with most being swept away and/or buried. 
Disruption No disruption – – No functionality and uneconomic to repair. 
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2.5.3.3 Interactions between volcanic hazards 
During a volcanic eruption multiple hazardous phenomena often occur simultaneously 
or in short succession. This is caused by changes in eruption style (from effusive to 
explosive or from explosive to effusive), during explosive eruptions or as a result of 
multiple vents erupting simultaneously. The interaction and impact of multiple volcanic 
hazards on critical infrastructure may lead to different vulnerability outcomes compared 
to single hazard impacts. However, multiple volcanic hazard impacts are rarely studied 
because of the increased complexity of hazard and infrastructure interactions.  
One study that addresses multi-volcanic hazard impacts is Zuccaro et al. (2008). They 
investigate impacts on residential buildings from tephra fall with simultaneous 
earthquakes or PDCs for a simulated Mt. Vesuvius eruption. For the combination of 
tephra fall and earthquake a decrease in the seismic response of the building was 
observed, i.e., the building is more susceptible to earthquake damage if tephra is 
deposited on the roof. For the scenario of tephra fall followed by a PDC, Zuccaro et al. 
(2008) found that the vertical load exerted on the roof from tephra fall provided a 
stabilising effect when the building was impacted by a PDC. While this approach 
estimated building vulnerability it could also be applied to critical infrastructure. Multi-
volcanic hazard research should be advanced to develop vulnerability assessments for 
volcanic eruptions and/or scenarios rather than just specific individual volcanic hazards. 
2.6 Future direction 
2.6.1 Implications for volcanic risk assessment 
Over the past few decades there has been an emphasis on understanding, quantifying 
and modelling volcanic hazards. This has produced a number of high quality empirical, 
physical and probabilistic models which evaluate occurrence probabilities and spatial 
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extents of various volcanic hazards (e.g., Schilling, 1998; Bonadonna, 2006; 
Charbonnier and Gertisser, 2009; Wadge, 2009; Marzocchi et al., 2010; Jenkins et al., 
2012). These models have contributed to a detailed understanding of volcanic hazards 
and have greatly improved the contribution of volcanology science to disaster risk 
reduction and management. 
At present, volcanic vulnerability and comprehensive risk assessments are less 
advanced than hazard assessments (Section 2.3), however the contributions of Blong 
(1984), Spence et al. (1996), Blong (2003a), Baxter et al. (2005), Wardman et al. 
(2012c), T.M. Wilson et al. (2012) and Jenkins et al. (2014a) have progressively 
increased and broadened the knowledge of volcanic impact occurrence, damage 
mechanisms, mitigation strategies and emergency management response. While these 
studies go a long way towards improved vulnerability assessment, collectively they 
have not progressed to the point of developing robust quantitative vulnerability models 
to inform land-use planning and infrastructure design codes (perhaps with the exception 
of residential buildings). Additionally, lack of awareness of volcanic impacts in critical 
infrastructure mitigation strategies, such as citing, design and contingency planning 
rarely, if ever, consider volcanic hazards. Whilst land-use planning and engineering 
design might not be appropriate in all situations it is appropriate for sensitive and/or 
high value infrastructure, such as nuclear power stations. For example, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency initiative (IAEA, 2013) has considered volcanic hazards in site 
evaluation at nuclear power installations. The NZ VISG science/industry collaboration 
is also an example of critical infrastructure organisations supporting and using volcanic 
resiliency research to reduce risk (Wilson et al., 2014). And global awareness is 
increasing with the inclusion of volcanic hazards for the first time in the Global 
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 (Jenkins et al., 2014b). 
Engineering design, often implemented at little extra cost, and effective contingency 
planning is likely to offer substantial societal benefits through reduced infrastructure 
service downtime and restoration costs. A cost-benefit analysis would be the next step 
to investigate the value of such mitigation strategies.  
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2.6.2 Goals for the next 10 to 25 years 
Reducing the impacts of volcanic eruptions on society is the ultimate goal of volcanic 
risk management. Population growth, land-use pressure and society’s increasing 
expectation of infrastructure performance during and after disasters will make this a 
challenge for critical infrastructure operators. 
To progress towards increased critical infrastructure resilience, a crucial first step is for 
infrastructure operators to include volcanic hazards as a risk routinely managed. A value 
proposition is required where scientists and operators identify and establish the risk 
context and demonstrate the value of risk mitigation. The scientific community must 
support this collaboration through producing the best possible quality hazard, 
vulnerability and risk information to support risk mitigation and management. Broad 
and in-depth understanding of direct and indirect impacts from all credible volcanic 
hazards and hazard intensities is required. By first understanding the intensity at which 
impacts occur for different critical infrastructure components and the resulting impact 
severity enables decisions to be made about the most appropriate mitigation strategy for 
the particular situation; whether it be land-use planning, infrastructure design or 
contingency planning. To improve volcanic vulnerability assessments, the volcanology 
community in partnership with engineers, infrastructure operators, risk and continuity 
managers, and the communities which rely on critical services, need to identify safe and 
acceptable levels of critical infrastructure performance during volcanic crises by 
robustly analysing existing impact data and seeking additional quantitative empirical 
and theoretical data. Continued investment in research to identify and refine 
vulnerability (or conversely resilience) of critical infrastructure requires continued field 
observations, laboratory experiments and numerical modelling to inform mitigation 
strategies and resilience design. We acknowledge this can be resource intensive and in 
some cases impractical due to hazard and infrastructure complexity, but if the benefit of 
mitigation strategies is well defined and recognised then such investments become 
justified. Mitigation for volcanic hazards is also likely to reduce risk for other non-
volcanic hazards. 
2.6 Future direction 
Page | 106 
Future research priorities to reduce risk and increase resilience for critical infrastructure 
sectors we believe should be addressed within the next 10 to 25 years are: 
 Focus on quantitative vulnerability estimation for critical infrastructure 
impacted by volcanic hazards. This should include open source standardised 
methodologies and databases for collection of quantitative impact data from 
post-eruption field assessments, laboratory experiments and numerical 
modelling and the derivation of fragility and vulnerability functions. 
Developing such approaches for critical infrastructure will be challenging due 
to the wide variability in system and component design, operational 
requirements and the interdependency between different infrastructure sectors. 
However, a standardised approach allows repeatable quantitative vulnerability 
estimates to be made and facilitates direct comparisons with other critical 
infrastructure and natural hazards. 
 Laboratory analysis of infrastructure systems and components under 
controlled conditions to more robustly inform vulnerability estimates; 
particularly for high-value infrastructure components which society requires 
high levels of reliable performance. 
 Increasing the awareness of volcanic hazards, their impacts and the value of 
volcanic risk management for critical infrastructure operators. This may be 
achieved through partnerships between volcanic scientists, infrastructure 
operators and engineers to encourage the inclusion of volcanic hazards in 
infrastructure site evaluation/assessment criteria, design and contingency 
planning aimed at increasing resilience. 
 Demonstrate the value of volcanic risk management for critical infrastructure 
by the provision of useful and understandable vulnerability and mitigation 
information, backed by cost-benefit analysis, to critical infrastructure 
operators so informed decision making regarding infrastructure operation and 
resilience can take place. 
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2.7 Summary 
This paper reviews disruption and physical damage impacts to critical infrastructure 
sectors from tephra falls, pyroclastic density currents (PDC), lava flows and lahars. Data 
are primarily from post eruption impact assessments and are generally qualitative, 
although several quantitative assessments are available. Impacts to critical infrastructure 
can be classified on a continuum from disruption to complete destruction. Impact 
severity is primarily controlled by the type of hazard, its intensity and the specific type 
of infrastructure and its design. In general, disruption occurs at low hazard intensities 
for tephra falls, PDCs and lahars, while physical damage occurs at higher intensities for 
all hazards. Lava flows are the exception and tend to cause physical damage at all 
intensities. 
Quantitative volcanic hazard assessment is at an advanced state, however, quantitative 
vulnerability assessments are lacking. The lack of these assessments can be attributed 
to: (1) difficulties in determining which hazard characteristic is the primary cause of 
damage to infrastructure and its accurate measurement; (2) ongoing eruptions, clean-up 
and mitigative strategies can alter infrastructure impacts and are challenging to account 
for in assessments; and (3) lack of volcanic construction or design codes, or 
performance guidelines which could prompt and facilitate detailed vulnerability 
assessment. Despite this, several studies have assessed the vulnerability of buildings and 
critical infrastructure sectors impacted by tephra fall, PDCs and lahars. To facilitate 
continued development of vulnerability assessments in volcanology, impacts to critical 
infrastructure from volcanic hazards should be quantified in a more robust, systematic 
and standardised manner. We have highlighted a number of aspects to consider when 
estimating vulnerability and developing fragility and vulnerability functions, such as 
hazard intensity measures, hazard interactions, infrastructure interdependencies, 
limitations and uncertainties. 
We challenge the volcanology community to create a consistent methodology for the 
development and refinement of physical vulnerability assessment for all volcanic 
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hazards and critical infrastructure. The final goal is to provide robust quantified 
vulnerability estimates for volcanic risk managers, decision makers and policy experts 
in order to minimise disruption, reduce economic losses and loss of life during volcanic 
eruptions. 
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 – Infrastructure impact database and Chapter Three
data collection guidelines 
3.1 Abstract 
Post-eruption impact assessments documenting critical infrastructure impacts are a 
valuable data source for volcanic vulnerability and risk assessments. While impacts 
have been documented after historic eruptions, they have not been undertaken in a 
systematic fashion and resulting data is of variable quantity and quality. In this chapter, 
I describe the newly developed Critical Infrastructure Volcanic Impacts Database 
(CIVID), which stores and facilitates the acquisition of post-eruption impact data. The 
CIVID provides standardised templates for volcano, eruption, hazard, critical 
infrastructure characterisation and impacts data entry. Post-eruption impact guidelines 
are presented which follow the database structure and provide standard questions which 
researchers should aim to answer during volcanic impact assessments. A standardised 
approach for documenting eruption impacts allows comparison between different 
eruptions and facilitates the derivation of vulnerability and fragility functions from 
commonly formatted data. Chapter 4 will demonstrate how the CIVID can be used to 
derived fragility functions. The database is currently not publicly available and is used 
for internal research purposes, but it will be made public in due course. The database 
can be used by researchers to document impacts and in future versions a simplified data 
entry form will be developed so that infrastructure operators, emergency managers and 
the public can contribute to eruption impact documentation. 
3.2 Introduction 
After a volcanic eruption much can be learnt about hazard extent and intensity, societal 
and critical infrastructure impacts, response and recovery. Knowledge of impacts 
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(defined here as service disruption or physical damage) can help not only in the 
immediate aftermath with response planning and resource allocation but also over the 
longer term with future vulnerability assessments. Volcanic vulnerability assessments 
estimate the physical consequences of volcanic hazards on exposed assets such as 
critical infrastructure (e.g., electrical supply networks, waste supply and wastewater 
networks, transportation, communications and associated buildings) and are an essential 
part of volcanic risk management (see Figure 2.1). Post-eruption impact data are the 
primary data source used for current volcanic vulnerability assessments as they offer a 
wealth of information on impact occurrence, mechanisms and management practices. 
Using post-eruption impact data has the advantage of accounting for a wider range of 
hazards and exposed asset characteristics than experimental and analytical (numerical) 
approaches. However, post-eruption assessments are typically site, region, asset, and 
context specific and therefore knowledge gained may not be transferable to other 
regions. Nonetheless, by collating impact data from multiple eruptions, regions and 
assets these limitations may be overcome. 
Historically observed post-eruption impacts are documented by many authors (e.g., 
Blong, 1984; Spence et al., 1996; Blong, 2003; Baxter et al., 2005; Stewart et al., 2006; 
Wilson et al., 2012; Jenkins et al., 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014) and summarised in 
Chapter 2. While these studies identify a wide range of impacts to different critical 
infrastructure and buildings, the vulnerability data are of variable quality and format. In 
Chapter 2 I identified the need for a standardised approach for the collection and 
documentation of post-eruption impact data. A consistent approach will: (1) increase 
data quality and coverage; (2) provide a standard dataset for the derivation of 
vulnerability and fragility functions, a top priority for volcanic vulnerability assessment 
(see Chapter 4); (3) facilitate easy comparison between different eruptions and regions; 
and (4) ensure data is collected and documented in a systematic manner. In this chapter 
I present a standardised database to document post-eruption impact data and a set of 
guidelines for the collection of impact data. 
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This chapter describes: (1) the standardised design template of the Critical Infrastructure 
Volcanic Impacts Database (CIVID) (Section 3.3); (2) the intended use of the CIVID, 
development and related difficulties and limitations of its use (Section 3.4); and (3) 
guidelines and questions for researchers to use when conducting post-eruption impact 
assessments to obtain consistent data coverage based on the experience of New Zealand 
Volcanic Impact Study Group (NZ VISG) researchers (Section 3.5). Hazard intensity 
metric and impact state scale definitions are from Chapter 2, Tables 2.8–2.11 and 2.12–
2.15, respectively. Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13 in Chapter 2, which show 
infrastructure impacts as a function of hazard intensity, are derived from data in the 
CIVID. This chapter does not provide a protocol for conducting a full post-eruption 
impact assessment as there are other situational considerations which need to be 
arranged, such as human ethics approval, logistics, coordination, local connections, 
obtaining access, and health and safety regulations. These aspects are likely to vary 
considerably and establishing a universal protocol is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
3.3 Database design 
As previously established a standardised approach is required to document post-
eruption impact data; a relational database fulfils this requirement. I designed the 
CIVID to reflect its purpose to document a range of impacts to different critical 
infrastructure sectors from volcanic eruptions. As such, each infrastructure sector has 
two tables: one describing site characteristics (e.g., age of infrastructure) and the other 
cataloguing data regarding volcanic impacts at that site. These infrastructure tables are 
linked to tables storing data on eruptions and source volcanoes. In addition, there are a 
number of link and dictionary tables, which respectively maintain the relationships 
between the main tables and provide lookup functions for common descriptions, e.g., 
building typology. The CIVID structure is outlined in Figure 3.1 and a detailed structure 
for buildings is shown in Figure 3.2. The following section is split into sub-sections 
which describe the different tables and their relationships within the database. 
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Figure 3.1: Structure of the Critical Infrastructure Volcanic Impacts Database (CIVID). One-to-many relationships (solid lines) relate one 
record from a table to many records in another table. One-to-one relationships (dashed lines) relate one record from a table to one record in 
another table. Note; in the database the reference table relates to all other tables; however, to improve diagram readability these relationships 
are not shown here. 
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Figure 3.2: Detailed database structure for tables related to building characteristics (building_siteT) and impacts (building_impactsT). 
Dictionary tables (_dic) act as look-up tables for codes used in other tables. Link tables (_link) allow many-to-many relationships. The ‘1’ and 
‘∞’ symbols represent the ‘one’ and ‘many’ sides, respectively, of a one-to-many relationship. The reference table is not shown here to 
improve diagram readability, but is available for every datum. 
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3.3.1 Volcano and eruption properties 
The volcano table contains ~1,500 volcanoes from around the world derived from the 
Smithsonian Institution’s Global Volcano Program (GVP) database (Siebert et al., 
2010). The GVP database documents current and known past volcanic activity for all 
volcanoes active in the last 10,000 years. Two key fields included in this table are the 
GVP volcano name and volcano number. The volcano number is unique for each 
volcano and is used to prevent ambiguity regarding volcano name and location for 
volcanoes that are known by generic or many names (GVP, 2013). Other fields include 
latitude, longitude, region, sub-region, elevation, primary volcano type and last known 
eruption. The GVP database is used as it is the international authoritative source for 
volcanoes and global volcanic activity. In addition, further information about a volcano 
can be easily obtained from the GVP website (www.volcano.si.edu) using the volcano 
numbers. 
Presently, the eruption table contains 47 eruptions for which there are documented 
volcanic impacts to critical infrastructure. GVP eruption data is used and supplemented 
with other literature, typically from local reports, where appropriate and available. 
Many more eruptions are documented in the GVP database; however, the majority have 
not impacted infrastructure and/or have no documented impacts and therefore I have not 
included them in the CIVID. The eruption table is related to the volcano table via the 
volcano number in a one- (volcano table) to-many (eruption table) relationship. This 
relationship allows one volcano to have many eruption records but each eruption to only 
have one volcano record. Data fields in the table include: 
 Eruption identification number which uniquely identifies the specific eruption. 
 An eruption code comprised of the first three letters of the volcano’s name and 
the last two digits of the eruption year (e.g., PAC10 for Pacaya’s 2010 
eruption). This is not strictly unique but helps users quickly identify the 
erupting volcano and year. 
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 Eruption start and end date or an indication if the eruption is ongoing. 
 Eruption size as Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) and magnitude where 
available. 
 Average or typical eruption column height. 
 Environmental conditions at the time of eruption (e.g., rainfall, wind 
direction), which can influence impact occurrence and severity. 
 Indication of which volcanic hazards were produced during the eruption. 
 
For the purpose of the CIVID, the volcanic hazards included are: tephra falls; 
pyroclastic density currents (PDC); lava flows; lahars; ballistics and gas emissions. 
These are the most common volcanic hazards to occur and cause impacts; however, 
additional hazards (e.g., newly created edifice) can easily be included in future versions 
of the CIVID. Related to the eruption table are hazard properties tables which record 
properties of each hazard which occurred during an eruption. These tables include data 
about hazard extent, volume, duration, composition and particle size. There is also the 
ability to attach external files into the various tables which, for example, isopach maps, 
grainsize distributions and tephra leachate results. These hazard property tables are 
intended to provide an overview and context for the eruption rather than provide hazard 
property data for specific impacts (see Section 3.3.2). 
3.3.2 Critical infrastructure characteristics and impact data 
The critical infrastructure sectors currently included in the CIVID are: electrical supply 
networks, water supply and wastewater networks, transportation (road and air) and 
associated buildings. Future iterations will also include communication networks and 
critical components (heating, ventilation and air conditioning and small electrical 
equipment such as computers) which are common across multiple infrastructure sectors. 
Due to differences in operation and observed impacts, the electricity supply network is 
split into three sub-sectors: generation sites; substation sites; and transmission lines. In a 
similar manner, pipe networks used by the water supply and wastewater networks are 
3.3 Database design 
Page | 132 
considered separately (Figure 3.1) as impacts to pipes occur regardless of the 
infrastructure sector they belong to. 
Each infrastructure sector or sub-sector has two tables; one for general site 
characteristics and the other for volcanic-induced impacts. The main reason for this 
separation is because a single infrastructure sector could have multiple impacts during 
the same eruption, i.e., a one-to-many relationship. For each table there is a required 
field which indicates whether the data in the table relates to an individual site, an 
individual section (for pipes and transmission lines), multiple sites or the whole sector. 
This distinction is made because field data may be collected at these different spatial 
scales and provision needs to be made to include all data in the database. Also, in 
publications by the NZ VISG, who commonly undertake post-eruption impact 
assessments (T.M. Wilson et al., 2014), a section describing general infrastructure 
characteristics and impacts of a whole sector precedes a more detailed discussion about 
specific site impacts (e.g., Sword-Daniels et al., 2011; Wardman et al., 2012). 
The purpose of the infrastructure site characteristics table is to establish site location, 
the equipment present and normal operating capacity. Documenting these aspects 
provides a pre-eruption baseline operating level which can be compared to post-eruption 
levels to determine impact severity. In addition, reviewing infrastructure site 
characteristics can highlight certain aspects which may influence vulnerability during 
future eruptions. The infrastructure site characteristics tables include data fields for the 
following: 
 Unique infrastructure site identification number. 
 Infrastructure operating company and/or owner. 
 Location (e.g., latitude, longitude, nearby populated centres and distance from 
the volcanic vent). 
 Equipment characteristics (e.g., type of equipment, length, number, materials, 
equipment location and layout). 
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 Normal operation of equipment (e.g., people and areas serviced, throughput, 
production rate and normal water quality levels). 
 Preparation for volcanic hazards (e.g., contingency plans, mitigation actions 
and previous eruption experience). 
 
The infrastructure site characteristics tables are only related to the infrastructure impact 
tables and not directly to the eruption table (Figure 3.1). This allows infrastructure 
characteristics to be recorded without being directly related to an eruption, facilitating 
pre-eruption vulnerability assessment (see Section 3.4.3 for further discussion). 
Infrastructure impact tables record any and all volcanic-induced impacts to a specific 
infrastructure site. Impact tables are directly related to the eruption table in a many-to-
one relationship such that one eruption can cause many infrastructure impacts (Figure 
3.1). Each infrastructure impact table is also related to its corresponding site 
characteristics table such that an infrastructure site can have many impacts. In the 
impact tables, a distinction is made between service disruption and physical damage 
impacts to provide a simplified classification of the impacts sustained at a particular 
site. 
Two mandatory data fields in the impact tables are the impact state (IS) and hazard 
intensity metric (HIM) value. The ISs used in the database are from Tables 2.12–2.15 
which define four impact states: IS0 – no damage; IS1 – cleaning required; IS2 – repair 
required; and IS3 – replacement or financially expensive repair. Recording the IS 
provides a semi-quantitative assessment of impact intensity at a particular infrastructure 
site. The HIM value is a measure of hazard intensity which caused a specific impact. 
For each volcanic hazard many different HIMs can cause impact (see Tables 2.8–2.11) 
and provision is made in the HIM table to record common HIMs (e.g., tephra thickness, 
PDC dynamic pressure, lava flow depth, diameter of ballistics) of a particular volcanic 
hazard at an infrastructure site. If HIM values are not obtained during post-eruption 
impact assessments, they can be extracted from other data sources such as isopach maps 
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for tephra thickness. Both the HIM value and IS are used in the derivation of 
vulnerability and fragility functions (Chapter 4): one of the main purposes of the 
CIVID. 
For each infrastructure site, impacts can be recorded by selecting from a pre-populated 
list. The list is populated with commonly observed impacts from past eruptions (Table 
2.5); however, the user can also enter additional impacts if required. This data field is 
intended to provide quick identification and classification of sustained infrastructure 
impacts. This classification scheme and recorded HIM values were used to populate 
impact plots in Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13. More detailed impact descriptions can 
be added in the comments section or under specific data fields which are provided for 
common impacts. For example, for wastewater treatment plants there are specific 
abrasion, corrosion and filter blockage description data fields. The infrastructure impact 
tables include data fields for the following: 
 Unique infrastructure impact identification number. 
 Selection of observed or documented impacts at the site from a pre-populated 
list. 
 Identification of which hazard(s) caused the observed impacts. Currently this 
list is restricted to tephra falls, PDCs, lava flows, lahars, ballistics and gas 
emissions. 
 Recording the HIM value which caused the impacts (e.g., tephra thickness, 
PDC dynamic pressure, lava flow depth, diameter of ballistics). This data is 
recorded in a separate table (Figure 3.1) and is a mandatory data field. 
 Assigning an impact state to the infrastructure site to reflect overall impact 
intensity. This is a mandatory data field. 
 Infrastructure-specific data fields which allow more detailed descriptions (e.g., 
occurrence, severity, how specific impacts were rectified) of common impacts. 
 Warnings of eruption or hazard occurrence received by infrastructure 
operators, as these can influence response, impact occurrence and severity. 
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 Recording how impacts were managed, whether previous eruption experience 
aided in current volcanic risk management practices and any potential lessons 
operators learnt which could be applied in future eruptions. 
3.3.3 Data quality and literature references 
It is important to know the quality and source of each datum as this allows the user to 
make an assessment as to the applicability of the data to their needs. Data quality is 
based on the source of the data (i.e., who collected the data) with the assumption that 
scientists/researchers obtain higher quality data than infrastructure operators, media or 
the general public. Table 3.1 defines the data quality indicators used for each record in 
the CIVID. 
Table 3.1: Data quality indicator used in the CIVID based on data source. 
 
Quality indicator Data source description 
0 (lowest) Public eyewitnesses or media reports 
1 Infrastructure operators/managers 
2 Qualitative post-eruption impact assessments (scientists) 
3 (highest) Quantitative post-eruption impact assessments (scientists) 
 
Where possible, literature references are provided for each data field in the various 
tables and are stored in their own references table (Figure 3.1). This approach allows 
each table to have multiple references for different data fields. In addition, each data 
field can have multiple references which accounts for multiple authors documenting the 
same eruption, infrastructure site or impacts. As a minimum, each record in all tables 
has at least one literature reference which allows users to refer to the original data 
source for further information. 
3.4 Discussion 
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3.4 Discussion 
3.4.1 Intended use of the volcanic impacts database 
The CIVID provides extensive documentation of known impacts (i.e., disruption and 
damage) to critical infrastructure sectors from historic (since 1900 CE, the 79 CE 
Vesuvius eruption notwithstanding) volcanic eruptions and is the first of its kind. This 
database will be of interest to volcanic researchers who would normally undertake 
extensive literature reviews to obtain relevant infrastructure impact and vulnerability 
data. Database outputs will be of relevance to emergency management agencies and 
infrastructure operators who will be interested in knowing which infrastructure impacts 
might be likely to occur and how future volcanic eruptions can be managed. 
The database can be used as a research tool to analyse trends in infrastructure impact 
occurrence, correlate impacts to volcanic hazard intensity values, identify different 
impact mechanisms and provide data for the derivation of volcanic vulnerability and 
fragility functions (Chapter 4). In this regard, the CIVID provided data for Figures 2.4, 
2.5, 2.7, 2.9 and 2.13 which show common infrastructure impacts as a function of 
hazard intensity for historic volcanic eruptions. Using these data, impact state scales 
were derived for all infrastructure sectors for four volcanic hazards (Tables 2.12–2.15). 
Figure 3.3 shows the frequency of each IS recorded in the CIVID for water supply, 
wastewater, electrical supply and transportation networks. Data from the database was 
used to derive the volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions in Chapter 4 which are 
common quantitative approaches to assess vulnerability and one of the goals of volcanic 
vulnerability assessment. Using post-eruption impact data to derive these functions has 
the benefit that impacts that occurred in the past are likely to occur again and the 
research community can learn from these. As new data are incorporated into the 
database from future volcanic eruptions or from the re-assessment of past eruptions, 
volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions can be refined to better predict impacts to 
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infrastructure. Researchers can also use the CIVID to supplement vulnerability data 
derived from other methods such as laboratory experiments or numerical modelling. 
The database also facilitates the systematic collection of post-eruption impact data by 
providing a standardised format for data entry for each infrastructure sector and 
volcanic eruption (see Section 3.5 for further discussion). 
 
Figure 3.3: Frequency of different impact states (defined in Section 3.3.2) for four 
infrastructure sectors compiled from post-eruption impact assessments documented in the 
CIVID. The number of case studies used is: 16 (water supply); 6 (wastewater); 30 
(electricity); and 29 (transportation). 
3.4.2 Difficulties and limitations 
The difficulty in developing this database is obtaining and compiling relevant data. 
While many eruptions have occurred in the past which have undoubtedly impacted 
society and infrastructure, there is relatively little documentation of these impacts. In 
addition, volcanic eruptions which do impact critical infrastructure are infrequent events 
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In addition, some data may be missed during post-eruption impact assessments because 
some impacts occur over long time periods (e.g., metal corrosion and abrasion) and the 
assessment may have occurred prior to these impacts becoming evident. Multiple 
follow-up impact assessments could overcome this limitation. Tolerance to impacts is 
likely under-represented as damaged infrastructure is typically the focus of post-
eruption impact assessments. The standardised database and data collection guidelines 
will assist in fully documenting impacts and tolerance in future eruptions, increasing the 
quantity of impact data. 
Currently the CIVID documents observational data obtained from post-eruption impact 
assessments and does not provide for other data sources such as laboratory experiments, 
numerical modelling or expert elicitations. These data sets could be included in future 
versions of the CIVID to provide a complete critical infrastructure vulnerability 
database, although this would require modification of the existing database structure. 
3.4.3 Future developments 
Currently the CIVID is not publicly available and is for internal research only, however 
in the future it is anticipated it will be made public in a web portal that would allow 
researchers to search and extract infrastructure impact data. In addition, the long term 
plan is to allow researchers to easily add data to the database. This could be 
accomplished in a web portal or a phone application where researchers could follow 
impact data collection guidelines (Section 3.5 and Appendix B) and upload impact data 
directly into the CIVID after validity checking by the database manager. This approach 
would allow consistent data to be collected from different volcanic eruptions without 
relying on one research team (e.g., the NZ VISG) to conduct assessments. Another 
objective is to develop a modified version of the web portal which could be provided to 
infrastructure operators or the public in the impacted areas to allow them to document 
observations in a crowdsourcing type approach. 
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In the database, additional fields could be added within the critical infrastructure tables 
to allow researchers to assign vulnerability indicators/scores to different sites. This 
could then be used to assess the vulnerability of an infrastructure site prior to an 
eruption, allowing the development of site-specific mitigation strategies. The CIVID 
would then act as a repository for both pre-eruption vulnerability and post-eruption 
impact assessment data. 
Photographs, either taken by researchers or obtained from other sources, are a valuable 
resource to assist with impact verification and documentation when back from field, and 
thus should be collected. The use of aerial or small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
could also assist in volcanic impact documentation over large spatial areas or in areas 
with difficult access. Currently the CIVID does not have a facility to store photographs 
although this is envisaged in future versions. 
3.5 Post-eruption impact assessment guidelines 
3.5.1 Motivation 
Standardised impact data collection guidelines will enable the consistent and ongoing 
collection of volcanic impact data and subsequent comparison between volcanic 
eruptions. The benefit of standardised impact assessments is that the same data are 
collected for each infrastructure sector, providing consistency within and between 
eruptions. In addition, multiple researchers or research groups can conduct impact 
assessments using the same procedure, removing the reliance on a single research 
group, which could be beneficial during large scale or prolonged volcanic eruptions. 
Using standardised data collection also allows data to be easily stored in the CIVID. 
The post-eruption impact assessment guidelines presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3 and 
Appendix B are sets of questions and prompts which can be answered by the 
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investigating researcher or through interviews with local residents, infrastructure 
operators and emergency personnel. These guidelines are based on the experience of NZ 
VISG researchers who have systematically documented societal impacts, primarily from 
tephra fall, for 17 eruptions worldwide (T.M. Wilson et al., 2014). The guidelines 
follow the general structure of the CIVID such that there are requirements to obtain data 
regarding the: volcano; eruption; volcanic hazards; critical infrastructure characteristics; 
and critical infrastructure impacts. As an example these guidelines were used to conduct 
a post-eruption impact assessment for areas impacted by the 2014 Kelud eruption in 
Indonesia (Appendix C). 
3.5.1.1 Post-eruption impact assessment timing 
The timing of a post-eruption impact assessment can determine the quantity and 
coverage of data obtained. If an impact assessment is conducted soon after an eruption, 
researchers will be able to directly observe and document any impacts, collecting high 
quality data. However, immediately after an eruption, emergency response is likely 
occurring and infrastructure operators and emergency management personnel may be 
unavailable for interviews. In addition, some impacts, such as metal corrosion and 
abrasion, may only appear in the future, so the impact assessment will not include it and 
therefore will not document the full range of impacts. 
When an impact assessment is undertaken many months after an eruption, a more 
complete understanding of the impacts can be obtained, as the majority of the impacts 
will have occurred. However, at this time researchers may not be able to directly 
observe any impacts as they may already be repaired, and data will need to be obtained 
from interviews. 
The timing for conducting a post-eruption impact assessment will depend on many 
factors, for example eruption magnitude, logistics, research permits and funding. The 
NZ VISG has conducted impact assessments up to ~20 years after eruptions; however, 
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after recent eruptions assessments have been conducted after ~1–9 months (T.M. 
Wilson et al., 2014). 
3.5.1.2 Post-eruption impact assessment scope 
The number of sites visited and level of detail of a post-eruption impact assessment 
depends on a number of factors including hazard extent, personnel, time and funding. 
Jenkins et al. (2014) suggested different assessment methodologies (e.g., 
comprehensive, single-point sampling, multi-point sampling, special interest and 
transect) depending on available resources. With regard to critical infrastructure, the 
number of sites visited may be low because in a number of cities there are only a few of 
each infrastructure type. For example, in Auckland, New Zealand, which could be 
impacted by an eruption from the Auckland Volcanic Field, there are 19 water supply 
treatment facilities (Watercare, 2015) in comparison with ~470,000 households 
(Auckland Council, 2014). Resources permitting, as many sites as possible should be 
visited and at a minimum, location, type of equipment, impact intensity (impact state) 
and volcanic hazard intensity data should be recorded. 
3.5.2 Example case study: electricity supply network 
Post-eruption impact assessment guidelines for the electricity supply network are 
provided here as an example. The questions and data required are divided into: 
electricity site characteristics (Table 3.2); electricity site impacts (Table 3.3); and HIM 
value(s) (Table 3.4). Impact assessment guidelines for other infrastructure sectors are 
provided in Appendix B. 
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Table 3.2: General site characteristics for all electrical supply infrastructure and specific 
characteristics for generation sites, substations and the transmission network. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
General Site identification. 
 Name of the site. 
 Operating company. 
 Town or city site is located within. 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Number of customers served. 
 Is the site: one site, a small section or whole network? 
 Describe any volcanic hazard contingency or preparedness plans that were in place 
pre-eruption. 
 Describe any contingency plans that have been developed since the eruption. 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this 
time? 
 Have any volcanic-specific mitigation actions been implemented to reduce impacts? 
Age of each site. 
 If possible obtain a network or site layout map. 
Generation sites Type of generation used. 
 Installed capacity (MW). 
 Average annual generation (GWh). 
 Number of turbines, type (model) and material. 
 List equipment used at the site including control equipment. 
 Describe cooling system including number and type of fans. 
 Hydroelectric power (HEP) catchment area. 
 HEP storage volume. 
 Is there a system for high turbidity water to bypass HEP turbines? 
 Description of wind turbine and blade design. 
 Number, type and inclination angle of solar panels. 
 Was station operating at full capacity prior to eruption? 
Substation In which part of the network is the substation located (transmission, distribution, grid 
exit, grid input)? 
 Is the substation located inside or outside? 
 Number and voltage of input and output circuits. 
 List equipment used at the site including control equipment. 
 Number and type of transformers. 
 Number and type of circuit breakers. 
 Number and type of insulators. 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Is a gravel ground cover used, if so what is its normal resistivity? 
 What safety measures are taken to keep gravel ground cover at a specific resistivity? 
Transmission 
network 
Total line length, operating voltages and peak currents of grid and individual line 
segment assessment relates to. 
 What type of conductors are used and are they insulated? 
 What type of conductor support structures are used (including dimensions and 
materials) and number? 
 Are pole transformers used, if so what type of transformers? 
 What type of insulators are used (including dimensions and materials) and number of 
sheds and insulator strings? Record for both vertical and horizontal (strain) 
insulators. 
 Are insulators protected from animals or pollutants? 
 Does pollution (sea salt, industrial emissions) cause line outages and/or flashovers? 
 Are conductors and insulators regularly cleaned to remove contaminants? 
 
Table 3.3: Questions and data required for a post-eruption impact assessment for all 
electricity supply infrastructure and specific questions for generation sites, substations and 
the transmission network. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
General Electricity site identification. 
 Eruption identification. 
 Was a warning received before the eruption? Who provided the warning? How much 
warning time was given? 
 Describe any steps that were taken to prepare for the eruption. 
 Describe how any impacts were managed (shutdown, repair, additional maintenance, 
clean up). 
 Are there any lessons learnt or procedures that would help future eruption response? 
Generation 
sites 
Was the generation site tolerant to the eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List the impacts observed at the site. 
 Were any support buildings impacted? 
 What is the impact state (using Tables 2.12–2.15)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value (recorded in Table 3.4)? 
 Was electricity generation disrupted, what percentage was generation reduced by and 
how long was generation disrupted? 
 What caused the disruption (hazard itself, cleaning or repair)? 
 Did HEP turbines suffer from abrasion, if so how much tephra passed through them, 
when did abrasion occur, how severe was the abrasion, how was abrasion repaired? 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Did cooling systems suffer abrasion, if so when did abrasion occur, how severe was the 
abrasion, how was abrasion repaired? 
Substation Was the substation site tolerant to the eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List the impacts observed at the site. 
 Were any support buildings impacted? 
 What is the impact state (using Tables 2.12–2.15)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value (recorded in Table 3.4)? 
 Describe any impacts to transformers and methods to restore their function. 
 Was there any disruption to transmission, switching or control operations at the 
substation, if so how long did the disruption last? 
 Did the gravel ground cover have to be cleaned, if so, why was it cleaned (safety, low 
resistivity), how was it cleaned and how long did it take? 
Transmission 
network 
Was the distribution and transmission network tolerant to the eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List the impacts observed. 
 What is the impact state (using Tables 2.12–2.15)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value (recorded in Table 3.4)? 
 Did insulator flashovers occur, if so, how many insulators suffered flashover and what 
type of insulators were they? Was flashover one-off or continuous? 
 Was electricity transmission disrupted, if so, for how long? How were circuits 
reconnected (automatically or manually)? 
 Was there any tephra on the underside of insulators which suffered flashover? 
 Were flashovers influenced by weather/rain? 
 
Table 3.4: Hazard intensity metrics table. For each impacted infrastructure site at least one 
hazard intensity metric must be recorded for the hazard that caused impact(s). 
 
Hazard Hazard intensity metric (HIM) 
Tephra fall Thickness (mm) 
 Mass per unit area (kg/m
2
) 
 Static load (kPa) 
 Atmospheric concentration (mg/m
3
) 
 Mean grainsize (mm) 
 Qualitative description of grainsize 
 Moisture content (dry, moist, wet, saturated) 
PDC Dynamic pressure (kPa) 
 Temperature (°C) 
 Emplacement flow height (m) 
 Deposit height (m) 
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Hazard Hazard intensity metric (HIM) 
Lava flow Lava present (yes/no) 
 Depth of flow (m) 
 Dynamic pressure (kPa) 
 Temperature (°C) 
 Cooling time (hours) 
Lahar Dynamic pressure (kPa) 
 Emplacement flow height (m) 
 Deposit height (m) 
Ballistics Diameter (mm) 
 Particle density (kg/m
3
) 
 Impact energy (J) 
Gas emission Gas present (yes/no) 
 Species (CO2, SO2, H2S, HCl, HF) 
 Concentration (ppm) 
3.6 Summary 
The CIVID currently contains 47 historic volcanic eruptions which have impacted 
critical infrastructure sectors. Data are sourced from post-eruption impact assessments, 
the primary data source for volcanic vulnerability research, and stored in the database 
using standard templates. Standardising volcanic impact data allows easy comparison 
between different eruptions, quick identification of missing data and facilitates the 
derivation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions. The CIVID provides 
relational data tables for source volcanos, eruptions, hazard occurrence and intensity, 
infrastructure characteristics and impacts. Standardised post-eruption impact assessment 
guidelines and questions, based on the experience of NZ VISG researchers, specify the 
required data for each database table. 
This database is the first of its kind for volcanic hazard impacts to critical infrastructure 
and will provide a useful resource for volcanic vulnerability and risk researchers once 
made publicly available. The goal of the CIVID is to facilitate the ongoing 
documentation of infrastructure impacts in a consistent way and provide vulnerability 
3.7 References 
Page | 146 
data for the derivation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions. The CIVID can 
help researchers assess volcanic risk and develop appropriate risk reduction solutions; 
the goal of both the Global Volcano Model (GVM; www.globalvolcanomodel.org) and 
the United Nations Global Assessment of Risk 2015 (UNISDR, 2015). 
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 – Framework for developing volcanic Chapter Four
fragility and vulnerability functions 
4.1 Abstract 
Assessment of volcanic risk using sophisticated probabilistic models is increasingly 
desirable for risk management, particularly for loss forecasting, critical infrastructure 
management, land-use planning and evacuation planning. This has driven the 
development of sophisticated probabilistic hazard models over the past decades; 
however, volcanic vulnerability models of equivalent sophistication have lagged 
considerably behind. Therefore, there is an increasingly urgent requirement for 
development of quantitative vulnerability models, such as vulnerability and fragility 
functions which provide quantitative relationships between volcanic impact (damage 
and disruption) and hazard intensity. Few such functions are presently available, except 
for tephra fall impacts to buildings, which have been driven by life safety concerns. 
The aim of this chapter is to present a structured approach for the quantitative 
assessment of infrastructure vulnerability to volcanic hazards. The framework I present 
here focuses on the derivation of vulnerability and fragility functions for critical 
infrastructure impacted by volcanic hazards. The framework details impact data sources, 
different impact intensity scales, preparation and fitting of data, uncertainty analysis and 
documentation. The primary data sources are post-eruption impact assessments, 
supplemented by laboratory experiments and expert judgment, with the latter drawing 
upon a wealth of qualitative studies. A number of different data processing and function 
fitting techniques can be used to derive functions; however, due to the small datasets 
currently available, simplified approaches are discussed. The most important aspect of 
function derivation is the documentation of data processing, assumptions and 
limitations. Documentation provides transparency of the process used and allows others 
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to update functions more easily. Using a standardised approach, a volcanic risk scientist 
can step though the process and requirements to derive a fragility or vulnerability 
function, which can be easily compared to other functions and updated when new data 
become available. Using the methodologies in this chapter, I derive fragility and 
vulnerability functions for discrete tephra fall impacts to the electricity supply, water 
supply, wastewater and transport networks. Functions present the probability of an 
infrastructure site being equal to or exceeding one of four impact states as a function of 
tephra thickness. These functions represent the first attempt at quantifying the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure sectors to tephra fall using fragility and 
vulnerability functions. 
4.2 Introduction 
Volcanic eruptions are multi-hazard events which pose considerable threat to society, 
including critical infrastructure (Cottrell, 2014; G. Wilson et al., 2014). Critical 
infrastructure such as electrical supply networks, water and wastewater networks, 
transportation, communications and associated buildings, are man-made systems and 
processes which function together to deliver essential services to society (Rinaldi et al., 
2001). To reduce impacts and loss of critical infrastructure during volcanic eruptions, 
successful risk assessment and management is required. This requires the combination 
of hazard, exposure and vulnerability assessments (Figure 2.1). Sophisticated 
quantitative probabilistic volcanic risk models are increasingly desirable for volcanic 
risk management, particularly for loss forecasting, infrastructure management and land-
use planning. This has driven the development of sophisticated probabilistic hazard 
models (e.g., Schilling, 1998; Bonadonna, 2006; Costa et al., 2006; Del Negro et al., 
2008; Wadge, 2009). However, vulnerability models have lagged considerably and 
there is an increasingly urgent need for quantitative vulnerability assessment of volcanic 
hazard impacts. Quantitative vulnerability assessments are available for buildings (e.g., 
Spence et al., 2005; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Jenkins and Spence, 2009), which have been 
primarily driven by life safety concerns for the occupants. For critical infrastructure 
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there are a number of qualitative assessments (e.g., Patterson, 1987; Johnston and Nairn, 
1993; Daly and Wilkie, 1999; T.M. Wilson et al. 2012; Jenkins et al., 2014b; G. Wilson 
et al., 2014) however, quantitative vulnerability assessments are lacking and those 
available are derived using different methods. To address the need for comprehensive 
quantitative volcanic vulnerability assessments for all infrastructure sectors, a 
framework is required which guides volcanic risk scientists through the process of 
conducting quantitative volcanic vulnerability assessments. 
The focus of this chapter is the quantification of critical infrastructure vulnerability to 
volcanic hazards. The primary aim of vulnerability assessments is to derive a 
relationship between hazard intensity (e.g., tephra thickness, flow dynamic pressure) 
and damage, disruption or other impact metric to infrastructure components or sectors. 
There are a number of approaches, both qualitative and quantitative, to assess 
vulnerability of exposed elements to volcanic hazards, these are reviewed in Section 
4.3.1. A brief review of the currently published vulnerability and fragility functions for 
vulnerability assessment in volcanology is presented in Section 4.3.2, with additional 
material in Appendix A. Developing fragility and vulnerability functions for critical 
infrastructure sectors impacted by volcanic hazards requires a standard framework. The 
framework presented in Section 4.4 outlines a methodology for the derivation of 
vulnerability and fragility functions, focusing on input data (Section 4.4.1), impact and 
hazard intensity metrics (Sections 4.4.2–4.4.3), function fitting (Section 4.4.4), 
uncertainties analysis (Section 4.4.5) and documentation (Section 4.4.6). The 
framework is designed to be a living document that can and should be updated with new 
approaches for developing functions when they become available. A suite of fragility 
and vulnerability functions for four critical infrastructure sectors impacted by volcanic 
tephra fall is presented in Section 4.5. These functions are a first attempt at quantifying 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure sectors for tephra fall impacts and should be 
updated (e.g., calibration, adjust function fitting, improve uncertainty assessment) when 
new volcanic impact data becomes available. 
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4.3 Volcanic vulnerability assessment 
4.3.1 Volcanic vulnerability assessment approaches 
There are a number of qualitative and quantitative approaches that can be used to assess 
vulnerability of exposed elements to volcanic hazards (Table 4.1). Use of relatively 
simple qualitative descriptions of volcanic hazard impacts to different exposed elements 
has formed an important foundation of volcanic impact knowledge. This knowledge has 
been successfully used for volcanic risk management, such as informing of emergency 
management exercises, development of public and sector specific information resources 
and some risk assessments (T.M. Wilson et al., 2014). A formative review on the 
subject is presented by Blong (1984), who documented impacts to society, infrastructure 
and agriculture from historic eruptions. Since this review, various authors (e.g., Spence 
et al., 1996; Blong, 2003a; Baxter et al., 2005; Stewart et al., 2006; T.M. Wilson et al., 
2012; Jenkins et al., 2013; Jenkins et al., 2014a; G. Wilson et al., 2014) have updated 
the knowledge base with examples from recent eruptions. These works have contributed 
to a broader and deeper understanding of the impacts that are likely to occur to 
infrastructure sectors during an eruption. This information allows the identification of 
vulnerable infrastructure components and knowledge gaps where directed research 
could be undertaken to increase our understanding. This approach also allows simplified 
information about likely impacts to be presented to infrastructure operators (e.g., T.M. 
Wilson et al., 2014) such that they can develop their own risk mitigation strategies. 
Building upon qualitative descriptions of likely impacts, vulnerability indicators are 
used to represent an infrastructure property or system which influences vulnerability or 
resilience to natural hazard impacts. For example, a vulnerability indicator for water 
supply is the water source. If water is sourced from open water bodies the system is 
likely to have higher vulnerability to tephra fall as tephra can easily enter the water 
body compared to a groundwater source which is protected (C. Stewart, pers. comm., 
2015). These indicators can be expressed either with qualitative descriptors or numerical 
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values. Indicators allow relative comparison between different spatial areas that have 
been assessed with the same set of indicators (Birkmann, 2007). 
While qualitative descriptions of impacts provide useful information, a move towards 
quantification is required to facilitate more robust numerical calculations of risk, 
allowing comparisons between infrastructure sites and other natural hazard risks (T.M. 
Wilson et al., 2012; Jenkins et al., 2014b; G. Wilson et al., 2014; Brown et al., 2015). In 
the first instance this can be achieved by categorising or ordering volcanic vulnerability 
data based on impact intensity. Impact state (IS) scales and threshold levels are 
commonly used to categorise data (Blong, 2003b). These approaches (ISs and threshold 
levels) are very similar in that they both categorise vulnerability data into discrete states 
(Table 4.1), which can be used to compare volcanic impacts between different locations. 
These scales can also be used after an eruption to back-calculate hazard intensity given 
the observation of a particular IS (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013). For example, if a building 
is observed to be at a particular IS after an eruption, then a particular thickness of tephra 
is likely to have fallen at that site, depending on building typology and tephra density, to 
cause the observed damage. 
The most complex and advanced vulnerability approach is the use of fragility and 
vulnerability functions. Two types of vulnerability functions are defined here as those 
correlating hazard intensity to a component’s damage or function loss as: (1) an index 
or a percentage relative to total impact (e.g., 90% damaged); or (2) an economic cost 
which is either an absolute cost of repair and/or replacement or a ratio of cost of repair 
to cost to replace (i.e., damage ratio) (Tarbotton et al., 2015). A fragility function is 
defined as the probability that a particular impact state will be reached or exceeded for a 
given hazard intensity (Rossetto et al., 2013; Tarbotton et al., 2015). It follows that 
vulnerability functions describe mean impact levels of a component or infrastructure 
sector, while fragility functions describe a range of possible impact outcomes and their 
associated probability of occurrence (Tarbotton et al., 2015). Whether vulnerability or 
fragility functions are developed is dependent on the specifications of the vulnerability 
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assessment and available volcanic impact data. Functions are normally developed for 
use within risk assessments and for loss estimation. In this context the functions provide 
the vital calculation link between hazard intensity and damage (loss) upon which risk 
mitigation and management decisions are based. Functions can also be developed which 
consider mitigation actions, such as strengthening of components or clean-up, providing 
useful data for risk reduction cost-benefit analyses. 
4.3.2 Existing volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions 
In volcanology there are fewer existing vulnerability and fragility functions than other 
natural hazard fields (e.g., earthquake). There are a number of reasons for this: (1) 
volcanic hazards are not often considered in infrastructure hazard assessments; (2) 
volcanic hazards are rarely considered in catastrophe modelling; (3) there are no 
building or infrastructure design codes for volcanic impacts which would prompt the 
derivation of functions; and (4) volcanic eruptions are infrequent events on human and 
infrastructure timeframes (Douglas, 2007; G. Wilson et al., 2014). In addition, a range 
of intrinsic volcanic hazard properties can cause different impacts, leading to difficulties 
in deriving functions (see Section 4.4.3). Despite these challenges, several vulnerability 
and fragility functions have been developed for volcanic hazards (see Table 2.4) and are 
briefly reviewed below. See Appendix A for a detailed review. 
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Table 4.1: Description, advantages and disadvantages of different vulnerability assessment approaches for volcanic hazards in order of 
increasing complexity, data requirements and quantification. Selected examples are provided for each approach. 
 
Name Description Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Qualitative 
descriptions 
Qualitative description of probable 
impacts to infrastructure based upon 
the presence of a volcanic hazard. 
Can provide detailed 
explanation of likely 
impacts and vulnerabilities 
for each infrastructure 
sector, highlighting where 
mitigation strategies could 
be implemented. 
May not provide an indication 
of the differing levels of 
vulnerability at a particular 
site and difficult to compare 
to other sites. 
No spatial extent of 
vulnerability or impacts is 
required. 
T.M. Wilson et al. (2012) 
and G. Wilson et al. 
(2014) review and 
document impacts to 
critical infrastructure 
from historic eruptions. 
Vulnerability 
indicators 
Vulnerability indicators are an attribute 
or property of a system which 
influences vulnerability or resilience 
to volcanic hazards. The degree to 
which this attribute influences 
vulnerability can be expressed 
qualitatively (e.g., high, medium, 
low) or with numerical values that 
can be summed to provide an 
overall vulnerability value/score. 
Identifies which attributes or 
properties influence 
vulnerability and/or 
resilience, providing a basis 
for further research. 
Can quickly and easily provide 
relative spatial distribution 
of areas of different 
vulnerability. 
Assigning qualitative 
descriptions or numerical 
values to indicators can be 
subjective. 
Can be difficult to have 
common indicators and 
rankings for different 
spatial scales and different 
infrastructure designs. 
Galderisi et al. (2012) used 
infrastructure 
vulnerability indicators 
to assess vulnerability 
of volcanic hazards on 
Vulcano Island, Italy. 
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Name Description Advantages Disadvantages Example 
Impact states 
(IS) 
Impact state scales categorise 
infrastructure damage or disruption 
into a set number of defined states, 
typically ranging from no damage to 
complete destruction. Each state is 
typically assigned a numerical 
vulnerability value such as repair 
cost, damage ratio (repair cost 
relative to replacement cost) or 
percentage of damage. 
Allows simple classification of 
impact into a number of 
states. 
Provides distribution of impact 
states and comparison 
between impacted areas. 
Easy to characterise post-
eruption. 
Assignment of impact states to 
impacted areas is subjective 
and relies on expert 
judgment. 
Qualitative impact 
descriptions may not cover 
all aspects of impact or 
infrastructure design. 
Spence et al. (1996) 
developed a damage 
scale for the 
classification of tephra 
induced building 
damage following the 




Similar to damage states in that 
impacts are categorised into a set 
number of states; however, in 
addition to the vulnerability values, 
each impact state is also assigned 
hazard intensity threshold values 
(e.g., tephra thickness, dynamic 
pressure). 
Provides a relationship 
between impact state (i.e., 
damage and disruption) and 
hazard intensity. 
Providing a range of hazard 
intensity threshold values 
accounts for some 
uncertainty within 
vulnerability estimates. 
The selected hazard intensity 
metric may not be 
appropriate to estimate 
impacts for all 
infrastructure components. 
The wide range of 
infrastructure design and 
operation characteristics 
influences vulnerability. 
Spence et al. (2004), 
Jenkins et al. (2014b) 
and G. Wilson et al. 
(2014) have developed 
threshold level scales 
which indicate hazard 
intensity for each 
damage state for 





Quantitative functions (i.e., 
mathematical equations). 
Vulnerability functions express relative 
loss or economic cost to hazard 
intensity. 
Fragility functions express the 
Impact intensity relationship is 
continuous over a range of 
hazard intensities and is not 
bounded by thresholds. 
Ability to have multiple 
functions for different 
Requires large statistically 
valid datasets for robust 
correlations. 
The selected hazard intensity 
metric may not be 
appropriate to estimate 
Spence et al. (2005), 
Zuccaro et al. (2008) 
and Wardman (2013) 
have developed fragility 
functions for tephra fall 
impacts on buildings 
Chapter Four – Fragility function framework 
Page | 157 
Name Description Advantages Disadvantages Example 
probability of a level of impact 
being equaled or exceeded for a 
given hazard intensity. 
infrastructure components 
and typologies if data are 
available. 
Mathematical approach can 
account for some of the 
uncertainty associated with 
these assessments. 
Feed into quantitative risk 
assessments for impact and 
loss estimation. 
impact for all infrastructure 
components. 
Functions are only applicable 
to the infrastructure 
typology they were derived 
for and may not be widely 
used without modification. 
and electrical 
transmission systems. 
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The majority of the published functions have been derived for tephra fall (Spence et al., 
2005; Kaye, 2007; Jenkins and Spence, 2009; Maqsood et al., 2014), PDC (Spence et 
al., 2007; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Jenkins and Spence, 2009) and lahar (Zuccaro and De 
Gregorio, 2013) induced building damage. The development of these functions is 
primarily driven by life safety aspects for occupants during volcanic eruptions. These 
functions have been derived using data from numerical failure calculations, mechanical 
experiments, post-eruption impact assessments and expert judgment. The majority of 
the tephra fall fragility functions are derived specifically for Neapolitan (Italy) buildings 
because of the large population living close to or on the flanks of Mt. Vesuvius, one of 
the most dangerous volcanoes in the world (Baxter et al., 2008). For accurate 
vulnerability assessment these functions will have to be modified or new fragility 
functions will need to be developed for roof typologies in other parts of the world. 
Functions derived by Maqsood et al. (2014) are based on global building typologies and 
therefore have wider applicability. 
Few vulnerability or fragility functions exist for volcanic impacts to critical 
infrastructure. Published functions are available for tephra fall impacts to electrical 
transmission networks (Wardman, 2013), wastewater networks (Kaye, 2007), 
transportation networks (Kaye, 2007) and laptop computers (G. Wilson et al., 2012) 
(Table 2.4). Vulnerability estimates, based on volcanic hazard intensity thresholds, are 
also available for the majority of infrastructure sectors and volcanic hazards (Chapter 2; 
Spence et al., 2004; Jenkins et al., 2014b). Due to the lack of quantitative post-eruption 
impact data, these infrastructure functions have been derived through laboratory 
experiments and qualitative expert judgment. 
The review of critical infrastructure impacts from volcanic hazards (Chapter 2) and 
available volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions has several key findings: 
 A number of vulnerability and fragility functions are available for buildings 
and agriculture, although mostly for tephra fall impacts. 
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 There have been few, if any, attempts at developing volcanic vulnerability and 
fragility functions for critical infrastructure sectors. This is primarily due to 
difficulties assessing vulnerability across a wide range of infrastructure 
typologies, designs, operating practices and societal pressures. 
 The majority of available volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions are 
derived for specific infrastructure and building typologies. While this 
increases their applicability and accuracy for local risk assessments, these 
functions cannot be used in other areas. For regional or global volcanic risk 
and vulnerability assessments, derived functions will need to account for a 
range of infrastructure typologies or assume generic typologies. 
 There are limited quantitative empirical (post-eruption impact assessments and 
laboratory experiments), analytical or theoretical data which can inform the 
development of volcanic fragility or vulnerability functions for critical 
infrastructure sectors. 
 There are a large amount of qualitative vulnerability data available, primarily 
from post-eruption assessments, which can be used to inform quantitative 
volcanic vulnerability assessments. However, a methodology is required to 
bring both qualitative and quantitative data together to develop quantitative 
vulnerability estimates for critical infrastructure sectors. Hence the need for 
the volcanic vulnerability framework developed in Section 4.4, which provides 
a method to use all vulnerability data to derive vulnerability and fragility 
functions. 
4.4 Volcanic vulnerability and fragility framework 
To assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to volcanic hazards in a robust and 
systematic way, a framework is required which guides volcanic risk scientists to derive 
vulnerability estimates. This method focuses on fragility and vulnerability functions as 
quantitative approaches to assess vulnerability of critical infrastructure to volcanic 
hazards. The definitions for these functions are: 
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 Vulnerability functions – a component’s damage or function loss as a value 
relative to total impact or as an economic cost as a function of hazard 
intensity. 
 Fragility functions – the probability that a particular impact state will be 
equalled or exceeded as a function of hazard intensity. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows a framework for the derivation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility 
functions. This section is structured to follow that of the framework. The framework 
presented here is based upon similar frameworks used for earthquake (e.g., Rossetto et 
al., 2014a) and tsunami (e.g., Tarbotton et al., 2015) vulnerability assessments. 
 
Figure 4.1: Empirical framework for deriving vulnerability and fragility functions for 
critical infrastructure sectors impacted by volcanic hazards. 
Chapter Four – Fragility function framework 
Page | 161 
4.4.1 Impact data 
The data which are used to derive vulnerability and fragility functions is henceforth 
termed as impact data. Impact data relates infrastructure impact to hazard intensity and 
can be classified into four main groups: empirical; expert judgment; analytical; and 
hybrid (Schultz et al., 2010). Each of these data groups are summarised in Table 2.3 and 
discussed in more detail in this section. 
4.4.1.1 Empirical data 
Empirical data are observations of critical infrastructure impacts at different hazard 
intensities sourced from previous volcanic eruptions (post-eruption impact data) or from 
controlled laboratory experimentation. The main assumption of post-eruption impact 
data is that past impacts will likely occur again in the future (Rossetto et al., 2014a). 
Post-eruption impact data are highly specific to hazard conditions which caused the 
observed impacts and differences in hazard conditions will likely result in different 
impact outcomes. The typology of impacted assets will influence impact occurrence; 
therefore impact data might not be applicable to other infrastructure typologies. To 
minimise these variations, a large dataset, which takes into account a wide range of 
hazard conditions and asset typology, is required. Therefore, when obtaining or using 
post-eruption impact data, it is important to understand and document infrastructure 
typology and the volcanic hazard conditions which lead to the observed impacts. 
Multiple volcanic hazard occurrences, i.e., prolonged eruptions or tephra remobilisation, 
can influence impact occurrence, as impacts will be aggregated from multiple eruptions 
(Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003). Refer to Chapter 3 and Appendix B for standardised 
guidelines for obtaining and documenting post-eruption impact data. 
Laboratory experiments allow for the systematic calculation of volcanic vulnerability of 
a certain infrastructure component(s) at specific hazard intensities. Laboratory 
experiments can provide control for most variables, allowing the examination of 
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specific impact mechanisms. Figure 4.2 outlines a generic methodology to undertake 
experiments with critical infrastructure for tephra fall impacts. The methodology will 
differ for each experiment depending on purpose of the experiment and the 
infrastructure system being examined. Not every infrastructure component or sub-sector 
can be examined experimentally for three main reasons: (1) cost of experimental setup; 
(2) component(s) too large to fit in laboratory; and (3) removing an individual 
component from a system could change its performance and vulnerability 
characteristics. The selection of which component or sub-sector to experiment with is 
generally determined by previous knowledge of its vulnerability to volcanic hazards, 
while also accounting for the considerations above. Laboratory experiments should be 
repeated to account for experimental variability and allow for uncertainty 
characterisation. 
 
Figure 4.2: Flowchart outlining the general methodology for conducting laboratory 
experiments to determine infrastructure component vulnerability from tephra fall impacts. 
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4.4.1.2 Expert judgment data 
Expert judgment can be used to estimate vulnerability and fragility when other data 
(e.g., empirical, analytical) are unavailable (Rossetto et al., 2014a). Expert judgment can 
also be used to refine or update existing functions which may have been derived from 
other data sources. A benefit of using experts is that they are able to consider a range of 
volcanic hazard conditions and infrastructure elements when assessing vulnerability. 
The selection of experts is important, as not all experts are equally knowledgeable in 
volcanic hazards, infrastructure and their vulnerabilities or skilled at making scientific 
judgments (Aspinall and Cooke, 2013). It is also important that experts are familiar with 
the expert elicitation process and what the goals of specific elicitations are. As such, 
facilitators need to provide detailed information before any discussions, which outline 
the objectives, definitions, project context and how the process will be conducted. 
There are numerous expert elicitation methods (Aspinall and Cooke, 2013) including 
the Delphi process and Cooke’s Classical Model (Jaiswal et al., 2011), the two most 
common methods. In the Delphi process each expert provides an answer for the posed 
question in isolation. Then experts view each other’s answers anonymously and are 
allowed to revise their original answer. This process is repeated until a single acceptable 
(consensus) answer is obtained (Dalkey, 1969). For Cooke’s method, answers provided 
by experts are weighted by their performance based upon their answers of various seed 
questions (Jaiswal et al., 2011). Seed questions are questions in which the facilitator 
knows the exact numerical answers, but experts do not, but are able to provide credible 
answers. 
To use these methods to develop vulnerability and fragility functions, the facilitator 
elicits values of vulnerability and fragility for a particular asset at various defined 
hazard intensities. One approach is to have experts provide select values at 50% (mean) 
and one of more quantile values (e.g., 5th and 95% percentiles) (Jaiswal et al., 2011) 
rather than defining a complete distribution. Asking experts to provide estimates on 
quantile values captures their uncertainty about the vulnerability. Values provided by 
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the experts are then weighted by their performance score (in Cooke’s method) and a 
geometric mean is taken and a vulnerability or fragility function is derived. Expert 
values can also be given equal weightings, and compared to those with un-equal 
weightings. To derive vulnerability functions for tephra fall induced building damage, 
Maqsood et al. (2014) instructed experts to derive functions in isolation prior to 
discussing functions in a group environment. The individual expert functions were 
presented alongside weighted average functions. 
4.4.1.3 Analytical data 
Analytical approaches use numerical models to calculate vulnerability at different 
hazard intensities. This approach is predicated on the development of an appropriate and 
applicable model that accurately represents the infrastructure system and its 
vulnerability (Rossetto and Elnashai, 2003). Models and their results should be verified 
against post-eruption impact data and/or experimental results (Maqsood et al., 2014). 
This method has been used to determine vulnerability of buildings subject to tephra fall 
(e.g., Spence et al., 2005) and PDCs (e.g., Spence et al., 2004; Zuccaro et al., 2008). 
Analytical approaches have not been used to assess the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure to volcanic hazards. Using numerical models for critical infrastructure 
requires an advanced understanding (greater than currently available) of vulnerability to 
define appropriate models. 
4.4.1.4 Hybrid data 
Volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions can be derived by using a combination of 
empirical, expert judgment and analytical data to overcome their individual limitations. 
There are many ways to implement hybrid approaches, such as: 
 Develop functions with analytical data and validate with empirical data. 
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 Develop functions with expert elicitation methods using empirical data as a 
guide and for validation. 
 Derive different segments of the same function using different data sets to 
overcome limited vulnerability data (Schultz et al., 2010). 
4.4.1.5 Combining datasets 
Different datasets may need to be combined such that sufficient data are available to 
derive vulnerability and/or fragility functions. However, care must be taken when 
combining datasets, as there will be different biases, sources and magnitudes of 
uncertainty (Calvi et al., 2006) which can influence the quality of the resulting 
function(s). 
In the case of post-eruption impact assessment data, there may be many different 
datasets available for different eruptions and locations, all of which could have variable 
detail and quality. Prior to combining, Rossetto et al. (2014b) suggests impact data 
should be harmonised by: (1) assuring data type are the same form, e.g., if one dataset is 
at building-by-building scale and another contains grouped data (e.g., multiple buildings 
in one area), the more detailed data should be aggregated to the grouped scale; (2) 
assuring building and infrastructure typology is consistent among datasets, if not, the 
most general typologies should be used; and (3) assuring the impact scales are identical 
across datasets, if not, a conversion to the coarsest scale (i.e., the scale with the least 
levels) should be undertaken. Providing consistency among the different datasets allows 
easier derivation of vulnerability and fragility functions. Infrastructure impact scales for 
four volcanic hazards are developed in Chapter 2 and should be used as the common 
impact scales for future post-eruption impact assessments. In Chapter 3 and Appendix B 
standardised post-eruption impact assessment guidelines are presented for each 
infrastructure sector to provide consistency for impact data collection. 
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4.4.1.6 Data quality rating 
Each impact dataset will have differences in data quality dependent on how data were 
obtained. Here, a qualitative quality rating system is used to indicate the quality of data 
for different infrastructure components and sectors (Table 4.2). Where possible, high 
quality data should be preferentially used to derive volcanic vulnerability and fragility 
functions. These quality ratings also highlight which sectors need further research to 
categorise their volcanic vulnerability. 
Table 4.2: Data quality ratings and descriptions used to rate the quality of volcanic 
vulnerability data for each infrastructure sector and sub-sector. 
 
Quality rating Data quality description 
A (highest) Volcanic impacts documented post-eruption from multiple locations (large datasets) 
and statistically valid analytical modelling or experiments have been undertaken at 
multiple hazard intensities. 
B Volcanic impacts have been observed post-eruption with recorded hazard intensity and 
experimental studies or analytical calculations have been undertaken. 
C Volcanic impacts have been observed by scientists or infrastructure operators post-
eruption and hazard intensity level is recorded. 
D Volcanic impacts have been observed and reported post-eruption by eye-witnesses 
(public, media and infrastructure operators). 
E (lowest) Volcanic impacts are possible, but have not yet been observed or identified. 
4.4.2 Impact metrics (IM) 
An impact metric (IM) is used to assess volcanic impact intensity for a particular 
infrastructure component or sector. Impact metrics are commonly bounded between 0–1 
or 0–100 and are the dependent variable of vulnerability and fragility functions. For 
vulnerability functions, the IM can be a value or index which describes impact or 
economic loss. Any IM can be used for a vulnerability function with appropriate 
justification for its use. Common IMs for vulnerability functions are: 
 Damage percentage – percentage of damage sustained by an asset compared to 
pre-impact condition (e.g., 90% damaged). 
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 Loss of function – loss of function of an asset as a percentage compared to 
pre-impact condition (e.g., a water treatment plant is 80% functional). 
 Damage index – damage percentage normalised between 0–1. 
 Function loss index – loss of function percentage normalised between 0–1. 
 Damage ratio – a ratio between the cost of repair relative to cost of 
replacement. 
 Economic cost – absolute cost of impact(s) in dollar amounts. 
 Impact state (IS) – states of damage and disruption defined by qualitative 
impact descriptions (see Section 2.5.3.2 for impact state descriptions for 
volcanic hazards). 
 
The IM for fragility functions is the probability of an asset being equal to or exceeding a 
specified level of impact. Typically the level of impact is defined by ISs. The fragility 
function gives the probability of being equal to or exceeding ISi. Commonly fragility 
functions are derived for each IS (i.e., a set of fragility functions) or only for the highest 
IS. Given that ISs are sequential, such that ISi implies that ISi-1 has occurred, then the 
probability of being equal to a specific IS can be calculated by the difference between 
consecutive ISs. 
4.4.3 Hazard intensity metrics (HIM) 
A hazard intensity metric (HIM) describes the intensity of a volcanic hazard at a 
particular site and is the independent variable of vulnerability and fragility functions. 
Volcanic hazards have a number of different properties which can convey intensity. 
Different properties lead to different mechanisms of damage and disruption; not all 
HIMs adequately capture all of the impactful attributes of volcanic hazards (G. Wilson 
et al., 2014). Therefore, the selection of an appropriate HIM is important. As discussed 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5.3.1), the selection of a HIM must consider: (1) the HIM’s 
appropriateness to describe a range of infrastructure impact intensities; (2) the ease of 
HIM measurement in the field or laboratory; (3) the applicability of the HIM to hazard 
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model outputs; and (4) which HIM has been used in existing impact datasets. The most 
common HIMs are: thickness or mass loading (tephra fall, PDC deposits, lahar 
deposits), dynamic pressure (PDC, lahar), flow height (lava flow, lahar), presence or 
absence (lava flow, gas emissions), density per unit area (ballistics), impact energy 
(ballistics) and concentration (gas emissions, tephra fall) (Tables 2.7–2.10). 
4.4.4 Function derivation 
The derivation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions requires: (1) data 
preparation to convert raw infrastructure impact data into data which can be used for 
function derivation; (2) a method to fit functions to available data, whether this be 
expert judgement or complex statistical approaches; and (3) justification for function 
applicability (i.e., is the derived function for a whole infrastructure sector or a specific 
component). These three aspects are discussed in turn in this section. 
4.4.4.1 Data preparation 
To derive volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions, some data preparation is 
required. For vulnerability functions, each data point needs to have a HIM and an IM 
value. Different IM values are described in Section 4.4.2 and are typically either a 
percentage value or normalised index. For fragility functions, each data point needs two 
attributes; (1) a HIM value which describes the volcanic hazard intensity; and (2) an IS 
(from Tables 2.11-2.14) which describes the impact intensity. Data are ordered by 
increasing HIM value and grouped into HIM bins, such that each bin has approximately 
the same number of data (Porter et al., 2007; Tarbotton et al., 2015). The probability of 
being equal to or exceeding each IS can be calculated for each HIM bin by counting the 
number of data which are greater than or equal to the IS of interest (see Table 4.3 for an 
example). Discrete HIM values are obtained by taking the median of each HIM bin. 
This method is used to derive fragility functions for electricity supply, water supply, 
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wastewater and transportation networks primarily using post-eruption impact data and 
expert judgment (see Section 4.5). 
Table 4.3: Example calculation of the probability of being equal to or exceeding different 
impact states (IS) for a tephra thickness bin between 1–10 mm using hypothetic data. The 
first two columns show the hypothetical tephra thickness and corresponding impact state. 
The third column provides the calculation and probability that the impact state experienced 
(is) is greater than or equal to IS1, IS2 and IS3. 
 
Hypothetic tephra 




















7 IS2  
8 IS2  
9 IS3  
10 IS2  
4.4.4.2 Function fitting 
Discrete or continuous mathematical functions can be fit to prepared impact data to 
obtain volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions. Because there are no methods to 
systematically derive volcanic vulnerability or fragility functions, a review of different 
function fitting methods from other natural hazard fields is required. At the simplest 
level, a function can be binary, such that below some hazard intensity threshold impact 
does not occur and above the threshold, impact occurs. For example, if lava is present, 
an asset (e.g., a road) may be considered completely destroyed and if lava is absent, the 
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where 0 represents no damage and 1 represents complete destruction. 
Linear equations can also be used to define volcanic vulnerability and fragility 
functions. A linear function could be applied to the whole dataset or to individual 
segments. For the volcanic fragility functions derived in Section 4.5, I defined a 
fragility function for each IS with three linear equations. The start and end point of each 
line segment is defined by the available data points after the HIM binning process (see 
Section 4.4.4.1). I took this approach because the limited volcanic impact data only 
allowed three data points to be obtained from the binned HIM data, and using a 
complex mathematical equation to interpolate between data points is unjustified. The 









𝑘1 ≤ 𝐻𝐼𝑀 < 𝑘2




where m1, m2 and m3 are slope constants and c1, c2 and c3 are intercept constants for 
three linear equations. Constants k1, k2 and k3, where k1 ≠ k2 ≠ k3, are critical HIM values 
at which the different linear equations apply. Other mathematical equations, such as 
exponential and polynomial, can be used to define vulnerability and fragility functions; 
however, care must be taken with these, and with linear equations, as they are un-
bounded on the x-axis and y-axis and could result in negative values or probabilities >1. 
In other natural hazard fields, particularly earthquake and tsunami fields, the normal or 
lognormal cumulative distribution function (CDF) is commonly used to define fragility 
functions (Rossetto et al., 2013; Tarbotton et al., 2015). The form of the normal 
(Equation 4.3) and lognormal (Equation 4.4) CDF, respectively, are: 
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𝑦 = 𝛷 (




where Φ(·) is the standard normal CDF, μ/μ’ is the mean and σ/σ’ is the variance of the 
normal and lognormal CDFs, respectively. The lognormal CDF is used frequently for 
earthquake vulnerability assessments. Porter et al. (2007) and Rossetto et al. (2013) 
attribute its use to: (1) the function being constrained on the y-axis between 0–1 which 
is ideal for fitting probabilities bounded in this range; (2) the x-axis being constrained 
between 0–+∞ which prevents negative hazard intensities; and (3) is skewed to the left 
which better represents earthquake damage data clustered around low hazard intensities.  
These mathematical equations can be fit to vulnerability and fragility data using 
statistical data fitting techniques, such as least squares or maximum likelihood 
estimation (see Baker (2014), Rossetto et al. (2014b), Lallemant et al. (2015), Tarbotton 
et al. (2015) and references therein for discussion and review of statistical data fitting 
techniques). Expert judgment can also be used to fit functions to limited or incomplete 
datasets or when simplifying complex problems. For expert judgment to be successful 
and transparent, I devised the following rules and general considerations for fitting 
functions to volcanic impact data. These rules are not explicitly used in research fields 
where sufficient data are available to derive vulnerability estimates (e.g., earthquake 
vulnerability assessment); however, are vital for volcanology where there are limited 
data to base vulnerability estimates on. 
 Individual functions in a set are sequential, such that ISi must be reached 
before ISi+1. This allows the progressive accumulation of impact, for example, 
a building roof impacted by tephra fall must pass through light damage (IS1) 
before complete destruction (IS3). 
 Individual functions in a set can converge but not intersect. Intersecting 
functions violates the above rule of sequential functions. 
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 A probability of 0 means impact is physically impossible to occur and 
conversely a probability of 1 means impact is certain, based on probability 
theory. 
 No impact occurs when the HIM value is zero. This rule assumes normal 
infrastructure operation when volcanic hazards are absent. 
 Functions are non-decreasing, i.e., functions do not decrease as the HIM value 
increases. This rule assumes the impact intensity is constant or becomes more 
intense as volcanic hazard intensity increases. 
 Pre-condition (e.g., maintenance, age) of infrastructure sites can influence 
their vulnerability to volcanic hazards and functions should be modified for 
specific individual sites. 
 Factors such as equipment typology, level of preparedness, mitigation 
strategies can influence volcanic vulnerability and functions should be tailored 
to individual infrastructure sites on a case-by-case basis to address these site 
specific factors. 
 Different impact mechanisms can influence volcanic vulnerability and the 
interaction or dominance of different volcanic hazard impact mechanisms and 
should be considered. 
 
All infrastructure sectors considered in Section 4.5 have limited (typically <20 data 
points), and often incomplete, post-eruption impact datasets. This meant that after data 
were aggregated into HIM bins, not all ISs were represented and when linear functions 
were fit to the data, the functions violated the above data fitting rules. Therefore, the 
functions were modified by expert judgment using the above rules, so that the data 
fitting rules were not violated and functions better represented the fragility of the 
infrastructure sectors to volcanic hazards. Figure 4.3 illustrates how the set of fragility 
functions for tephra fall impacts on the electricity transmission network was modified 
by expert judgment to prevent violation of data fitting rules. 
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Figure 4.3: Steps to modify set of fragility functions for the electricity transmission 
network for tephra fall impacts. A histogram showing the number of available post-eruption 
impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin. B fragility functions derived for 
each impact state (IS) from 24 post-eruption impact data points. Arrows indicate which data 
points need to be modified to avoid violating data fitting rules. C resulting fragility 
functions after modification by experts to prevent violation of data fitting rules. 
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4.4.4.3 Function applicability 
Volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions can be derived for different hierarchical 
tiers of an infrastructure sector. Tiers are: the whole infrastructure sector (highest and 
most broad); sub-sectors; systems; and components (lowest and most narrow) (Figure 
4.4). For example, a volcanic fragility function could be derived for an entire water 
supply sector (including water source, treatment plants and the pipe network) and/or for 
a specific type of water pump inside a water treatment plant (component). Functions can 
also be derived for different elements within the same tier. Using the above example, a 
function could be derived for an entire water supply network or multiple functions could 
be derived for each individual sub-sector (Figure 4.5). The decision for which tier(s) a 
function is derived for depends on a number of factors (Table 4.4) and justification of 
any decision should be provided with each function. System diagrams of infrastructure 
networks can aid in this decision. 
 
Figure 4.4: Critical infrastructure tier scheme with a hypothetical example from the 
electricity supply network (right). Bold typeface indicates which aspect is being assessed at 
each tier (in this example only). 
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Figure 4.5: Simplified system diagram for a water supply network showing water storage, 
pipe network and treatment site sub-sectors. Volcanic fragility and vulnerability functions 
can be derived for any combination of sub-sectors. 
 
Table 4.4: Description of factors which influence which infrastructure sector tier a volcanic 
vulnerability or fragility function can be derived for. Tiers are: the whole infrastructure 
sector (highest and most broad); sub-sectors; systems; and components (lowest and most 
narrow) (see Figure 4.4). 
 
Factor Description 
Impact data source Available volcanic impact datasets might relate to only individual infrastructure 
tiers or be an amalgamation of all tiers. For instance, post-eruption impact 
data may have only been collected or aggregated at specific infrastructure 
sector tiers or experimental impact data may be available only for specific 
components. 
Impact data quantity The quantity of volcanic impact data available can dictate which tiers functions 
can be derived for. Small datasets may not be able to be split into lower tiers, 
as there are too few data at each tier for function derivation. Large datasets 
which cover a range of tiers could be separated, allowing function derivation 
for individual tiers. 
Expert judgment The level of vulnerability knowledge and understanding experts have about a 
particular infrastructure sector/tier can influence which functions are 
derived. In-depth knowledge of infrastructure vulnerabilities to volcanic 
hazards allows the derivation of component-level functions. 
Impact response Different infrastructure aspects within the same tier might have different impact 
mechanisms or vulnerabilities, which could be neglected if not separated into 
lower tiers. 
Function purpose The purpose and end use of a function can dictate which infrastructure sector 
tier a function is derived for. A regional volcanic risk and vulnerability 
assessment requires an infrastructure sector approach, whereas a volcanic 
vulnerability assessment of an individual site might require component-level 
functions. 
External factors Volcanic vulnerability assessments (which require fragility and/or vulnerability 
functions) might be required by legislation, dictating which functions need to 
be derived. 
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4.4.5 Uncertainty analysis 
When deriving volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions, there are a number of 
uncertainties which influence the quality of the resulting functions (Table 4.5). 
Aleatoric (statistical) uncertainty is introduced by the natural variation of volcanic 
eruptions, hazard occurrence, or the variation of infrastructure response to volcanic 
hazards. Different sources of epistemic (systematic) uncertainty are associated with 
HIMs and the volcanic impact dataset (Rossetto et al., 2014a). As discussed in Section 
4.4.3, not all HIMs can adequately describe all the impactful aspects of a particular 
hazard. Therefore, a compromise is made when selecting a HIM for vulnerability and 
fragility functions introducing uncertainty. This could be overcome by deriving multiple 
volcanic function sets for different HIMs or combining multiple HIMs. In addition, 
most volcanic HIMs cannot be measured in real time and rely on measurements taken 
after an event, eye witness reports, and inference from volcanic deposits or impacts. For 
example, it is difficult to measure dynamic pressures of PDCs due to their potential to 
cause injury and destroy measurement equipment; therefore, the dynamic pressure is 
typically estimated from deposits or resulting asset damage (e.g., Jenkins et al., 2013). 
This can lead to large uncertainties in the measurement of volcanic hazard intensity 
(e.g., Engwell et al., 2013). 
Large sources of uncertainty within volcanic impact data are from the classification of 
impacts into ISs and the sample size. Appropriate IS scales are required and need to be 
applied correctly to accurately assess infrastructure impacts from volcanic hazards. The 
use of different impact scales will result in the derivation of vulnerability and fragility 
functions which cannot be directly compared. The use of a standard volcanic impact 
scale, such as those presented in Tables 2.11–2.14, or the harmonisation of different 
volcanic impact scales to a standard scale is recommended (see Section 4.4.1.5). The 
number of observations in volcanic impact datasets can affect data interpretation and 
statistical analysis. Currently this is a large source of uncertainty for volcanic hazard 
vulnerability and fragility functions, with many datasets containing few data (~10s of 
data points). As a comparison, for earthquake fragility functions, Rossetto et al. (2014b) 
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consider ~30 buildings for each building class as a minimum for function derivation and 
they recommend >100 buildings to be used. 
Regardless of the source of uncertainty or its magnitude; identification, minimisation 
and quantification of all uncertainties should be performed. Rossetto et al. (2014a) 
considers this a fundamental step in the derivation of vulnerability and fragility 
functions for infrastructure assets. 
Table 4.5: Sources of uncertainty for volcanic fragility and vulnerability functions for 
critical infrastructure. 
 
Factor Source of uncertainty 
Hazard intensity metric 
(HIM) 
Lack of observed and/or measured HIM. 
Incorrect measurement of HIM. 
Selection of appropriate HIM. 
Impact data Variation in impact of assets of similar typology for a given HIM. 
 Uncertainty in the definition of ISs. 
 Incorrect classification of observed impacts into ISs. 
 Limited number of observations, spatial coverage and biased samples. 
 Sampling methodology. 
Asset data Differences in asset vulnerability for the same asset typology. 
 Incorrect identification of asset typology. 
 Limited number of observations for each asset typology. 
Function fitting Data manipulation. 
 Expert judgment biases. 
 Selection of statistical model to represent function. 
 
For the volcanic fragility functions derived in Section 4.5, uncertainty is accounted for 
at each HIM value by calculating the probability that an infrastructure site could be in 
one of four ISs. Variation in the HIM value is taken into account by binning these 
values and using the median bin value as discrete HIM values on each fragility plot. 
Other approaches, such as the use of confidence intervals (e.g., 5th and 95th 
percentiles), could be used to account for uncertainties, particularly with large data sets 
where these intervals can be statistically estimated. 
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4.4.6 Documentation 
Documentation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions is important for their 
reproducibility, reliability and implementation. For functions to be used in volcanic 
vulnerability and risk assessments, users must understand what the functions show, how 
they were derived, their limitations and applicability. Transparency and understanding 
can be achieved by documenting the aspects in Table 4.6 for each (or set of) 
vulnerability and fragility function(s) for volcanic hazards. Documentation also 
provides the basis for review and updating of functions when further volcanic impact 
data becomes available. 
Table 4.6: Aspects which must be documented for each (or set of) volcanic vulnerability 
and fragility function(s). 
 
Required documentation aspect Description 
Infrastructure sector and sub-sector 
applicability 
Which infrastructure sector and/or sub-sector have the functions 
been derived for and which sector they are applicable to. 
Specific asset typology Which specific asset typology (e.g., a specific type of water 
pump) have the functions been derived for or an indication if 
functions are for mixed typologies (e.g., all water pump 
designs). 
Data source(s) Source (bibliographic reference if available) of the volcanic 
impact data used to derive functions. If expert judgment was 
used, a description of how the judgment process was 
conducted is required. 
Data quality rating Overall quality of the impact dataset using the quality rating 
scheme in Table 4.2. 
Number of observations The total number of observations (data points) used to derive 
functions. 
Impact metric (IM) The impact metric used and justification for its use. 
Hazard intensity metric (HIM) The volcanic hazard intensity metric used and justification for its 
use. 
Impact scale (IS) The volcanic impact state scale used or if a new scale was 
developed, a description of each impact state and justification 
for its use. 
Function form, fitting and 
manipulation 
The mathematical form of the functions used (e.g., linear, 
lognormal CDF, binary), the fitting technique used (e.g., linear 
regression, least-squares, expert judgment) and any data 
manipulation performed. 
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Required documentation aspect Description 
Assumptions Discussion of any and all assumptions and decisions made during 
the process of data manipulation and function fitting. 
Uncertainties Discussion and identification of the uncertainties associated with 
the derived functions and how they are accounted for. 
Limitations Discussion of any and all limitations of the derived functions. In 
particular, limitations which indicate what the function should 
not be used for. 
4.5 Volcanic tephra fall fragility functions 
4.5.1 Overview 
In this section I present fragility functions for discrete tephra fall impacts to the 
electricity supply (Section 4.5.3), water supply (Section 4.5.4), wastewater (Section 
4.5.5) and transport networks (Section 4.5.6). Buildings are not included here as a 
number of studies (e.g., Spence et al., 2005; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Jenkins and Spence, 
2009; Maqsood et al., 2014) have already derived fragility functions for different 
building typologies and this is not the focus of my thesis. This section focuses on tephra 
fall as it is the most common and widespread volcanic hazard (T.M. Wilson et al., 
2012). In addition, there are more tephra fall impact data available with which to derive 
fragility functions. 
4.5.2 Methodology overview 
The functions presented here have been derived using the methodology described in 
Section 4.4, with a brief summary provided here. 
The HIM used for all functions in this section is tephra thickness. Thickness is used 
because the majority of post-eruption impact assessments record tephra thickness, as it 
is an easy quantity to measure in the field. Thickness is also a common output of tephra 
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hazard models, which allows direct relation between hazard and vulnerability for risk 
estimation. The IM used for fragility functions is the probability of being equal to or 
exceeding an IS (ISs are defined in Table 2.12). Impact states are used because most 
post-eruption impact data provide qualitative descriptions of impacts, rather than 
quantitative values of impact intensity. The qualitative descriptions of damage and 
function loss are used to assign an IS for each impacted site, providing a semi-
quantitative estimate of impact intensity. Based on tephra thickness, data are aggregated 
into at least three thickness bins and the probability of being equal to or exceeding each 
IS is calculated. Probabilities for each IS are plotted against median tephra thickness for 
each bin and segmented linear functions are fit to data for each IS using Equation (4.2). 
Each set of fragility functions comprises four individual functions; one for each of IS0–
IS3. Expert judgment is used to modify fragility functions if they violate the data fitting 
rules outlined Section 4.4.4.2. A segmented linear function is used; because after data 
aggregation, due to the limited available impact data, only three data points for each IS 
are obtained. Using a complex mathematical function to interpolate between so few data 
points is unjustified at this time. Each set of fragility functions is accompanied by a 
histogram plot which shows the available impact data, mapped to ISs, which are used to 
derive each function. 
For each set of fragility functions, the required documentation from Section 4.4.6 is 
included, in addition to commonly observed impacts (further details can be found in 
Chapter 2 and figures therein), vulnerable components and key knowledge gaps. These 
additional sections provide the context in which the functions are derived and identify 
areas for future research. 
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4.5.2.1 Caveats 
The following caveats apply to all fragility functions in this section: 
 Presented fragility functions are for discrete infrastructure sites and only 
consider generic infrastructure design and typology due to limited 
vulnerability data on specific typologies. Vulnerability will be different when 
considering different typologies and sites; therefore, functions should be 
tailored on a site-by-site basis. 
 Interdependencies between infrastructure sectors are not considered; each 
sector is assessed in isolation. Interdependencies between sectors are complex 
and will likely influence overall vulnerability. 
 Presented fragility functions only consider discrete tephra fall events and not 
prolonged or reoccurring tephra falls, nor clean-up and restoration of 
infrastructure sectors following tephra fall. 
4.5.3 Electricity supply network 
Electricity supply networks comprise electricity generation sites, substation sites and 
transmission networks. While these three sub-sectors are part of the same network they 
differ in the type of equipment used and resulting tephra impact mechanisms; therefore, 
are considered separately. Commonly observed tephra fall induced impacts are: 
insulator flashover; breakage of transmission lines; abrasion of turbines and cooling 
systems at generation sites; and disruption of service at substations. See Section 2.4.1 
for further discussion of impacts to electricity supply networks. 
4.5.3.1 Available tephra fall vulnerability data 
The majority of the vulnerability data for electrical networks impacted by tephra falls 
comes from post-eruption impact assessments. There are data for at least 10 eruptions 
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dating back to the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption; summarised in Section 2.4.1 and by 
Wardman et al. (2012b). The majority of these data report impacts to transmission and 
distribution networks, although there are some data for generation and substation sites. 
The data are primarily qualitative and document disruption and damage as a function of 
tephra fall intensity. Wardman (2013) conducted systematic laboratory experiments to 
determine the probability of insulator flashover as a function of tephra thickness and 
moisture content. Experiments to document flashover were conducted in a controlled 
environment using different insulator types common in New Zealand with both dry and 
wet tephra. Other experimental research on tephra induced insulator flashover was 
conducted by Nellis and Hendrix (1980) and Matsuoka et al. (1995). Laboratory 
experiments by Zorn (2014) were conducted to determine changes in solar panel 
performance as a function of increasing tephra thickness; however, this study is limited 
in its extent and is not used here. 
Quality rating of vulnerability data 
Table 4.7: Quality rating of available tephra fall impact data for each electricity sub-sector 
and asset. See Section 4.4.1.6 for quality rating scheme. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Quality rating 
Generation sites Hydroelectric power (HEP) C 
 Thermal power D 
 Geothermal power D 
Substations Whole site C 
 Insulators B 
 Transformers/switch gear C 
 Control systems C 
 Gravel ground cover C 
Transmission Insulators B 
 Conductors (lines) C 
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Vulnerable components matrix 
Table 4.8: Impact modes and factors which influence vulnerability to tephra fall for 
different electricity network assets. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Impact modes Factors which influence 
vulnerability 
General All assets Cascading failure of 
electrical transmission 
network due to impact at 
individual sites. 
Interdependency and 







Abrasion of turbines. 
Contamination and blockage 
of control systems. 
Sedimentation in storage 
reservoirs. 
Turbine design (shape, 
material). 
Reservoir catchment size and 
volume. 
Turbine bypass systems (is 
tephra contaminated water 
able to bypass turbines). 
 Thermal power Abrasion and blockage of air 
intakes and cooling 
systems. 
Contamination and blockage 
of control systems. 
Contamination of fuel 
supplies. 
Cooling system (condenser) 
design. 
 Geothermal power Abrasion and blockage of air 
intakes and cooling 
systems. 
Contamination and blockage 
of control systems. 
Cooling system design. 
Substations Whole site Contamination and abrasion 
of sensitive equipment and 
control systems. 
Contamination of gravel 
ground cover. 
Substation location and 
whether it is covered (i.e., 
inside a building) or not. 
 Insulators Insulator flashover. Operating voltage. 
Insulator orientation (vertical or 
horizontal). 




Abrasion and contamination 
of switching components. 
Transformer design. 
Design of moving parts. 
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Sub-sector Assets Impact modes Factors which influence 
vulnerability 
 Control systems Contamination of control 
systems. 
Design of control system. 
 Gravel ground cover Contamination and resistivity 
changes of gravel ground 
cover. 
Design resistivity level. 
Transmission Insulators Insulator flashover. Operating voltage. 
Insulator orientation (vertical or 
horizontal). 
Insulator design (material, 
profile). 
Whether lines are above or 
below ground. 
 Conductors (lines) Loading of lines. Operating voltage. 
Static load rating. 
Whether lines are above or 
below ground. 
Key knowledge gaps 
 Performance of HEP stations during and after tephra fall, in particular the rate 
at which turbine abrasion occurs and how the catchment area and reservoir 
volume influence tephra transport to the turbines. 
 Performance of open air and water cooling systems exposed to different doses 
of tephra at thermal and geothermal power stations. 
 Performance of air intake systems and filter setup for thermal power stations. 
 Influence of various substation equipment (transformers, circuit breakers, 
capacitors) for the overall vulnerability of substations during tephra fall. 
 Wind turbine blades abrasion occurrence and rate. 
 Performance and abrasion damage of solar panels. 
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4.5.3.2 Fragility functions 
Electricity generation 
Tephra can affect the generation of electricity through impacts to the cooling systems of 
thermal power stations and through abrasion of HEP turbines. These impacts can cause 
disruption to electricity generation. 
Due to the size and scale of equipment used at electricity generation sites, no 
experiments have been undertaken to systematically determine the vulnerability of these 
to tephra fall. In this case, the fragility functions presented here are based on post-
eruption impact assessment data. Twelve case studies documenting impacts to different 
generation types are available and Figure 4.6A shows that the majority are classified as 
IS1 with no documented cases of IS3. 
Impact mechanisms for the three generation types considered here are fundamentally 
different; however, there are insufficient data to derive appropriate fragility functions 
for each generation type. Therefore, all data are used, in association with expert 
judgment to avoid violating data fitting rules, to derive a set of fragility functions 
(Figure 4.6B) for mixed-generation types (i.e., this set of functions can be used to 
calculate the fragility of a HEP, thermal or geothermal power stations). While no 
available case studies document impacts at IS3, I assume they are likely to occur in 
future eruptions and therefore IS3 has been included in the fragility function with a 
probability <0.2. 
Here I provide a brief summary of some of the vulnerability differences between each 
generation type which can inform, along with addition tephra fall impact data, specific 
generation type vulnerability assessments in future research. At HEP stations, water, 
which could be contaminated with tephra, is in direct contact with the turbines which 
could lead to abrasion damage reducing turbine efficiency (e.g., Meredith, 2007). At 
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thermal and geothermal power stations, turbines are typically steam driven and are 
closed systems, such that tephra would be unlikely to be in direct contact with the 
turbine; reducing the potential for abrasion. Therefore, for a given tephra thickness, the 
probability of each ISs for HEP stations is likely to be slightly higher than for thermal 
and geothermal power stations. 
Some impacts are dependent on the concentration (or ‘dose’) or tephra received over 
time. This is typically the case for abrasion damage to HEP turbines. For example, 
during the 1995 Mt. Ruapehu eruption, tephra fell in the Rangipo catchment and passed 
through two turbines at the nearby power station. Immediately after the eruption there 
was no damage and the turbines remained in operation for six months before the station 
was temporarily shut down after significant turbine abrasion occurred (T.M. Wilson et 
al., 2012). For the majority of the HEP data here, impacts occurred between 6–12 
months after the eruption. With additional research regarding the occurrence of abrasion 
damage (a key knowledge gap), time and/or ‘dose’ based fragility functions may be able 
to be derived, providing better estimates of vulnerability over time. 
Geothermal and thermal stations require air for cooling and combustion, the latter for 
thermal stations. These systems may sustain abrasion or filters may become blocked 
over time. Again this depends on the ‘dose’ of tephra these systems receive over time; 
an aspect that is not currently well understood and requires further investigation before 
appropriate vulnerability estimates can be made. 
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Figure 4.6: Mixed electricity generation types (hydroelectric, geothermal and thermal): A 
histogram showing the number of available post-eruption impact data classified by IS for 
each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility functions for mixed electricity generation types 
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Figure 4.7 Electricity substations: A histogram showing the number of available post-
eruption impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility 
functions for electricity substations showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS 
for tephra thickness. 
Substations 
Substations are vulnerable to tephra fall due to the range of sensitive equipment they 
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fragility functions for tephra fall impacts. I am unaware of any experimental data for 
substation components, likely due to difficulties in conducting experiments with the 
complex and often large equipment. The majority of the post-eruption impact data are 
classified as IS1, cleaning required, (Figure 4.7A) as a result of operators cleaning 
gravel ground cover or sensitive equipment such as transformers. Few instances of 
substation impact ≥IS2 have been documented (Figures 2.4 and 4.7A) indicating that 
cleaning related impacts are more common than equipment damage. However, like 
generation sites, IS3 is likely to occur in future eruptions and is therefore estimated with 
a probability ≤0.15 in the fragility function (Figure 4.7B). The higher likelihood of a 
substation being at IS1 is represented in Figure 4.7B with the IS1 fragility function 
retaining a probability of between 0.3–0.6 for any given tephra thickness. 
Electricity transmission lines 
Electricity transmission lines are vulnerable to tephra fall impacts resulting in 
permanent or temporary disruption of electricity supply. The majority of the 24 post-
eruption impact data points are classified as requiring cleaning (IS1) to be reinstated 
(Figure 4.8A). Disruption is typically cause by flashover (the most common impact 
observed; Wardman et al., 2012b), controlled shutdowns to prevent damage and 
cleaning of equipment. Physical damage such as line breakage (IS2) has occurred in 
three previous eruptions (Figure 2.4), however more intense damage (IS3) has not been 
documented, although could occur in future eruptions. In addition to these post-eruption 
impact data, Wardman et al. (2012b) and Wardman (2013) conducted laboratory 
experiments to investigate the occurrence of tephra induced flashover. Insulator 
flashover occurred at all tephra thicknesses when wet tephra accumulated on insulator 
surfaces. Insulator flashover is classified as IS1, and therefore, I used the Wardman et al. 
(2012b) flashover fragility function to inform and modify the IS1 function. A set of 
tephra fall fragility functions for transmission lines is shown in Figure 4.8B. These 
functions are derived from all known impacts to transmission lines and estimate the 
probability of each ISs as a function of tephra thickness. 
4.5 Volcanic tephra fall fragility functions 
Page | 190 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Electricity transmission lines: A histogram showing the number of available 
post-eruption impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility 
functions for electricity substations showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS 
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4.5.4 Water supply networks 
Water supply networks include water source areas (rivers, lakes, and groundwater), 
water treatment, storage facilities and distribution networks (above or below ground). 
Impacts commonly caused by tephra fall are: changes in water quality (chemical and 
turbidity changes); increased water demand (typically for tephra clean-up); abrasion of 
pumps; and blockage of filters at treatment plants. See Section 2.4.2 for further 
discussion of impacts to water supply networks. 
4.5.4.1 Available tephra fall vulnerability data 
The majority of the available vulnerability data for water supply networks comes from 
14 post-eruption impact assessments from 1980 (Mt. St. Helens, USA) to the present; 
summarised in Section 2.4.2 and by Johnston et al. (2004), Stewart et al. (2009) and 
T.M. Wilson et al. (2012). These assessments are of variable quality and detail; they are 
predominantly qualitative data sets describing both disruption and physical damage. 
Studies by Hindin (1981), Stewart et al. (2006) and White et al. (2011) have 
quantitatively assessed impacts to water quality (chemical contamination and turbidity) 
through numerical modelling and laboratory experiments. I am unaware of any 
quantitative studies on the physical impacts of tephra fall to water treatment and 
distribution networks. 
Quality rating of vulnerability data 
Table 4.9: Quality rating of available tephra fall impact data for each water supply sub-
sector and asset. See Section 4.4.1.6 for quality rating scheme. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Quality rating 
Water source General C 
Pipe network Pipes D 
 Pumps C 
Treatment plant Whole site C 
 Water quality B 
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Vulnerable components matrix 
Table 4.10: Impact modes and factors which influence vulnerability to tephra fall for 
different water supply assets. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Impact modes Factors which influence vulnerability 
Water source General Contamination of raw source 
water. 
Whether source water is an open water 
body or groundwater. 
 Intake 
structure 
Blockage and abrasion of 
intake structure. 
Intake design and materials. 
Automatic intake shutdown system. 
Pipe network Pipes Blockage of pipes. Pipe capacity, design and sediment load. 
 Pumps Abrasion and blockage of 
pumps. 
Pump design and material. 
Pump capacity and throughput. 
Treatment 
plant 
Coagulation Treatment disruption. Treatment strategy. 
Plant design. 
 Clarification Abrasion of mechanical 
components. 
Infilling of tanks. 
Design and materials of components. 
Tank capacity, surface area and roof 
design. 
 Filtration Blockage of filters. Filter design. 
 Disinfection Abrasion of ultra violet lights. 
Blockage of filters. 
Impacted water quality. 
Design and materials of components. 
Finished water quality requirements. 
 Whole site Abrasion and blockage of 
pumps. 
Power loss to treatment 
facility. 
Pump design and materials. 
Pump capacity and throughput. 
Key knowledge gaps 
 How the catchment area, reservoir volume and surface hydrology influence 
tephra settling and transport through reservoir to intake structures. 
 The process by which tephra moves through water treatment plants and pipe 
networks. 
 The process and occurrence of tephra induced abrasion and mechanical failure 
of water pumps and intake structures. 
 Progressive blockage and decreased efficiency of water filters and screens. 
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4.5.4.2 Fragility functions 
Tephra fall can impact water supply networks causing both disruption and physical 
damage. Analysis of post-eruption impact data shows that the most common impact 
intensity is IS2 followed by IS1 (Figure 4.9A). There is one instance of IS3 from Pacaya 
where some above-ground pipes suffered damage from large tephra particles (Wardman 
et al., 2012a). This is also the only instance of pipe damage documented from previous 
eruptions. Because there is only one instance of pipe damage, the set of fragility 
functions I derive here are for individual treatment plants and not the pipe network(s). 
The pipe network is likely to be more resilient to tephra fall impacts as they are 
commonly underground; however, further research would confirm this. Although, 
tephra deposited into water sources may be transported through the pipe network into 
the treatment plant. Tephra arriving at the treatment plant in this manner will influence 
vulnerability, likely increasing vulnerability. Until further research investigates this 
aspect, the functions in Figure 4.9B are for direct tephra fall at a treatment plant. Figure 
4.9B shows that for thin tephra falls there is a higher probability of tolerance (IS0) and 
disruption type impacts (IS1). As tephra thickness increases there is a higher probability 
of a water treatment plant being at IS2, reflecting the higher occurrence of these impacts 
during previous eruptions. While there are limited data to assess the probability of IS3, I 
assume that as tephra thickness increases, the probability of IS3 will also increase as a 
result of the increase likelihood of tephra induced abrasion of pumps. Figure 2.7A 
shows that abrasion damage on pumps and other mechanical components is more likely 
at tephra thicknesses ≥30 mm than <30 mm. 
A limitation of this set of fragility functions is the time taken for abrasion damage and 
filter blockage to occur is not accounted for. These impact types are controlled by the 
tephra concentration (or ‘dose’) components are exposed to over time, which is 
currently poorly understood. Therefore, discretion must be used when applying the 
derived functions (Figure 4.9B) as higher ISs (IS2, IS3) are likely to occur sometime 
after a tephra fall event. In addition, water treatment plants can be highly specialised 
and specifically designed for the local/regional water characteristics. Each of the 20 
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post-eruption instances of water supply impact occurred at a slightly different treatment 
plant, the subtlety of these differences has been lost in deriving these functions (Figure 
4.9B). Therefore, a recommendation is made that fragility functions be derived 




Figure 4.9: Water supply treatment plant: A histogram showing the number of available 
post-eruption impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility 
functions for water supply treatment plant site (not including the influence of tephra 
deposited in water sources or transported through pipe networks) showing probability of 
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4.5.5 Wastewater treatment network 
Wastewater networks comprise a network of underground collection pipes, pumps and 
above-ground treatment facilities. Wastewater networks may be combined with 
stormwater systems or the two may be completely separate, with the former 
configuration increasing the vulnerability of the overall network (Barnard, 2009). 
Impacts commonly caused by tephra fall are: abrasion of pumps and mechanical 
components; pipe blockages; and treatment disruption (collapse of biological processes) 
which could result in the bypassing of untreated wastewater. See Section 2.4.3 for 
further discussion of impacts to wastewater networks. 
4.5.5.1 Available tephra fall vulnerability data 
The two primary vulnerability data sets available for wastewater networks are post-
eruption impact assessments and laboratory experiments. Impact assessments come 
from a limited number of eruptions (eight in total) between 1980 (Mt. St. Helens) and 
2011 (Puyehue-Cordón Caullé) and are summarised in Section 2.4.3 and Barnard 
(2009). The only quantitative data I am aware of is the analogue laboratory experiments 
undertaken by Barnard (2009). Due to the size and cost of large wastewater treatment 
pumps, Barnard (2009) examined pump abrasion on smaller effluent pumps commonly 
used in agricultural settings. While these experiments cannot be directly compared to 
wastewater pumps, they can provide insight as to the potential impacts and guide any 
expert judgment. 
Quality rating of vulnerability data 
Table 4.11: Quality rating of available tephra fall impact data for each wastewater sub-
sector and asset. See Section 4.4.1.6 for quality rating scheme. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Quality rating 
Pipe network Pipes D 
 Pumps C 
Treatment Whole site C 
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Vulnerable components matrix 
Table 4.12: Impact modes and factors which influence vulnerability to tephra fall for 
different wastewater network assets. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Failure modes Factors which influence vulnerability 
Pipe 
network 
Pipes Blockage of pipes. Pipe capacity, design and sediment 
load. 
 Pumps Abrasion and blockage of 
pumps. 
Pump design and material. 
Pump capacity and throughput. 
Treatment Primary treatment Blockage of filters. 
Abrasion of sediment 
scrapers. 
Infilling of tanks. 
Design and material of scrapers. 




Infilling of tanks. 
Impact on bacterial 
processes. 
Tank capacity, surface area and roof 
design. 
Treatment strategy. 
 Whole site Abrasion and blockage of 
pumps. 
Power loss to treatment 
facility. 
Pump design and materials. 
Pump capacity and throughput. 
Key knowledge gaps 
 Ingress of tephra into underground stormwater and wastewater pipe networks. 
 The influence of combined wastewater-stormwater networks on the overall 
vulnerability of wastewater networks. 
 The process by which tephra moves through wastewater treatment plants and 
pipe networks and the development (in time and space) of pipe blockages. 
 The process and occurrence of tephra induced abrasion and mechanical failure 
of wastewater pumps. 
 Progressive blockage and decreased efficiency of filters and screens. 
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4.5.5.2 Fragility functions 
Analysis of the available post-eruption impact data shows that the most common impact 
intensities are IS1 and IS2 (Figure 4.10A). IS3 has also been documented at tephra 
thicknesses between 5–25 mm after the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption. In this case the 
Yakima Wastewater Treatment Plant suffered severe abrasion damage to pumps and 
pumping components and the treatment plant was bypassed which resulted in the 
discharge of untreated waste into the Yakima River (Blong, 1984). While these impacts 
are documented as occurring with tephra thicknesses between 5–25 mm (given by 
isopach maps), significantly more tephra likely passed through the treatment plants as 
tephra was being washed into the stormwater network (Blong, 1984). Therefore, the 
probability of exceeding IS3 increases as tephra thickness increases (Figure 4.10B). 
However, for thicknesses >10 mm, there is a higher probability of a site being at IS2. 
This trend is influenced by the post-eruption impact data which contain a number of 
older wastewater networks which are combined with stormwater networks. Tephra can 
enter stormwater networks though drainage systems, introducing additional tephra into 
the wastewater treatment plant, leading to increased impact at lower recorded tephra 
thicknesses. This limitation of the derived functions is difficult to overcome with 
available data which does not record volume of tephra entering a treatment facility. By 
obtaining additional data which combines tephra volume and exposure time, 
vulnerability assessments will improve; however, this data is difficult to obtain. 
In modern wastewater systems, the stormwater network is typically separate. In this 
case the wastewater network is effectively a closed system and tephra is less likely to 
arrive at the treatment plant though the pipe network, increasing overall resilience. 
Tephra may still accumulate at the plant through direct air fall. Because there is a 
limited understanding of how tephra moves enters and moves through wastewater pipe 
networks, the fragility functions in Figure 4.10B are derived for individual treatment 
sites and do not consider the influence of tephra entering through the pipe network. 
Until further research investigates this aspect, the functions in Figure 4.10B are for 
direct tephra fall at a treatment plant. 
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Figure 4.10: Wastewater treatment plant: A histogram showing the number of available 
post-eruption impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility 
functions for wastewater treatment plant site (not including the influence of tephra entering 
and being transported through pipe networks) showing probability of equalling or 
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4.5.6 Transportation networks 
Transportation networks include those on land, air and sea, the latter not considered 
here due to very limited tephra fall impact data. Typically, these include large expansive 
linear networks (roads, railways), nodes (airports, ports) and vehicles (cars, trains). This 
section excludes vehicles, trains, aircraft and support buildings (e.g., airport terminals 
and train stations). Impacts commonly caused by tephra fall include: reduction in 
visibility and traction; covering of roads and runways; and vehicle damage (abrasion, 
filter blockage, seized engines). See Section 2.4.4 for further discussion of impacts to 
transportation networks. 
4.5.6.1 Available tephra fall vulnerability data 
The majority of the available transport vulnerability data are from post-eruption impact 
assessments and media reports and are typically qualitative (Figure 2.9A). To date there 
are limited quantitative data relating different impact types to tephra thicknesses. 
Barnard (2009) undertook a number of semi-quantitative experiments to determine the 
difficultly of driving on tephra covered roads, primarily on the slopes of Mt. Etna, Italy, 
and laboratory experiments are currently being conducted to quantitatively examine the 
skid resistance (traction) on tephra covered roads and visibility reduction during tephra 
falls (D. Blake, pers. comm., 2015). Large databases have been compiled documenting 
impacts to airports between 1944–2006 (Guffanti et al., 2008) and aircraft between 
1953–2009 (Guffanti et al., 2010). A number of experiments have been undertaken to 
examine tephra impacts, particularly engine damage, to aircraft inflight (e.g., Drexler et 
al., 2011; Dunn, 2012; Shinozaki et al., 2013; Davison and Rutke, 2014; Song et al., 
2014). Impacts to rail networks are the least documented, with the only available data 
from eruptions of Soufrière St. Vincent (1902), Mt. St. Helens (1980) and Shinmoedake 
(2011) (Figure 2.9A). 
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Quality rating of vulnerability data 
Table 4.13: Quality rating of available tephra fall impact data for each transport sub-sector 
and asset. See Section 4.4.1.6 for quality rating scheme. 
 
Sub-sector Assets Quality rating 
Road Road B 
 Vehicle C 
Rail Track D 
 Train D 
Air Airport C 
 Aircraft (inflight) B 
Vulnerable components matrix 
Table 4.14: Impact modes and factors which influence vulnerability to tephra fall for 




Assets Failure modes Factors which influence 
vulnerability 
Road Road Loss of traction. 
Covering of markings. 
Loss of visibility. 
Road surface composition and level 
of maintenance. 
Road inclination. 
 Vehicle Abrasion damage. 
Clogging of filters. 
Loss of visibility. 
Vehicle design. 
Type of filters. 
Rail Track Loss of traction. 
Loss of electrical communication and 
engine signals. 
Disruption to track switches. 
Track design and material. 
Communication method between 
train and control stations. 
 Train Abrasion damage. 
Clogging of filters. 
Loss of visibility. 
Train design. 
Type of filters. 
Air Airport Loss of traction. 
Covering of markings and lights. 
Loss of visibility. 




Loss of engine thrust. 
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Key knowledge gaps 
 Quantification of reduction in visibility and traction during tephra falls for all 
type of transportation. 
 Abrasion damage of paved surfaces (roads, runways) cause by direct tephra 
fall and during tephra clean-up. 
 Abrasion damage occurrence on train wheels and railway tracks. 
 Failure of electric and non-electric rail signals and switches. 
4.5.6.2 Fragility functions 
Road transportation 
Tephra fall can cause disruption to the road network and can lead to traffic accidents, 
reduction in speed and possible road closure. Due to the limited number of quantitative 
experimental data regarding impacts to the road network, post-eruption impact data are 
used to derive road fragility functions. The majority of the available post-eruption 
impact data can be classified as IS1 (Figure 4.11A), suggesting that in most cases loss of 
traction, visibility and possible abrasion will occur. Typically these impacts occur with 
thin (~2–3 mm) tephra deposits (Figure 2.9A) and therefore, disruption of road 
transportation is common in distal areas. In a number of cases roads have been closed; 
however, this is typically controlled by authorities’ risk tolerance and safety protocols. 
The set of fragility functions (Figure 4.11B) reflect the tendency for more sites at IS1 
across all tephra thicknesses, as it has the highest occurrence probability. At 100 mm 
there is a probability of 0.15 that a road remains in IS0. Post-eruption data and 
experiments by Barnard (2009) suggest that in some cases vehicles can drive through 
tephra deposits between 50–100 mm thick, albeit at a reduced speed. The only available 
impact assessment for IS3 is from the 2008 Chaitén eruption where a non-engineered 
bridge sustained significant damage after ~200 mm of tephra accumulated (Wilson, 
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2009). I assume the probability of exceeding IS3 to be ≤0.1 based upon this assessment 
and the assumption that engineered bridges are less likely to be damage by tephra fall. 
Rail transportation 
Railway lines can be disrupted during tephra fall as a result of tephra covering tracks, 
reducing traction, jamming mechanical switches and disrupting communication signals. 
There have been few (three eruptions) documented examples of railway lines being 
impacted by tephra fall; the most recent was from the 2011 Shinmoedake eruption in 
Japan (see Magill et al., 2013). Of the documented instances, the majority are at IS1 
with an equal number at IS0 and IS2 (Figure 4.12A). The set of fragility functions 
derived from these data and expert judgment show that IS1 has the highest probability of 
occurring for all tephra thicknesses (Figure 4.12B). This reflects the documented tephra 
fall impacts which are primarily loss of function and minor damage. Most railway 
tracks are between 100–180 mm high (Mundrey, 2010). If tephra at least this thick 
accumulates, the track will become buried and train wheels will no longer make contact 
with the track, causing complete disruption. This is reflected in the fragility function 
with a probability of equaling or exceeding IS1 of 0.95 at 100 mm tephra thickness, i.e., 
a low probability (0.05) of sustaining no impact (Figure 4.12B). Tram tracks or tracks 
which are level with road surfaces (e.g., level crossings) are likely to be buried when 
thin tephra deposits accumulate (i.e., they may become disrupted with lower tephra fall 
intensities). 
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Figure 4.11: Road transportation: A histogram showing the number of available post-
eruption impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility 
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Figure 4.12: Rail transportation: A histogram showing the number of available post-
eruption impact data classified by IS for each tephra thickness bin; B set of fragility 
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Airports 
The most common impact to occur at airports during tephra fall is airport closure. 
Closure can result from tephra accumulating on runways and taxiways or the presence 
of tephra in the airspace surrounding an airport (not considered here). I am unaware of 
any instances of physical damage to runways or taxiways from direct tephra falls. 
However, at La Aurora International Airport, Guatemala, the runway was severely 
abraded after the 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano as a result of tephra clean-up 
(Wardman et al., 2012a). Therefore, I only consider the probability that an airport will 
be closed (effectively IS1) during tephra fall. Also the probability of closure is likely 
more useful to airport operators before and during an eruption than an estimate of 
potential damage. 
Guffanti et al. (2008) catalogued impacts, primarily cause by tephra fall, to airports 
between 1944–2006. From this database, I extracted 44 instances where tephra 
thickness and airport status (open or closed) was recorded (Figure 4.13A), to calculate 
the probability of airport closure as a function of tephra thickness (Figure 4.13B). The 
resulting function shows that the probability of closure rapidly increases at low tephra 
fall intensities, up to 0.8 at 4 mm, and at 20 mm all airports examined here are closed. 
The main factors influencing airport closure are aircraft damage and life safety. Aircraft 
can sustain severe damage flying though tephra (Guffanti et al., 2010), therefore airports 
close (in most cases at relatively thin tephra deposits) to reduce the likelihood of 
damage and aircraft crashes. However, factors such as operational requirements, 
scheduling and economics, not accounted for here, may determine at which point an 
airport closes. 
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Figure 4.13: Airports: A histogram showing the number of airport status data available 
from post-eruption impact assessment for each tephra thickness bin; B fragility function 
showing the probability of airport closure as a function of tephra accumulation on the 
ground. 
4.5.7 Critical components 
Critical components such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems 
and small electronics (e.g., control systems, computers) are integral to most 
infrastructure sectors. Vulnerability data from post-eruption impact assessments (Figure 
2.9B) and laboratory experiments (Gordon et al., 2005; Barnard, 2009; G. Wilson et al., 
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abrasion of fans and motors; blockage of filters and ventilation holes; decreased 
usability of computers; and temporary shutdown of systems. See Section 2.4.6 for 
further discussion of impacts to critical components. 
While these vulnerability data document impacts, all impacts are measured against 
tephra thickness. However, tephra thickness is not the most appropriate HIM to use for 
these components, as the primary damaging mechanism is ingestion of tephra. As such, 
fragility functions for critical components are not derived here. Future experimental 
studies are required which consider the tephra concentration and the time components 
are exposure to tephra, i.e., experiments should match fragility to tephra ‘dose’. With 
this being said, an experimentally derived function which matches laptop computer 
functionality to tephra thickness is include in Appendix A, as a placeholder until future 
research is undertaken. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter presents a structured framework for the quantitative assessment of 
infrastructure vulnerability to volcanic hazards, with a focus on the derivation of 
vulnerability and fragility functions for critical infrastructure. These functions provide 
quantitative estimates of impact intensity as a function of volcanic hazard intensity 
which are commonly desired for volcanic risk assessments. A standard framework 
promotes consistent vulnerability assessment and provides a method for the derivation 
of new fragility and vulnerability functions; a much needed step in volcanic risk 
assessment. 
The framework details data source and preparation, function requirements, data fitting 
approaches, uncertainty considerations and documentation required to derive a new 
vulnerability and/or function for a critical infrastructure sector or component impacted 
by volcanic hazards. The primary data source used for volcanic vulnerability estimates 
are post-eruption impact assessments which document impacts from previous eruptions, 
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summarised in Chapters 2 and 3. Laboratory experiments are beneficial as they can be 
repeated to generate large impact datasets. Experimental data are available for some 
infrastructure sectors and components; however, are limited due to the difficulties of 
replicating volcanic hazards and large infrastructure components in the laboratory. 
Where data are limited, expert judgment is used to estimate infrastructure fragility and 
vulnerability based on experts’ knowledge of the impact(s) and hazard(s). A set of rules 
are devised to guide expert data fitting and to provide transparency of this process. 
Using these rules, expert derived functions are based on a standard foundation and are 
valid in a mathematical sense. These rules are not required for research fields where 
large datasets are typically available (e.g., earthquake vulnerability) and therefore are a 
unique approach for a field (volcanic vulnerability) with scarce vulnerability data. 
Throughout the process of estimating fragilities and vulnerabilities, uncertainties related 
to raw data and its manipulation can affect the quality of the resulting functions. Where 
possible, all uncertainties should be reduced and documented. In addition, the derivation 
process, data preparation and assumptions should be documented to provide 
transparency of the process and allow other researchers to assess the quality and 
applicability of functions before use. 
This chapter concludes with the derivation of fragility functions for discrete tephra fall 
impacts to the electricity supply, water supply, wastewater and transport networks 
(Section 4.5). I present these functions as an example of using the methodological 
framework (Section 4.4) to obtain new fragility functions. Data for the functions are 
primarily sourced from post-eruption impact assessments and supplemented by 
experimental data. Where data are limited or when fragility functions violated data 
fitting rules (e.g., decreasing impact with increasing thickness), expert judgment was 
used to modify functions using a transparent approach. The resulting functions give the 
probability of an infrastructure site being equal to or exceeding one of four impact states 
as a function of tephra thickness. These fragility functions represent the first attempt at 
quantifying the vulnerability of critical infrastructure sectors to tephra fall. As such, 
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these functions should be used in volcanic risk assessments while considering all 
assumptions and limitations. When appropriate, these fragility functions should be 
updated with new post-eruption impact data, experimental data and expert judgment. 
4.6.1 Where to next 
The research field should adopt the method and framework present here as a standard 
approach to deriving and updating fragility and vulnerability functions for critical 
infrastructure sectors impacted by volcanic hazards. The derivation of fragility and 
vulnerability functions is the next step to contribute towards robust probabilistic 
volcanic risk assessments; essential for the successful management of volcanic risk. 
In order to derive new, and update existing, fragility and vulnerability functions, high 
quality vulnerability data are required. Figure 4.14 shows that for the majority of the 
critical infrastructure considered here, data quality can be considered average (C) to 
below average (D). There are no infrastructure sectors that have vulnerability data 
which can be classified as high quality (A). This indicates that while there are data 
available to derive functions, additional research is required to increase data quality. A 
particular focus should be on the systematic collection of addition post-eruption impact 
data (Chapter 3) as this provides real-world vulnerability data. There also needs to be a 
continued focus on laboratory experiments to improve the understanding specific 
component vulnerabilities. The fragility functions presented here (Section 4.5) are based 
on currently available data and should be reviewed and updated when new vulnerability 
data becomes available. In the coming years I anticipate that the quality of vulnerability 
will increase across the board resulting in high quality functions for all critical 
infrastructure sectors. 
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Figure 4.14: Quality rating of available vulnerability data for electrical supply, water 
supply, wastewater and transportation networks. Rating A is the highest quality and E is the 
lowest. See Table 4.2 for rating descriptions. 
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5.1 Abstract 
We present a probabilistic tephra hazard assessment for the North Island of New 
Zealand using Monte Carlo methods and numerical tephra modelling. Eruptions were 
simulated from Mt. Taranaki, Mt. Ruapehu, Mayor Island, Tongariro, and the Okataina 
and Taupo Volcanic Centres using the advection-diffusion model TEPHRA2. For each 
volcanic source, simulated eruptions were grouped into eruption size classes and 
eruption parameters were stochastically sampled from statistical distributions based on 
values derived from recent eruption history studies. TEPHRA2 models important 
sedimentation processes, such as particle aggregation, and our simulations sampled a 
wider range of eruption sizes than considered by previous studies. Wind conditions, 
which influence tephra dispersal, were randomly selected from 15 years of available 
data (1999–2013). A catalogue of 25,000 simulated eruptions was produced with which 
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to estimate the tephra hazard at grid points across the North Island. For each location the 
hazard was estimated by summing the annual occurrence probability of each simulation 
which exceeded a given tephra thickness. The resulting hazard maps provide tephra 
thickness for the 500 and 2,500 year return periods. For both periods, the tephra hazard 
is highest immediately east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro due to their higher eruption 
frequencies. Our hazard assessment can be used for volcanic risk assessments of 
exposed communities, buildings, infrastructure and land-use (e.g., agriculture and 
forestry) in New Zealand. 
5.2 Introduction 
Tephra is one of the most widespread volcanic hazards and while it does not usually 
cause fatalities, it can impact human health (Horwell and Baxter, 2006) and cause 
disruption and damage to buildings, infrastructure and agriculture leading to economic 
loss (Wilson et al., 2012). In proximal areas, thick tephra deposits can cause structural 
damage to buildings and burial of productive land, while in distal areas thin deposits of 
a few millimetres can disrupt the electrical network, close airports and reduce traction 
on roads (Wilson et al., 2014). As populations increase and move into more volcanically 
active areas, society will become more susceptible to impacts caused by volcanic 
eruptions (Chester et al., 2000). 
Volcanic risk assessments, which comprise hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
assessments, establish and quantify which areas are at risk from volcanic eruptions 
(Wilson et al., 2014). These can lead to the development and implementation of 
mitigation actions to lower risk and minimise impacts. An integral part of risk 
assessment is the hazard assessment, which if insufficiently defined will lead to poor 
quality volcanic risk assessments. Tephra fall hazard assessments can consist of 
deterministic scenarios based on an eruption (or eruptions) which have been observed or 
mapped from the geological record (e.g., Johnston, 1997; Johnston et al., 1998; Marti et 
al., 2008). However, this can lead to an incomplete assessment as the whole range of 
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possible eruption sizes and environmental conditions (e.g., winds), which combine to 
produce and disperse tephra fall, might not be preserved in the geological record 
(Bonadonna, 2006), or indeed have occurred yet. Using a combination of numerical 
tephra models with stochastic sampling techniques (e.g., Monte Carlo methods) allows 
large sets of eruption parameters and environmental conditions to be used, simulating a 
range of possible tephra dispersal scenarios. A probabilistic tephra hazard assessment 
combines all simulated outputs with eruption probabilities. Probabilistic assessments 
can quantify some uncertainty due to the large number of simulations used; however, 
they are still limited by the accuracy and relevance of the input data (Jenkins et al., 
2012). 
The North Island of New Zealand is a volcanically active region with a number of 
active or potentially active volcanoes capable of depositing tephra over large areas, 
depending on the eruption size and wind conditions at the time of eruption. Three 
previous studies (Magill et al., 2006; Hurst and Smith, 2010; Jenkins et al., 2012) have 
developed probabilistic tephra hazard assessments for multiple New Zealand volcanoes. 
All three use the ASHFALL dispersion model (Hurst 1994) in different methodological 
approaches. Magill et al. (2006) modelled probabilistic tephra hazard specifically for the 
Auckland region from six North Island volcanoes using relative probabilities of each 
volcano depositing tephra in the Auckland region. Hurst and Smith (2010) estimated the 
tephra hazard for the North Island from simulated eruptions from eight volcanoes. 
Eruption parameters and probabilities used were derived from eruption records, and in 
some cases (e.g., Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro) were based on only a few data points. 
Jenkins et al. (2012) simulated eruptions from 11 volcanoes using eruption probabilities 
derived from global eruption databases to estimate the tephra hazard for urban areas 
with at least 400 residents/km
2
, which equates to ~2% of the North Island’s land cover 
(Newsome et al., 2013). There are a number of limitations in the selection of eruption 
parameters and the number of simulated eruptions for all models. As an example, 
Magill et al. (2006) only considered reference eruptions, not accounting for possible 
ranges of eruption parameters. Both Hurst and Smith (2010) and Jenkins et al. (2012) 
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simulated a different number of eruptions for each volcano and eruption size class. This 
may reduce the accuracy of the hazard output as for some volcanoes eruption 
parameters were randomly selected from a smaller sample pool than for other 
volcanoes. In addition to these models which consider multiple volcanoes, a number of 
studies have modelled tephra hazards from a single volcano (e.g., Dalziell, 1998; 
Bonadonna et al., 2005b; Bebbington et al., 2008; Jenkins et al., 2008) or modelled past 
eruptions (e.g., Hurst and Turner, 1999; Bonadonna et al., 2005a). 
Here we provide a new comprehensive probabilistic tephra hazard model for the whole 
North Island of New Zealand that accounts for a wider range of eruption conditions and 
includes new eruption probability analysis. Using the numerical model TEPHRA2 
(Bonadonna et al., 2005a), 25,000 eruptions are simulated from Mt. Taranaki, Mt. 
Ruapehu, Mayor Island, Okataina Volcanic Centre (OVC), Taupo Volcanic Centre 
(TVC) and Tongariro. Table 5.1 provides brief eruption history overviews of these six 
volcanoes. The Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) is not included in this study because it 
is a volcanic field which makes future vent locations difficult to assess; we are only 
considering single vent volcanoes and caldera eruptions. We use Monte Carlo methods 
to generate eruption parameters from statistical distributions and to randomly sample 
wind profiles from real wind records for input into the model. We use a wider range of 
eruption sizes than previous studies, Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI; Newhall and 
Self, 1982) 3–6 and up to VEI 7 for the TVC. This accounts for small tephra-producing 
eruptions not considered by Jenkins et al. (2012) and larger eruptions not considered by 
Hurst and Smith (2010). For some volcanoes, new eruption probabilities are derived 
from recent studies, such that Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro have higher probabilities 
compared to Hurst and Smith (2010), and OVC is less active than in Jenkins et al. 
(2012). New tephra modelling techniques, after Biass et al. (2014) account for particle 
aggregation in the plume, which influences tephra sedimentation, and checks whether 
erupted mass is realistic given other eruption parameters. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of eruption histories for the study volcanoes. 
 
Volcano Classification Description References 
Mt. Taranaki Stratovolcano Eruptive activity over the past ~115 ka. 
Defined by subplinian to Plinian eruptions interspersed with smaller explosive and 
effusive eruptions. 
Last confirmed eruption in 1755 CE. 
Alloway et al. (1995); Shane 
(2005); Magill et al. (2006); 
Molloy et al. (2009); Turner 
et al. (2009). 
Mt. Ruapehu Stratovolcano Four periods of cone building over past ~250 ka. 
Defined by hydrothermal to Plinian eruptions, largest producing an inferred 35 km 
high plume. 
Last eruption was a hydrothermal eruption in 2007 CE. 
Graham and Hackett (1987); 
Cronin et al. (2003); Pardo 
(2012). 
Mayor Island Shield volcano Volcanic activity over the past ~130 ka. 
Defined by lava flows, explosive eruptions and caldera collapse. 
Last eruption ~7,000 years ago which is one of only two Plinian tephra falls to 
reach the mainland. 
Houghton et al. (1992); Wilson 
et al. (1995); Lowe et al. 








Early history is dominated by four periods of caldera collapse. 
Defined by effusive (lava domes) and explosive (Plinian eruptions) caldera infilling 
activity. 
The last eruption was the 1886 CE Tarawera basaltic Plinian eruption. 
Nairn (2002); Smith et al. 
(2002); Houghton et al. 
(2004); Lowe et al. (2008); 
Cole et al. (2014). 
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Volcanic activity over the past ~300 ka. 
Early history defined by at least two caldera forming eruptions and since 26,000 
years ago by explosive and limited effusive activity. 
The last eruption was ~1,800 years and was a large multi-phase Plinian eruption. 
Cole et al. (1998); Wilson 
(1993); Wilson (2001); 
Mason et al. (2004); Wilson 
et al. (2009); Vandergoes et 
al. (2013). 
Tongariro Stratovolcano Volcanic activity over the past ~340 ka. 
Early history defined by larger explosive cone building eruptions with smaller 
explosive and hydrothermal activity. 
Most recent eruption was two hydrothermal eruptions at Te Maari in 2012 CE. 
Nairn et al. (1998); Moebis et 
al. (2011); Pardo et al. 
(2014). 
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This study provides a substantially improved tephra hazard assessment for North Island, 
New Zealand with which to determine estimates of tephra thickness at any point in the 
North Island for any return period of interest or conversely, estimates of the return 
period at any location for a given tephra thickness. These hazard outcomes can be used 
as the basis for volcanic risk assessment for exposed communities, buildings, 
infrastructure and agriculture. 
5.3 Probabilistic modelling framework 
The frequency and thickness of tephra fall at any location is dependent on eruption 
frequency and size, physical characteristics of tephra particles and wind conditions at 
the time of eruption. We use the advection-diffusion model TEPHRA2 (Bonadonna et 
al., 2005a) to simulate tephra fall extent and thickness across the North Island of New 
Zealand from six volcanoes: Mt. Taranaki, Mt. Ruapehu, Mayor Island, OVC, TVC and 
Tongariro. Each volcano had simulations corresponding to VEI 3–6. The TVC also 
included VEI 7 simulations. Each simulation outputs tephra accumulation as a mass per 
unit area, which we convert to thickness (millimetres) using a density of 1,000 kg/m
3
 
(Crosweller et al., 2012) for each point on a grid. Running the model a large number of 
times (e.g., 1,000 times) has two benefits: (1) the probability for exceeding certain 
tephra thickness thresholds can be estimated from the fixed number of simulations; and 
(2) overall aleatoric uncertainty is included in the output as a large number of eruption 
and environmental parameters are randomly sampled, accounting for natural variations 
in these parameters. By performing a sensitivity analysis varying the number of model 
simulations and wind profiles used, we determine the number of simulations required to 
obtain reproducible results (see Section 5.4.1). An essential input of tephra models is 
the eruption source parameters (e.g., column height, total grainsize distribution, erupted 
mass). These parameters are typically based on past eruptive activity with the 
assumption that future activity will be of a similar nature (Biass and Bonadonna, 2013). 
Using past eruption data, derived from geological investigations, reconstructions and 
eyewitness accounts, ensures realistic values are used, improving the accuracy of the 
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model output. The following sections describe the input parameters (summarised in 
Table 5.2) and model implementation required to estimate the tephra hazard. Figure 5.1 
shows the model workflow used. 
 
Figure 5.1: Tephra fall hazard assessment workflow. Sample indicates stochastic sampling 
of eruption parameters. 
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Table 5.2: Eruption parameters used as input values for the numerical model for each volcano. Values were based on eruption histories for 
each volcano, comparisons to similar volcanoes, where data were limited, and on the VEI classification system of Newhall and Self (1982). 
Grainsize distribution is expressed in phi units (Φ) where MdΦ is median phi and σΦ is standard deviation of phi. 
 



















Mt. Taranaki 10–40 0.5–6 0.05–300 -1.8–0.2 1–3 -8–10 0.2–0.8 
Mt. Ruapehu 8.5–40 1–7 0.05–270 -1.8–0.2 1.4–3.4 -8–10 0.2–0.8 
Mayor Island 10–40 0.5–6 0.05–300 -1–1 1–2 -8–10 0.2–0.8 
OVC 10–40 2–6 0.1–300 -0.8–4 1–3 -7–10 0.2–0.8 
TVC 10–40 0.5–7 0.1–1,200 -1.5–1.5 1–2 -3–10 0.2–0.8 
Tongariro 10–40 0.5–6 0.05–270 -1–1 1–2 -7–10 0.2–0.8 
a
 Logarithmic distribution, 
b
 Uniform distribution, 
c
 Gaussian distribution. 
 
Table 5.3: Annual eruption probabilities for each volcano and probabilities for each VEI class conditional upon an eruption occurring. 
 
Volcano Annual eruption 
probability 
Probabilities for each VEI class conditional upon an eruption occurring 
  VEI 3
d 
VEI 4 VEI 5 VEI 6 VEI 7 
Mt. Taranaki 0.016
a
 0.15 0.07 0.02 4.8×10
-3
 – 












 0.3 0.21 0.04 0.01 – 
TVC 2.1×10
-3





 0.15 0.09 0.03 6.2×10
-3
 – 
Data from Jenkins et al. (2012) except for: 
a
 Turner et al. (2009), 
b
 Wilson et al. (2009) 
c
 Scott and Potter (2014) and 
d
 this study. 
5.3 Probabilistic modelling framework 
Page | 228 
5.3.1 TEPHRA2 model 
TEPHRA2 is a model relying on an analytical solution of the advection-diffusion 
equations to describe tephra particle diffusion, advection and sedimentation (Bonadonna 
et al., 2005a). The model assumes a vertical plume extending above the vent from 
which the total erupted mass is released into the atmosphere for all grainsize classes. A 
value can be used to modify the mass distribution to take into account that the majority 
of the mass in an eruption column will be concentrated at the top. The atmosphere is 
divided into horizontal layers that are characterised by a uniform wind direction and 
velocity. At release points, located vertically within each horizontal layer and 
horizontally at (x,y) coordinates, all particles are released instantaneously and are 
assumed to be spherical with settling velocities which vary with the particle Reynolds 
number (Bonadonna et al., 2005a). Particles spread horizontally due to the effects of 
atmospheric diffusion and wind. Horizontal diffusion is considered isotropic 
(Bonadonna et al., 2005a) and is described in two regimes with the particle fall time 
threshold determining which is used. Coarse particles with low fall times follow linear 
diffusion based on the diffusion coefficient and fine particles follow a power law based 
on the apparent eddy diffusivity constant (Biass et al., 2014). Because the eruption 
column width increases with increasing height, particles become more spread out; this is 
accounted for by increasing the diffusion time as a function of column height (Connor 
and Connor, 2011). Particles travel (governed by particle density, grainsize, diffusion, 
gravity, atmospheric density) through the horizontal layer until they reach a lower layer 
where a different wind direction and velocity will influence sedimentation. This is an 
iterative process, and is repeated until the particles reach the ground. Once particles 
reach the ground, total tephra accumulation at each grid point is estimated as a mass per 
unit area. The reader is referred to Bonadonna et al. (2005a) for a detailed explanation 
of TEPHRA2. 
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5.3.2 Eruption probabilities 
For this study we are calculating tephra dispersal from multiple volcanoes. As such, 
each point within the North Island might be impacted by eruptions from multiple 
volcanoes, each with their own eruption frequencies and size. Therefore the annual 
eruption probability of each volcano needs to be considered, as well as the probability 
of a specific eruption size conditional upon an eruption occurring (Table 5.3). Annual 
eruption probabilities used here are from Jenkins et al. (2012), who derived the values 
from the Smithsonian Institution volcano database (for volcanoes with extensive 
eruptive histories) and by averaging global probabilities based upon volcano 
classifications (for all other volcanoes). The annual eruption probabilities utilised for 
Mt. Taranaki, OVC, Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro are based upon specific studies 
(Turner et al., 2009; Wilson et al., 2009; Scott and Potter, 2014) of their eruption 
histories rather than those of Jenkins et al. (2012). Using these new eruption 
probabilities based on eruption histories greatly improves the reliability of the hazard 
assessment. For example, Jenkins et al. (2012) used a return period of 8 years for OVC 
eruptions based on the entire eruption history recorded in the global eruption database 
(Siebert et al., 2010), whereas we use a return period of 1,800 years based on larger 
explosive eruptions in the eruption history, excluding small hydrothermal eruptions 
which will not contributed to tephra production. 
Given an eruption at a particular volcano, the conditional probability that it is of a 
particular eruption size needs to be considered (Table 5.3). For eruption size classes 
VEI≥4 we use probabilities from Jenkins et al. (2012). Jenkins et al. (2012) derived 
conditional probabilities from the number of eruptions for each eruption size class 
recorded in the global eruption database (Siebert et al., 2010) for each volcano type 
classification (e.g., caldera, stratovolcano, shield). These conditional probabilities were 
verified against some well-studied volcanoes and assigned to volcanoes based upon 
their volcano type classification. We use this method to derive the conditional 
probability of VEI 3 eruptions, which were not directly evaluated by Jenkins et al. 
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(2012). The annual eruption probability and eruption size probability can be multiplied 
to give the annual probability of a particular eruption size from a particular volcano. 
5.3.3 Eruption column height 
Eruption column height is taken from the VEI classifications of Newhall and Self 
(1982) with adjustments made to lower and upper bounds to account for historic 
eruption data. For each eruption size class, the model randomly samples a value 
between the lower and upper boundaries on a logarithmic scale so that lower height 
columns have a greater probability of occurring than higher columns (Bonadonna et al., 
2005a). 
5.3.4 Mass eruption rate and erupted mass 
The mass eruption rate (MER) is calculated from the column height and wind velocity 
at the tropopause, a height of ~11 km over New Zealand (Schofield et al., 2004), using 
the method of Degruyter and Bonadonna (2012). Erupted mass is then calculated using 
the MER and eruption duration. The resulting mass is compared to the initial range 
defined in Table 5.2 and if the calculated mass is within this range it is used in the 
model, if not a new column height and wind profile is chosen and the MER and mass 
are recalculated (Figure 5.1). This approach developed by Biass et al. (2014) prevents 
unrealistic eruption parameters being used in the tephra model. 
5.3.5 Total grainsize distribution and aggregation 
Total grainsize distribution (TGSD) is a critical input of tephra dispersal models. Here, 
all TGSDs are assumed Gaussian and generated from sets of medians and standard 
deviations stochastically sampled within predefined ranges for each volcano (Table 5.2). 
For simulated eruptions from Mt. Ruapehu, TVC and OVC, values were based upon 
Chapter Five – Probabilistic tephra hazard assessment 
Page | 231 
past eruption grainsize distributions. Fewer data was available for the remaining 
volcanoes and therefore TGSDs from reported international literature (e.g., Girault et 
al., 2014) were used (Table 5.2). 
Tephra particle aggregation influences particle transport and deposition which affects 
hazard estimation. Aggregation was taken into account using the method of Biass et al. 
(2014). This method removes an equal mass portion of particles from phi classes ≥4Φ 
and redistributes the mass evenly between classes -1Φ to 3Φ. The mass removed (the 
aggregation coefficient) for all volcanoes is randomly sampled between 20–80% (Table 
5.2). This allows smaller particles to fall out as though they were larger particles (i.e., 
aggregates). 
5.3.6 Wind profiles 
Wind conditions during eruptions determine where tephra is deposited. For this study, 
15 years (January 1999 to December 2013) of wind data were obtained from the 
National Centres for Environmental Protection (NCEP) and Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR) Reanalysis 1 database (Kalnay et al., 1996). This global database provides six 
hourly wind direction and velocity at 17 pressure levels on a 2.5° × 2.5° grid. We 
obtained wind data for a single point in central North Island to use for all volcanoes to 
provide consistency, because locally derived wind profiles for different locations vary in 
height due to different measurement techniques (NIWA, 2015). 
Wind rose diagrams (Figure 5.2) for the 15 year dataset show that near the surface and 
at tropopause levels wind predominantly blows towards the east with velocity 
increasing with height. At higher elevations (~mid stratosphere) the wind blows towards 
the east and west, with wind towards the west more frequent. The frequency of wind 
direction changes throughout the year with wind typically blowing towards east 
throughout the southern hemisphere winter months (Figure 5.3). To account for wind 
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direction variability through time, for each simulation of the model we randomly 
selected a wind profile from the 21,916 profiles available between 1999–2013. 
 
Figure 5.2: Wind rose diagrams showing variation in the direction wind is blowing towards 
and velocity for the North Island, New Zealand for the period 1999–2013 at three 
elevations: near surface (~2 km); tropopause (~13 km); and mid stratosphere (~23 km). 
Data source: NCEP/NCAR Reanalysis 1 database (Kalnay et al., 1996). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Monthly wind direction frequency from 1999 to 2013 for the North Island, 
New Zealand, for all elevations. Wind direction is defined as the direction it is blowing 
towards, measured in degrees clockwise from north. Symbols represent direction bins: open 
diamonds are north (316–45°), closed squares are east (46–135°), open triangles are south 
(136–225°) and closed circles are west (226–315°). 
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5.3.7 Model implementation 
For each volcano, 1,000 model runs (see Section 5.4.1) of each VEI class were 
simulated using TEPHRA2, giving a total of 25,000 simulations of tephra thickness on a 
5 km × 5 km grid across the North Island. At each grid location x the annual probability 
that the simulated tephra thickness Z exceeds a certain threshold z given volcano V 
erupts with VEI 3 can be calculated as: 
 





where S is the number of simulations which produce tephra thicknesses exceeding a 
defined threshold z at grid location x, EVEI≥3 is the probability of an eruption of VEI 3 or 
greater, wVEI 3 is the weighting of VEI 3 eruptions from that volcano and TotalS is the 
total number of simulations for that volcano. A VEI weighting is used because an equal 
number of eruptions for each VEI class is simulated, however each VEI class has a 
different probability of occurring (Table 5.3). The annual probability that a particular 
grid location will be impacted by tephra thicknesses exceeding a certain threshold from 
multiple volcanoes is calculated by summing the annual probabilities of all eruptions 
that reach that location and exceed the thickness threshold. Contemporaneous eruptions 
from multiple volcanoes affecting tephra accumulation at a grid location are possible, 
however we consider this negligible and do not include it here. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Sensitivity analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was undertaken to determine the variability and accuracy of the 
Monte Carlo technique used in this study. The analysis varied the number of model 
simulations and range of wind profiles used for each run to find a balance between 
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model accuracy and computation time. The model was run for Mt. Ruapehu and 
calculated the probability of exceeding a tephra thickness of 0.1 mm at Auckland 
International Airport (260 km north of Mt. Ruapehu). Because this analysis did not 
depend on eruption frequency, an annual eruption probability was not used: the model 
was based on the assumption that the volcano had erupted. The number of simulations 
varied between 50–5,000 and subsets of wind profiles corresponding to 1, 3, 6, 12 and 
15 years of data were used. Each combination of model simulations and wind subsets 
was performed 10 times to calculate means and standard deviations. 
Results indicate the mean probability of exceedance (Figure 5.4A) and associated 
standard deviation (Figure 5.4B) change with different numbers of model simulations 
and wind profiles. With the minimum number of simulations there is a large spread of 
the mean exceedance probability for all wind datasets, however as the number of 
simulations increases the variability decreases and the mean and standard deviation 
stabilise for >500 simulations. With >1,000 simulations there is little difference between 
the different wind datasets, therefore we chose to use all available wind profiles (15 
years), to account for the variability in wind conditions. The lowest standard deviation 
occurs when using 5,000 simulations, however performing this many simulations takes 
approximately four times longer than performing 1,000 simulations with only a 2% 
improvement in mean probability, so we use 1,000 simulations for each model run. 
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Figure 5.4: Sensitivity analysis for the Auckland International Airport receiving tephra 
from a simulated Mt. Ruapehu eruption. The number of simulations varied between 50–
5,000 using five subsets of wind data given by different symbols. A shows the mean 
probability of exceeding 0.1 mm of tephra from 10 model iterations and B, the 
corresponding standard distribution. 
5.4.2 Model outcomes 
For each 5 km × 5 km grid point across the North Island, the tephra hazard was assessed 
using Equation (5.1) to sum the annual occurrence probability of all simulations from 
all volcanoes that reached that point and exceeded a particular tephra thickness. 
Continuous hazard curves were derived for each grid point by performing the 
calculation in Equation (5.1) using 500 tephra thickness thresholds distributed on a 
logarithmic scale from 0.1–10,000 mm. Figure 5.5 shows the mean return period for 
exceeding certain tephra thicknesses in one eruption at Auckland, Rotorua, Napier, New 
Plymouth and Wellington. By deriving continuous hazard curves for a range of tephra 
thicknesses the model can be used for any risk assessment and is not fixed to pre-
defined thickness thresholds or return periods. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show mean tephra 
thicknesses reached or exceeded from six volcanic sources for the 500 and 2,500 year 
return periods, respectively. These two return periods are used here as they are the two 
most common return periods used in natural hazard analysis and for building codes in 
New Zealand, especially for seismic loading (Standards New Zealand, 2004). Figure 5.8 
shows mean tephra thickness exceedance for the 10,000 year return period. By fixing 
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the tephra thickness at a particular threshold, the same hazard information can be 
displayed in a different way: Figures 5.9–5.10 show the mean return periods to exceed 
tephra thicknesses of 1 mm and 50 mm, respectively. At thicknesses of 1 mm airports 
may be disrupted, road markings start to be obscured and at 50 mm water pumps, non-
structural building components and vehicles can be damaged (Wilson et al., 2014). 
Figure 5.11 shows return periods for exceeding 100 mm, a thickness where non-
structural and light structural damage to buildings can occur. 
 
Figure 5.5: Hazard curves showing the mean return period (years) for exceeding certain 
tephra thicknesses at Wellington, Auckland, New Plymouth, Rotorua and Napier. Return 
period is the inverse of annual exceedance probability. 
5.5 Discussion 
Figure 5.6 shows that Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro contribute the most to the tephra 
hazard in New Zealand as these are the two most active volcanoes. There are also minor 
contributions from Mt. Taranaki in the west and the TVC. When the return period is 
extended to 2,500 years (Figure 5.7), Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro still provide the 
largest overall contributions, but there are slightly larger contributions from Mt. 
Taranaki and the TVC. As the return period is extended to 10,000 years the TVC begins 
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to contribute more to the overall tephra hazard (Figure 5.8). Figure 5.9 shows that areas 
east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro are likely to receive frequent (on human timescales; 
<100 years) thin tephra falls (1 mm) which may cause disruption to local communities 
and exposed assets (e.g., roads). Our tephra hazard is mostly consistent with Jenkins et 
al. (2012); however in their assessment there is a higher probability of receiving ≥1 mm 
of tephra on the east coast north of Gisborne due to the higher annual eruption 
probability they used for OVC eruptions. 
In all hazard maps (Figures 5.6–5.11) it is evident that OVC and Mayor Island 
contribute very little to the overall North Island tephra hazard. This can be explained by 
the long return periods of eruptions from these two volcanoes which are ~2,000 years 
for the OVC and ~9,000 years from Mayor Island (Table 5.3). However, in the future 
these volcanoes, or any of the others, could change the tephra hazard for New Zealand if 
their eruption style, size or frequency changes. This highlights one of the limitations of 
probabilistic hazard assessments, which is that hazard maps show the mean tephra 
thicknesses to be exceeded in a given timeframe, however if an eruption occurs, 
particularly a large one, then greater tephra thicknesses could be experienced. End-users 
must keep this point in mind when using these probabilistic tephra hazard outputs. 
The tephra hazard in New Zealand is highly dependent on the wind direction; seen in 
the tephra dispersal patterns shown on the hazard maps. Figures 5.6–5.11 show tephra 
dispersal towards the east, which is controlled by the predominant wind in the 
tropopause blowing in that direction (Figure 5.2). In addition to infrequent eruptions, 
another reason that there is minimal contribution of Mayor Island eruptions on the 
overall tephra hazard is due to the predominant wind direction. The majority of tephra 
erupted from Mayor Island is likely to be deposited into the ocean to the east of New 
Zealand, with tephra only being deposited on the mainland when there are unusual wind 
conditions. At least six tephra layers from previous Mayor Island eruptions have been 
found in ocean sediment cores located ~100 km northeast of Mayor Island (Shane et al., 
2006).  
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Figure 5.6: Probabilistic tephra hazard map showing mean tephra thicknesses (mm) 
exceeded for a 500 year return period from six volcanic sources. Main towns and cities 
indicated with circles and source volcanoes with triangles. 
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Figure 5.7: Probabilistic tephra hazard map showing mean tephra thicknesses (mm) 
exceeded for a 2,500 year return period from six volcanic sources. Main towns and cities 
indicated with circles and source volcanoes with triangles. 
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Figure 5.8: Probabilistic tephra hazard map showing mean tephra thicknesses (mm) 
exceeded for a 10,000 year return period from six volcanic sources. Main towns and cities 
indicated with circles and source volcanoes with triangles. 
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Figure 5.9: Probabilistic tephra hazard map showing mean return period (years) for 
exceeding 1 mm of tephra from six volcanic sources. Main towns and cities indicated with 
circles and source volcanoes with triangles. 
5.5 Discussion 
Page | 242 
 
Figure 5.10: Probabilistic tephra hazard map showing mean return period (years) for 
exceeding 50 mm of tephra from six volcanic sources. Main towns and cities indicated with 
circles and source volcanoes with triangles. 
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Figure 5.11: Probabilistic tephra hazard map showing mean return period (years) for 
exceeding 100 mm of tephra for six volcanic sources. Main towns and cities indicated with 
circles and source volcanoes with triangles.  
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Figure 5.5 also shows the influence of the wind direction on tephra dispersal and 
accumulation. Napier, located 120 km east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro, has a smaller 
return period for a given tephra thickness than New Plymouth, located 26 km north of 
Mt. Taranaki, due to the predominant wind towards the east. For thicknesses <100 mm 
the mean return periods for the two locations differ by approximately one order of 
magnitude, however at 1,000 mm the curves intercept due to the less frequent large 
eruptions from Mt. Taranaki depositing tephra on New Plymouth. In addition, Figure 
5.5 shows generally that Auckland (New Zealand’s largest city) and Wellington (New 
Zealand’s capital city) are expected to receive considerably less tephra than central 
North Island locations. This can be explained by their distance from the active 
volcanoes and their locations, which are infrequently downwind from the central North 
Island volcanoes (Figure 5.2). Tephra has been deposited in Auckland in the past, most 
recently during the 17 June 1996 eruption of Mt. Ruapehu. While this was a relatively 
small eruption (VEI 3), <1 mm of tephra was deposited at Auckland International 
Airport (260 km north of the vent) resulting in its closure (Johnston et al., 2000). 
5.5.1 Comparison with existing models 
Magill et al. (2006), Hurst and Smith (2010) and Jenkins et al. (2012) developed 
probabilistic tephra models for New Zealand. Due to the different methodologies and 
hazard models used (these previous studies used the ASHFALL model), there are 
differences in the hazard outcome between the models. While both TEPHRA2 and 
ASHFALL are based on the equations and principles of Macedonio et al. (1988), there 
are some differences between these models. Each model treats diffusion of particles 
through the atmosphere differently, with TEPHRA2 using two diffusion laws for 
different particles (Bonadonna et al., 2005a), while ASHFALL applies a horizontal 
corrective term once a particle reaches the ground based on its fall time (Hurst, 1994). 
Another difference between the models is the treatment of particle grainsize 
distributions. ASHFALL uses particle settling velocities and therefore does not 
discriminate between coarse and fine particles or require a Gaussian distribution (Hurst, 
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1994), whereas TEPHRA2 uses a Gaussian distribution in phi classes (Bonadonna et al., 
2005a). 
The study of Magill et al. (2006) is not directly comparable because they use relative 
probabilities of eruptions from different volcanoes reaching the Auckland region and 
not annual eruption probabilities. For the most part, our model is similar to that of 
Jenkins et al. (2012) because similar eruption probabilities were used for all volcanoes 
except the OVC. For the OVC we used a lower eruption probability, based on the 
eruption history, and therefore in our model this volcano contributes less to the overall 
tephra hazard than it does in the Jenkins et al. (2012) model. Compared to Hurst and 
Smith (2010), our model has a larger hazard footprint for both the 500 (Figure 5.6) and 
10,000 year (Figure 5.8) return periods, especially in the central North Island. One 
possible reason for this is that our model used annual eruption probabilities for Mt. 
Ruapehu and Tongariro 1–2 orders of magnitude larger than those of Hurst and Smith 
(2010), who derived them from six eruptions in the last 15,000 years. The probabilities 
we used for these two volcanoes were derived from new eruption history studies that 
suggest these volcanoes are more active than Hurst and Smith (2010) calculated. 
Because these eruption probabilities are higher, these volcanoes will contribute more to 
the overall tephra hazard. The difference between hazard outcomes is less pronounced 
at thin tephra thicknesses further away from the volcanic sources. 
In addition, differences between the hazard outcomes could be due to model 
implementation. Hurst and Smith (2010) implemented different maximum volume 
constraints for each volcano. These limits were derived from eruption histories and 
expected theoretical maximum eruption sizes. This does however ignore the very low 
occurrence probability of larger eruptions from any of the volcanoes. Our model 
imposes higher maximum sizes than Hurst and Smith (2010) for all volcanoes except 
the TVC. Because these larger eruptions are unlikely, they have low associated 
occurrence probabilities (Table 5.3), however are still included as potential large 
sources of large tephra deposits. 
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For each VEI class, we simulated an equal number (1,000) of eruptions and took the 
proportion of each of these into account using a weighting value (see Section 5.3.7 and 
Equation 5.1), whereas Hurst and Smith (2010) simulated an uneven number of 
eruptions for each volcano and Jenkins et al. (2012) simulated an uneven number of 
eruptions for each VEI class. Simulating an uneven number of eruptions directly 
accounts for the different frequencies of different eruption sizes; however, it also 
reduces the variability in the random sampling of wind conditions and eruption 
parameters. For example, our model simulated 1,000 VEI 7 eruptions from Taupo, 
whereas Jenkins et al. (2012) simulated ~33 eruptions which could result in variability 
in hazard outcomes as a result of the smaller sample size (see Section 5.4.1 and Figure 
5.4). 
Despite these differences, no one model is more correct than another, as all models 
approximate natural processes in mathematical and physical frameworks. This, 
however, does highlight that different hazard outcomes are produced depending on the 
modelling approach used, its implementation and the input of eruption source 
parameters. Our tephra hazard assessment is an improvement on existing assessments 
due to improved modelling techniques which include particle aggregation, eruption 
parameter validation, a wider range of eruption magnitudes and new eruption 
probabilities. 
5.5.2 Model limitations 
There are limitations with our modelling approach primarily related to eruption 
probabilities and input parameters. For this assessment we used eruption probabilities 
from Jenkins et al. (2012) which have been derived from global eruption databases. 
Jenkins et al. (2012)’s probabilities contain some uncertainty due to varying data 
completeness, however using these probabilities allowed for consistent coverage for all 
volcanoes. Where there were inconsistencies with eruption frequency and style we 
substituted more realistic values. For example, the recent history of the OVC is 
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dominated by small hydrothermal eruptions in lakes and craters around the margin of 
the caldera which produce very small, if any, tephra (Siebert et al., 2010; the 1886 CE 
Mt. Tarawera eruption notwithstanding). Because these eruptions will not contribute to 
the tephra hazard, they are not considered in assessing eruption frequency in this study 
and as a result the eruption return period increases from 8 years (Jenkins et al., 2012) to 
1,800 years (Wilson et al., 2009). 
To reduce complexity within our model we have not included the time-variability of 
eruption probabilities, nor the possibility of clustered eruptions or eruptive episodes. 
Instead we assign constant annual eruption probabilities to each volcano. Clustered 
eruptions and eruptive episodes will likely change the hazard outcome and should be 
included in future tephra hazard assessments. 
For the volcanic sources used here there are discrepancies in terms of knowledge about 
eruption histories, due to eruption frequency and the number of detailed studies 
undertaken for each source. To account for this discrepancy we use the VEI 
classification scheme to define ranges of plume height and erupted mass for each VEI 
class. This may result in uncertainty as some volcanoes may not produce eruptions that 
occupy the entire range of input values. Grainsize distribution is a critical model input 
which influences tephra dispersal, however for some we use distributions based on 
international literature, as typical total grainsize distributions for these volcanoes have 
not been identified from past eruptions. Uncertainties within eruption input parameters 
can lead to uncertainties within tephra hazard outputs and therefore should be refined in 
further studies. 
Another factor influencing tephra dispersal is wind direction and speed. Here, we use 
wind profiles from one location in the Central North Island for all volcanoes. Using this 
approach assumes that wind conditions across the whole North Island are the same, 
which may be an over simplification. However, this approach provides consistent height 
and temporal coverage for each volcano. In addition, TEPHRA2 does not account for 
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changes in wind conditions spatially away from the volcanic source, unlike other more 
complex 3D models (e.g., FALL3D, HYSPLIT, NAME). We also assume that wind 
conditions of the past 15 years will be the same in the future, which may not necessarily 
be the case given possible effects of future climate change. 
Another limitation is that the Auckland Volcanic Field (AVF) is not included in this 
hazard assessment because it is a volcanic field which makes future vent locations 
difficult to assess, and we were only considering single vent locations and caldera 
eruptions. In addition, a number of past AVF eruptions are less than our minimum 
eruption magnitude value of VEI 3 (Kereszturi et al., 2013) and will not contribute to 
the North Island-wide tephra hazard. However, tephra from eruptions in the AVF will 
cause impacts to local infrastructure as tephra deposits in excess of 1 mm have been 
identified several to tens of kilometres away from the source AVF vent (Kermode, 
1992). AVF eruptions were included by Hurst and Smith (2010) and should be included 
in further iterations of probabilistic tephra modelling. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this study we present a probabilistic tephra hazard assessment for the North Island of 
New Zealand using the advection-diffusion model TEPHRA2. The volcanic sources 
used are: Mt. Taranaki; Mt. Ruapehu; Mayor Island; Tongariro; and the Okataina and 
Taupo Volcanic Centres. For each volcano, 4,000 simulated eruptions were performed 
for VEI 3–6 with the addition of 1,000 VEI 7 simulations for the TVC. Eruption source 
parameters for these simulations were based on eruption histories and those defined by 
the VEI classification system, with values for each randomly sampled from statistical 
distributions. For each simulation a wind profile was randomly selected from a database 
containing profiles spanning 1999 to 2013; this accounts for the influence wind has on 
tephra dispersal. 
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The tephra hazard at each grid point (5 km × 5 km) in the North Island was estimated by 
summing the annual occurrence probability of each simulation which exceeded a given 
tephra thickness and which reached that location. Eruption probabilities are the largest 
source of uncertainty in our model (in addition to uncertainties inherent within 
TEPHRA2) and our model accuracy will improve with further research refining these 
probabilities. However, our model is an improvement upon exiting models as we used 
updated eruption probabilities from new eruption history studies for some of the 
volcanoes. Results of the tephra fall hazard assessment are presented in three ways: (1) 
hazard maps with fixed return periods, which spatially show varying mean tephra 
thickness; (2) hazard maps with fixed tephra thickness threshold, which spatially show 
varying mean return periods; and (3) hazard curves for select locations, which show 
mean return period as a continuous function of tephra thickness. Presenting the hazard 
outcomes in these different ways allows end-users to select the most appropriate end 
product for their needs. These products can feed into probabilistic risk assessments for 
exposed communities, buildings, infrastructure and agriculture across the North Island. 
The results of the hazard assessment show that the highest tephra hazard is immediately 
east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro. This pattern results from two factors: (1) these two 
volcanoes are the most active and have the highest annual eruption probabilities of the 
study volcanoes; and (2) the wind across the North Island predominantly blows towards 
the east, transporting erupted tephra in this direction. As the return period is increased, 
other less active volcanoes (e.g., Mt. Taranaki and the TVC) begin to contribute to the 
tephra hazard. Compared to previous models our assessment has a larger tephra hazard 
footprint due to improved eruption probability values and the inclusion of a larger range 
of eruption magnitudes. This means that more assets (infrastructure, buildings and 
agriculture) are exposed to potential tephra which requires reassessment of risk 
estimates and management strategies. 
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6.1 Abstract 
This study presents a volcanic tephra fall risk assessment of the electrical transmission 
network in the North Island of New Zealand. Electrical assets considered are generation 
sites (hydroelectric, thermal and geothermal power stations), substations and 
transmission lines. Fragility functions expressing the probability of electrical assets 
being at one of four impact states as a function of tephra thickness are derived for each 
asset class. Functions are derived using data from post-eruption impact assessments, 
expert judgement and laboratory experiments. Using a probabilistic tephra fall model, 
we obtained tephra thickness exceedance for 500 and 2,500 year return periods for all 
electrical infrastructure locations in the North Island. Modelled tephra thickness and 
fragility functions are used to estimate impact state exceedance for 500 and 2,500 year 
return periods by randomly generating impact states based on the relative probability of 
occurrence for each asset. Our risk assessment shows the highest risk to the 
transmission lines is immediately to the east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro due to their 
high eruption frequency and the predominant wind direction towards the east. In this 
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area the probability of disruption of the circuit resulting from insulator flashover is ≥0.8 
for both return periods and subsequently the highest priority area for mitigation 
implementation. Substations and generation sites to the north and east of Mt. Ruapehu 
will likely sustain impacts requiring extensive repair and/or replacement of components 
causing disruption (highest impact state) for both return periods. Our methodology can 
be used as a near real-time predictive impact assessment tool to assess impacts during a 
volcanic eruption as well as in broad risk assessment tools such as RiskScape. 
6.2 Introduction 
Electricity is one of the most critical infrastructure services in society as it is widely 
relied upon by other infrastructure sectors for their continued operation (Bose, 2005). 
Continued function of the electrical transmission network is critical during natural 
hazard impacts, including volcanic eruptions, to maintain economic activities in 
unaffected areas and for response activities (Wardman et al., 2012). 
Tephra fall is the most widespread volcanic hazard and typically causes disruption and 
damage to electrical transmission networks (Wardman et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2012). 
The most common impact on the transmission network (typically ≥110 kV) is insulator 
flashover. This occurs when tephra accumulates on insulators in the presence of 
moisture, thereby increasing their conductivity which can lead to an unintended 
electrical discharge over the surface of the insulator (a flashover) (Wardman et al., 
2012). If the flashover current is high enough to trip circuit breakers, disruption of 
transmission on that circuit will occur and damage to components may result. Another 
common impact is the abrasion of turbines at hydroelectric power stations (HEP), as 
tephra suspended in reservoirs settles and passes through the station and turbines. 
Abrasion damage to turbines or cooling systems at thermal or geothermal stations, or 
the fear of such damage, may require complete or partial shutdown (G. Wilson et al., 
2014). Table 6.1 and Section 6.4 summarise damage and disruption commonly observed 
for electrical transmission networks. 
Chapter Six – Electrical transmission network risk assessment 




Table 6.1: Summary of commonly observed and likely tephra fall impacts on electrical transmission networks in terms of physical damage 
and loss of functionality (summarised from Wardman et al., 2012; G. Wilson et al., 2014). 
 




General Equipment buildings, generator 
halls, offices, and electrical 
equipment support structures. 




Non-structural and structural damage 
to buildings and structures. 
Ingress of tephra into buildings and 
sensitive electronics and mechanical 
components, reducing their operability. 




HEP turbines and intake gates. 
Storage reservoir. 
Abrasion of HEP turbine blades, intake 
gates and other metal components 
from suspended tephra. 
Deposition of tephra into storage 
reservoirs, reducing storage volume and 
capacity to generate electricity. 




Abrasion and jamming cooling systems 
including upward facing fan blades. 
Abrasion of heat exchangers in cooling 
systems. 
Blockage of air intake filters, affecting 
combustion process. 
Blockage of heat exchangers in cooling 
systems. 
Contamination of fuel supply. 
Contamination of intake water. 
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Abrasion and jamming of upward 
facing fan blades in cooling systems. 
Abrasion and damage to well heads. 
Possible damage to over ground pipe 
network. 
Blockage of heat exchangers in cooling 
systems. 
Blockage of cooling system fans. 
Contamination of intake water. 
Substations  Control and switching 
equipment and components. 
Gravel ground cover. 
Insulators. 
Transformers. 
Buildings and structures. 
Damage to buildings and structures. 
Abrasion and jamming of mechanical 
components. 
Overheating of equipment causing 
permanent damage. 
Shutdown for cleaning and repair. 
Contamination of gravel ground cover 
requiring cleaning. 
Ingress of tephra into buildings and 
sensitive electronics and mechanical 






Breakage of lines or support structures. 
Etching or abrasion of insulator 
surfaces. 
Insulator flashover causing disruption of 
transmission on line (circuit). 
Disruption of transmission on line for 
cleaning or repair. 
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The high voltage (HV) electrical transmission and generation network in the North 
Island, New Zealand is an expansive system stretching the length of the island and 
comprising thousands of components (Figure 6.1). Due to active volcanism in the North 
Island, the transmission network has the potential to be impacted by tephra fall. 
Determining the areas of the network most at risk from tephra fall impacts is paramount 
to successful volcanic risk management and risk reduction. In this study, we use a 
probabilistic tephra fall model for six volcanoes in the North Island, developed in 
Chapter 5, to establish the tephra fall hazard at electrical infrastructure sites (Section 
6.3). To assess vulnerability, we derive volcanic fragility functions for generation sites, 
substations and transmission lines which give the probability of exceeding one of four 
impact states as a function of tephra thickness (Section 6.4.1). Combining the hazard 
and vulnerability assessments (Section 6.4.2), we assess the risk to the HV electrical 
transmission network in the North Island for hazard return periods of 500 and 2,500 
years (Sections 6.5–6.6). We also show the application of our vulnerability assessment 
during a volcanic eruption by using three eruptions from Mt. Ruapehu eruptions 
(Section 6.6.1). 
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Figure 6.1: North Island electrical transmission network map showing generation sites 
(squares), substations (diamonds), the high voltage transmission lines (lines), main towns 
(circles) and volcanoes (triangles). Electricity network data from Electricity Authority 
(2014) and Transpower (2014). 
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6.3 Probabilistic tephra fall hazard assessment 
The frequency and thickness of tephra falls at a location is dependent on eruption 
frequency and magnitude, physical characteristics of tephra particles and wind 
conditions. We use the probabilistic tephra fall hazard assessment developed in Chapter 
5. This assessment uses TEPHRA2 (Bonadonna et al., 2005) to simulate 25,000 
Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) 3–7 eruptions sourced from Mt. Taranaki, Mt. 
Ruapehu, Mayor Island, Okataina Volcanic Complex (OVC), Taupo Volcanic Complex 
(TVC) and Tongariro (Figure 6.1). Eruption parameters (e.g., erupted volume, column 
height, grainsize distribution) based on VEI classes and previous eruption deposits are 
stochastically sampled from statistical distributions for each simulation. For each 
simulation, wind profiles are randomly sampled from 15 years (1999–2013) of 
modelled wind data from National Centres for Environmental Protection (NCEP) and 
Atmospheric Research (NCAR) Reanalysis 1 database (Kalnay et al., 1996). 
Annual eruption probabilities for Mt. Taranaki, OVC, Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro are 
based upon specific eruption history studies (Turner et al., 2009; C. Wilson et al., 2009; 
Scott and Potter, 2014). Probabilities for the remaining volcanoes and conditional 
probabilities of different eruption sizes are from Jenkins et al. (2012), who derived these 
from global eruption databases and comparisons with similar volcano types. To estimate 
the tephra fall hazard at any location in the North Island, the annual occurrence 
probability of all simulations which reach each location and exceed a tephra thickness 
threshold are summed (i.e., a cumulative annual probability). Using this approach, the 
tephra thickness exceeded in a single eruption can be estimated for any North Island 
location on a 5 km × 5 km grid for any return period. 
In Chapter 5 some limitations in the hazard assessment are acknowledged and should be 
considered when using the risk assessment presented here. The eruption probabilities 
derived from global comparisons to similar volcanoes are subject to uncertainty due to 
varying levels of data completeness. However, these eruption probabilities were used so 
that there was consistent coverage for all volcanoes. With continued research of 
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eruption histories, uncertainties surrounding eruption probabilities can be reduced. In 
addition, the Auckland Volcanic Field was not included, as the hazard assessment only 
considered single vent volcanoes and calderas, therefore the risk in the Auckland region 
is likely to be underestimated. 
6.4 Electricity transmission network 
In New Zealand the electricity transmission network consists of generation sites, 
transmission and distribution lines and associated substations (Figure 6.1). In 2013, 
~42,000 GWh of electricity was generated, split between energy types (percentage of 
total 2013 generation in parentheses): hydroelectric (54.5%); thermal (coal and natural 
gas) (24.7%); geothermal (14.5%); wind (4.8%); and bioenergy (1.4%) (MBIE, 2014). 
Generation sites are typically located some distance from demand centres (Transpower, 
2014), therefore the transmission network connecting generation with demand centres is 
a critical part of the network. The New Zealand national transmission grid is a backbone 
of 110 and 220 kV alternating current circuits owned and operated by Transpower Ltd. 
(Transpower, 2014). The majority of the 11,764 km of transmission lines are located 
above ground, supported by ~41,000 support structures (concrete, wood and steel poles 
and steel lattice towers). Connecting the North and South Island networks is a 611 km 
long (40 km is a submarine cable under the Cook Strait) bi-directional high voltage 
direct current transmission line. Sub-transmission (33–110 kV) and distribution (<33 
kV) lines which connect customers to the grid are owned and operated by various 
regional lines companies, but are not considered in this study due to a limited 
understanding of their performance during tephra falls. Substations of varying size are 
located at three points within the network: (1) at generation sites to input power into the 
transmission circuits, known as grid injection points (GIP); (2) between different 
transmission circuits to switch and control electricity flow and; (3) at the interface 
between transmission circuits and the lower voltage distribution network, known as grid 
exit points (GXP). Substations are owned and operated by Transpower Ltd. and regional 
lines companies based on their location within the network. 
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6.4.1 Vulnerability assessment 
Nearly all components within the electricity transmission network are vulnerable to 
direct impacts from tephra fall. Because transmission networks extend above ground 
over large areas, they have high exposure, which increases their vulnerability to tephra 
falls. Table 6.1 summarises common impacts (disruption and damage) to different parts 
of the transmission network, derived from post-eruption impact assessments and 
experimental data. 
6.4.1.1 Volcanic fragility function derivation methodology 
To estimate the risk to the electrical network, a relationship between tephra fall intensity 
(i.e., tephra thickness) and impact (disruption or damage) is required. This relationship 
is typically represented as a fragility function which gives the probability of a particular 
asset reaching a certain impact level/intensity (Rossetto et al., 2013; Tarbotton et al., 
2015). The method to derive volcanic fragility functions and the electricity transmission 
functions themselves are presented in Chapter 4 (Sections 4.4.4 and 4.5.3, respectively) 
and are repeated and summarised here for this specific assessment. 
To derive fragility functions for electricity assets, we use data from global post-eruption 
impact assessments, laboratory experiments and expert judgment. Volcanic impact data 
for each asset type are prepared such that each data point is assigned two attributes: (1) 
a tephra thickness at which impact occurred; and (2) an impact state (IS) value which 
describes the observed impact intensity. Here we use the ISs described in Chapter 2 
(Table 2.12): IS0 – no damage (lowest state); IS1 – cleaning required (minor damage); 
IS2 – repair required (moderate damage); and IS3 – replacement or financially expensive 
repair (highest state). Each data point is assigned an IS based on the comparison of 
documented impact descriptions to those in Table 2.12. Data are ordered by increasing 
tephra thickness and are grouped into thickness bins, such that each bin has 
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approximately the same number of data points (Figure 6.2). The limited number of data 
prevented splitting the dataset into more than three thickness bins. 
The probability of an asset being equal to or exceeding each IS is calculated for each 
thickness bin using the relative proportions of each IS in that bin. Because ISs are 
sequential, in that reaching ISi implies ISi-1 has been reached, the probability of an asset 
being equal to an IS can be calculated. Discrete tephra thickness values are obtained by 
taking the median of each thickness bin. For each IS, a segmented linear equation is 
used to fit data and produce individual fragility functions. This simplified approach is 
taken because the limited number of data does not justify fitting more complex 
mathematical functions, such as a lognormal cumulative distribution function, which are 
commonly used in other natural hazards fields (e.g., Porter et al., 2007; Mas et al., 2012; 
Rossetto et al., 2013). 
Due to the limited post-eruption impact data (in respect of the number of data and their 
representativeness of all impacts), expert judgment is used to modify the probability 
values of resulting functions so that mathematical fitting rules are not violated. Fitting 
rules (explained in more detail in Section 4.4.4.2) are: (1) no impacts occur at 0 mm 
tephra thickness; (2) individual functions are sequential; (3) individual functions can 
converge but not intercept; and (4) functions are non-decreasing, i.e., the probability of 
each function does not decrease as tephra thickness increases. 
6.4.1.2 Generation fragility functions 
Operating conditions and impact mechanisms between the three generation types (HEP, 
geothermal and thermal) are different and should be considered in volcanic risk 
assessments. Sufficient impact data were not available to robustly derive fragility 
functions for each generation type. Instead a generic (average) fragility function is 
derived for all generation types and subsequently modified by expert judgment to 
produce fragility function sets for each generation type (Figure 6.3). Based on available 
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post-eruption impact data, HEP stations are likely to have the highest vulnerability of 
the three generation types (Figure 6.3). This is because reservoir water could become 
contaminated with tephra and pass through the turbines, causing significant abrasion 
damage, thereby reducing turbine efficiency (e.g., Meredith, 2007). Tephra could also 
block and/or limit the flow of water through pipes connecting the storage reservoir to 
the turbines. Turbines at geothermal and thermal power stations are closed systems and 
will therefore not suffer tephra-induced abrasion (i.e., lower vulnerability). 
Nevertheless, water is required at these stations for cooling purposes and tephra-
contaminated water might cause abrasion damage to water pumps and heat exchangers, 
increasing their vulnerability. At thermal power stations, air is required for combustion 
and cooling purposes and tephra fall could cause blockage of air intake filters and 
abrasion of cooling fans. Because air is not required for combustion at geothermal 
power stations, we estimate the vulnerability of thermal power stations to be higher than 
that of geothermal stations (Figure 6.3). 
While there are no case studies which document impacts at IS3, we believe this is due to 
under reporting and that these impacts are likely to occur in the future. Therefore, for 
the fragility functions we estimate the probability of generation sites being at IS3 to be 
<0.4 up to 100 mm tephra thickness (Figure 6.3). 
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Figure 6.2: Available post-eruption impact data for generation sites (G), substations (S) 
and transmission lines (T) classified into impact states (IS) and binned by tephra thickness. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Fragility functions giving the probability of electrical generation sites equalling or exceeding 
each impact state (IS) as a function of tephra thickness for hydroelectric power (solid line), thermal (long 
dash) and geothermal (short dash) generation. 
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6.4.1.3 Substation fragility functions 
Substations are vulnerable to tephra fall due to the range of sensitive equipment they 
contain and because they are key nodes for the transmission system. There are 16 post-
eruption impact assessments available and the majority of the empirical data can be 
classified as IS1 (Figure 6.2). Few instances of substation impact ≥IS2 such as 
transformer failure after the 1991 Mt. Hudson, Chile eruption (T.M. Wilson et al., 2009) 
have been documented (Figure 6.2), indicating that equipment damage is less common 
than cleaning related disruption. However, like generation sites, IS3 is likely to occur in 
future eruptions and is therefore estimated with a probability of ≤0.15 in the fragility 
function (Figure 6.4). The higher likelihood of a substation being at IS1 is represented in 
Figure 6.4, with the IS1 fragility function retaining a probability of between 0.3–0.6 for 
any given tephra thickness. This fragility function set assumes that substations are 
located outside and exposed to direct tephra fall. If a substation is covered, the overall 
fragility will be governed by the fragility of the roof and building structure. 
 
Figure 6.4: Fragility functions giving the probability of substations equalling or exceeding 
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6.4.1.4 Transmission fragility functions 
Transmission lines are vulnerable to tephra fall impacts resulting in permanent or 
temporary disruption of electricity transmission. The majority of the post-eruption 
impact data are classified as IS1 (Figure 6.2). Documented disruption is typically caused 
by flashover, controlled shutdowns to prevent damage and cleaning of equipment. 
Wardman et al. (2012) conducted laboratory experiments to systematically investigate 
flashover occurrence; we use their data to supplement the post-eruption impact data to 
derive the IS1 function (Figure 6.5). Given that flashover is far less likely with dry 
tephra (Wardman et al., 2012), the fragility functions should only be used to estimate 
insulator flashover in the presence of wet or moist tephra deposits. Physical damage 
such as line breakage (IS2) has occurred; however, it is less common. More severe 
damage (IS3) has not been documented, although this could potentially occur in future 
eruptions and therefore an estimated value is included in the fragility functions. 
 
Figure 6.5: Fragility functions giving the probability of transmission lines equalling or 
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6.4.1.5 Uncertainty and limitations 
There are uncertainties and limitations with our volcanic fragility functions which 
should be considered when using the results of this risk assessment. The data used to 
derive the electricity fragility functions come from a limited number of observations. 
Using the exceedance probability of each IS for a particular tephra thickness, we 
account for some of the data uncertainty. For each thickness there is a certain 
probability that the electricity site will be in any one of the four ISs (see Section 6.4.2). 
The post-eruption impact data used typically reflect the wide range of different 
infrastructure types and configurations used worldwide (Jenkins et al., 2014), thus there 
is rarely a standard electrical infrastructure typology with which to assess vulnerability 
to tephra fall. Our functions only consider aggregated electricity typologies (‘generic’ 
typologies) and we anticipate some typologies and/or configurations might have 
increased or decreased vulnerability. In addition, the derived fragility functions apply to 
individual sites in isolation from the rest of the network as we have not considered the 
interdependency of the different assets in this assessment. We have not conducted 
specific site assessments of New Zealand electricity transmission sites and if a more 
detailed volcanic risk assessment is required, we recommend that vulnerability be 
assessed on a site-by-site basis. 
A factor that is not accounted for in either the hazard or vulnerability assessments is the 
duration of tephra fall. While TEPHRA2 accounts for the eruption and tephra particle 
sedimentation duration, the output does not include the duration of tephra accumulation 
on the ground. Tephra fall duration may influence impact occurrence (e.g., abrasion can 
occur over long time periods) and the response of electricity site operators (e.g., tephra 
clean-up might be undertaken multiple times during prolonged tephra falls, altering the 
assets’ tephra exposure). 
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6.4.2 Risk assessment methodology 
Electricity transmission network data were obtained in geographic information system 
format from publicly available sources (Electricity Authority, 2014; Transpower, 2014). 
Centroid points were obtained from polygons for generation and substation sites and 
lines were obtained for transmission lines. Transmission lines were divided into 1 km 
segments as this was determined to be an appropriate scale to assess risk, due to the 
spatial resolution of the tephra fall hazard model (interpolated to a 1 × 1 km grid) and 
given the limitations of the transmission fragility functions. The midpoint of each line 
segment was used to obtain a tephra thickness to assess risk. The total number of 
insulators per 1 km segment of transmission line was not obtained as it typically only 
takes one insulator to flashover for a whole line to be disrupted. Additional attribute 
data (e.g., transformer type, turbine type, cooling system, insulator type, line support) 
were not obtained as there are limited data regarding how tephra will impact these 
specific components. 
The tephra thickness at each electricity site and transmission line segment midpoint was 
obtained from the North Island probabilistic tephra fall model developed in Chapter 5. 
This hazard model gives the tephra thickness to be exceeded in a single eruption from 
any of the six volcanoes for any return period. For this risk assessment, 500 and 2,500 
year return periods were selected. These two return periods are used as they are the two 
most common return periods used in natural hazard analysis and for building codes in 
New Zealand (Standards New Zealand, 2004). 
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Figure 6.6: Methodology used to estimate a discrete IS for each electricity transmission 
site using fragility functions and tephra exceedance thicknesses. 
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For a given tephra thickness, an electricity site has a probability of being in one of four 
impact states given by the fragility functions (Figures6.3–6.5). While it is useful to 
know these probabilities, it is difficult to map and present these four values for all 
electricity sites to electricity transmission operators. Therefore, a single IS is estimated 
for each electricity site, an approach used by New Zealand’s RiskScape software 
(RiskScape, 2014). To predict the IS of a site, 1,000 ISs are randomly generated based 
on the relative occurrence probabilities of each IS for a given tephra thickness. A 
weighted average of these ISs is taken and rounded to the nearest integer to give a single 
IS for that particular electricity site. This process is shown in Figure 6.6. By randomly 
determining ISs, this approach further accounts for uncertainty within the fragility 
functions. The ISs are displayed on maps using colour keys to represent different levels 
of risk for the 500 and 2,500 year return periods (see Section 6.5). The probability of 
insulator flashover (IS1) can be obtained from Figure 6.5 using tephra exceedance 
thicknesses from Figure 6.7. 
Table 6.2: Length of transmission lines, number of substations and generation sites in each 
impact state for return periods of 500, 2,500 and 10,000 years. 
 
Return period Asset type Impact states (IS) 
  IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3 






561 km (9%) 147 km (2%) 
 Substations 52 (46%) 55 (49%) 5 (4%) 0 (0%) 
 Generation sites 8 (27%) 11 (37%) 9 (30%) 2 (7%) 








367 km (6%) 
 Substations 22 (20%) 65 (58%) 20 (18%) 5 (4%) 
 Generation sites 3 (10%) 3 (10%) 14 (47%) 10 (33%) 
10,000 years Transmission 
lines 






 Substations 3 (3%) 52 (46%) 37 (33%) 20 (18%) 
 Generation sites 0 (0%) 4 (13%) 6 (20%) 20 (67%) 
Impact states are: IS0 – no damage (lowest state); IS1 – cleaning required (minor damage); 
IS2 – repair required (moderate damage); and IS3 – replacement or financially expensive 
repair (highest state) (see Table 2.12 for detailed descriptions of each state). Percentages are 
the percentage of total North Island network and do not always sum to 100% due to 
rounding. 
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Figure 6.7: Probabilistic tephra fall hazard showing exceedance thicknesses on the high voltage transmission lines in the North Island, New 
Zealand for return periods of A 500 years and B 2,500 years. Main towns and cities indicated with circles and source volcanoes with 
triangles. 
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Figure 6.8: Probabilistic tephra fall hazard showing exceedance thicknesses on electricity 
substations and generation sites in the North Island, New Zealand for return periods of A 
500 years and B 2,500 years. Main towns and cities indicated with circles and source 
volcanoes with triangles. 
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6.5 Results 
For each electricity generation, substation and transmission line site, volcanic risk is 
estimated and mapped as IS exceedance for a single eruption from any of the six North 
Island volcanoes for a 500 and 2,500 year return period. For example, if an electricity 
site is displayed as IS2 for the 500 year return period, then on average, we would expect 
that every 500 years that site will be equal to or exceed IS2 from a single eruption from 
one of the six volcanoes. Figures 6.7–6.8 show tephra exceedance thicknesses for the 
North Island electricity transmission infrastructure are greatest immediately to the east 
of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro for both return periods considered. Refer to Chapter 5 
for tephra fall hazard maps for the whole North Island (Figures 5.6–5.11). Figure 6.9 
presents hazard curves for key generation and substation sites, showing tephra thickness 
exceedance as a function of the return period. Figures 6.10–6.11 show the risk 
assessments for generation sites, substations and transmission lines. The highest risk is 
in the central North Island, corresponding to the high tephra exceedance thicknesses. 
Table 6.2 shows the number of generation and substation sites and length of 
transmission lines in each of the ISs for three return periods (500, 2,500 and 10,000 
years). It can be seen that as the return period increases the number of sites at IS3 also 
increases as larger eruptions become more frequent over longer return periods. 
6.6 Discussion 
Tephra thickness is greatest immediately east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro (Figures 
6.7–6.8) and electrical infrastructure in this proximal area (within 15–20 km of the 
volcanoes) can be expected to experience ≥1 m of tephra for return periods of ≥500 
years. The primary reasons tephra thickness is greatest here are that these are the two 
most active volcanoes in the North Island and that the wind predominantly blows 
towards the east dispersing tephra in this direction. We would expect infrastructure 
located further towards the east, in areas around Napier and Gisborne, to experience 
thicknesses exceeding 50 mm for return periods of ≥500 years. Mt. Taranaki has a lower 
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annual eruption probability than Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro (Table 5.3) and therefore 
contributes less to the overall tephra fall hazard. However, as the return period 
increases, transmission lines immediately east of Mt. Taranaki will experience greater 
tephra thickness, exceeding 100 mm over a 2,500 year return period. Due to the 
predominant wind direction towards the east and the concentration of volcanoes within 
the central North Island, electricity sites towards the north (Auckland) and south 
(Wellington) of the island have lower tephra exceedance thicknesses (Figures 6.7–6.8). 
Figure 6.9 presents hazard curves for key generation and substation sites, showing 
tephra thickness exceedance as a function of the return period. By deriving continuous 
hazard curves for a range of tephra thicknesses, volcanic risk analysis is not fixed to 
pre-defined thickness thresholds or return periods. For a given tephra thickness, e.g., 1 
mm, the hazard curves show a wide range of return periods; 40–1,000 years for 
generation sites (Figure 6.9A) and 50–1,800 years for substations (Figure 6.9B), 
depending on site location. For a given tephra thickness, electricity generation at 
Karapiro (HEP) and Huntly (thermal) and substations at Otahuhu and Haywards have 
the highest return periods. These sites are located further from the central North Island 
volcanoes and are therefore less affected by tephra falls (Figure 6.9C). Conversely, sites 
such as Tokaanu (HEP generation) and Tangiwai (substation), which are located close 
to Mt. Ruapehu, have the lowest return periods and can be expected to exceed 1 mm of 
tephra, on average, every 40–50 years. The hazard curves for generation and substation 
sites in Stratford show a different trend to other sites. The primary reason for this is that 
Stratford is mostly influenced by eruptions from Mt. Taranaki, whereas other sites are 
influenced by eruptions from multiple volcanoes. Effectively, the tephra fall hazard at 
Stratford is controlled by the eruption probability of Mt. Taranaki, whereas other sites 
are influenced by an aggregation of six volcanoes; therefore, hazard curves follow a 
similar trend. 
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Figure 6.9: Hazard curves showing return period as a function of tephra thickness for A 
critical generation sites and B critical substations. C shows substation and generation site 
locations. Return period is approximately the inverse of annual exceedance probability. 
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The risk analysis of electricity generation sites shows that for the 500 year return period 
there are two HEP stations (Tokaanu and Rangipo) which will be at IS3 (Figure 6.10A). 
At IS3, abrasion damage is likely to occur to the turbines at these stations which may 
require at least a temporary shutdown to repair or replace turbines and associated 
components. The risk for these two stations is likely to be underestimated. Our risk 
assessment does not take into account the influence of tephra entering the wider HEP 
catchment area and being transported through the network to the turbines, nor does it 
account for the long term exposure of turbines to tephra particles. Both of these stations 
are part of the 360 MW Tongariro Power Scheme in the central North Island, which has 
a catchment of >2,600 km
2
 (Genesis Energy, 2015). If tephra entering this catchment is 
considered then impacts could be more severe, requiring more expensive repair. A more 
detailed assessment of tephra entering and moving through a HEP station catchment is 
required to fully assess the risk; this is beyond the scope of this chapter. The lowest risk 
(IS0) generation sites over a 500 year return period are those in the Hamilton region and 
one thermal station near New Plymouth (Figure 6.10A) which are likely to continue 
electricity generation. For the 2,500 year return period, the number of generation sites at 
IS3 increases to 10 (Table 6.2), including a number of geothermal power stations to the 
north of the TVC (Figure 6.10B). In addition, all of the HEP stations between the TVC 
and Rotorua will experience IS2 or greater. If multiple generation sites are impacted 
during a single eruption then electricity supply within the North Island could be 
severely disrupted and there may be an increased reliance on generation from the South 
Island, provided substations and transmission lines remain operational. 
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Figure 6.10: Impact states for electricity generation sites and substations. A and B show the 
impact state to be equalled or exceeded for the 500 and 2,500 year return periods 
respectively for generation sites. C and D show the impact state to be equalled or exceeded 
for the 500 and 2,500 year return periods respectively for substations. Main towns and 
cities indicated with circles and source volcanoes with triangles. 
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The risk assessment of substations is crucial as they are critical nodes between 
electricity generation and transmission. A generation site may be unaffected by tephra 
fall and may continue to generate electricity, yet if its associated substation has been 
impacted then electricity cannot be transmitted to the transmission grid. The highest risk 
of substation impact is in the central North Island, extending towards the east, for both 
return periods (Figure 6.10C–D). For the 500 year return period, the majority of North 
Island substations are equal to or exceed IS1, a level associated with cleaning of 
equipment. Disruption may result from substation gravel ground cover becoming filled 
with tephra, causing changes in resistivity. These changes in resistivity can make the 
substation unsafe for personnel as the gravel cover is designed to be at a known 
resistivity to accommodate any transmission faults (e.g., short circuits) (IEEE, 2000; 
Wardman et al., 2012). For the 2,500 year return period, ~80% of the North Island 
substations equal or exceed IS1 (Table 6.2 and Figure 6.10D); this includes a number of 
substations in the Auckland and Wellington regions. Three critical substations, 
Haywards, Bunnythorpe and Otahuhu (see Figure 6.9C for locations) are at IS1 and 
Whakamaru is at IS2. These substations are critical to the transmission of electricity 
within the North Island and between the North and South Islands. If any of these 
substations are impacted during an eruption there is likely to be widespread disruption 
of electricity transmission throughout the North Island and possibly the South Island. As 
such, it is critical that these substations have tephra preparedness and clean-up plans 
developed prior to any future eruption in order to limit disruption caused by any tephra 
fall (e.g., Wardman et al., 2012; T.M. Wilson et al., 2014). A more robust solution 
would be to move critical parts of substations inside buildings to limit the direct 
accumulation of tephra on sensitive components and equipment. However, the expense 
of this action will need to be justified through cost-benefit analysis. 
The functionality of electricity transmission lines is critical, as these connect areas of 
generation with areas of demand. Figure 6.11A–B shows the ISs which will be equalled 
or exceeded for the transmission lines in the North Island for the 500 and 2,500 year 
return periods. The highest IS (IS3) occurs to the east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro, 
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suggesting that in this region transmission lines could sustain damage, such as pole and 
line breakage, from thick tephra deposits. This type of impact would cause significant 
and possibly widespread disruption to electricity transmission until repairs are 
undertaken. A more accurate assessment of this damage mechanism would need to 
include the characteristics (design load) of the transmission support structures and the 
tephra density and moisture content (wet dense tephra increases static loads; Johnston et 
al. 2000). For the 500 year return period the majority of the transmission network would 
equal or exceed IS1, indicating flashover, minor disruption and cleaning of lines is 
highly likely. Further from the central North Island volcanoes, the transmission network 
is likely to remain unaffected (IS0). For the 2,500 year return period, the transmission 
line between Napier to north of TVC is generally IS2, with small sections of IS3 (Figure 
5.11B). These small changes are the result of slight changes in tephra thickness and the 
random sampling of IS for each transmission line segment. 
The main cause of tephra-induced disruption to transmission lines is insulator flashover 
(Wardman et al., 2012), and for this risk assessment flashover is considered to occur at 
IS1. Because flashover is much more likely to occur in the presence of moist/wet tephra 
deposits than dry (Wardman et al., 2012), the assessments relating to flashover are only 
applicable in wet conditions. The insulators most at risk from flashover are those on 
transmission lines crossing the central North Island to the west and east of Mt. Ruapehu. 
For a 500 year return period, the highest risk area is a segment of 220 kV transmission 
line adjacent to Mt. Ruapehu and in the Napier region, where insulators have a high 
probability of flashover for this return period. Extending the return period out to 2,500 
years, the highest risk areas will cover a larger area in the central North Island. Over a 
2,500 year return period, ~3,700 km of transmission lines are likely to be at IS1 and 
suffer from insulator flashover (Table 6.2). In addition, there is an increased risk of 
flashover in the immediate vicinity of Mt. Taranaki as the eruption frequency here 
increases. In the Taranaki region there is a critical point at Stratford, where a number of 
thermal power stations connect to the national transmission grid, which could be 
impacted. 
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Figure 6.11: Risk assessment and disruption of electricity transmission lines to due tephra 
fall impacts. A and B show the impact state to be equalled or exceeded for the 500 and 
2,500 year return periods respectively. C and D show flashover probability for individual 
circuits to indicate likely disruption from a single flashover occurrence for the 500 and 
2,500 year return periods respectively. Main towns and cities indicated with circles and 
source volcanoes with triangles. 
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When a single flashover occurs, the circuit breaker on the circuit can be tripped, causing 
disruption to electricity transmission on that particular circuit (Wardman et al., 2012). 
Some circuit breakers have an auto-reclose system which automatically recloses the 
circuit breaker after a flashover. However, if tephra is still present on an insulator it may 
cause another flashover after the circuit is reconnected. This cycle can continue until the 
circuit is manually disconnected or tephra is removed from insulators. In essence, a 
single occurrence of insulator flashover can cause disruption to an entire circuit which 
could be hundreds of kilometres long (G. Wilson et al., 2014). Therefore, to assess the 
potential disruption from insulator flashover on individual circuits, we take the highest 
flashover probability on each circuit, as that will be the weakest link, and apply that 
value to the entirety of individual circuits (Figure 6.11C–D). Using this approach, for a 
500 year return period the highest risk to circuit disruption is on nine 110 and 220 kV 
circuits in the central North Island both west and east of Mt. Ruapehu and Tongariro 
(Figure 6.11C). Other circuits near Mt. Taranaki and around Rotorua have slightly 
lower flashover probabilities. Over a 2,500 year return period (Figure 6.11D), the 
majority of the north-south circuits have high flashover probabilities. Again, the circuits 
least at risk of flashover are those in the north and south of the island, further away from 
the volcanoes. If any of the north-south transmission circuits become disrupted during a 
future eruption, then transmission to Auckland, the North Island’s largest consumer 
(Transpower, 2014), could be limited. This could have potential flow on impacts to 
other sectors which rely on constant electricity supply. In the case of circuits becoming 
disrupted, electricity transmission could be re-routed to unaffected parts of the network 
for continued supply. The feasibility of re-routing needs to be considered from a 
network analysis point of view, as there may be capacity constraints on certain parts of 
the network which need to be considered; this is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
Our risk assessment identifies areas of high risk to the North Island electricity 
transmission network, highlighting in broad terms areas where mitigation techniques 
could be applied to reduce volcanic risk. Because our fragility functions consider 
generic electricity infrastructure, we cannot advise on the application of appropriate 
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mitigation treatments. In order to apply appropriate mitigation treatments, individual 
site vulnerability assessments, which account for local variations in vulnerability, are 
required. Cost-benefit analyses can then be undertaken to show the benefit of such 
mitigation. Mitigation can include avoiding risk (e.g., land-use planning); removing risk 
(e.g., cleaning); changing the likelihood (e.g., increasing insulation); or retaining risk 
with informed decision (e.g., monitoring) (Wardman et al., 2012). 
6.6.1 Crisis response – Mt. Ruapehu case study 
While our risk assessment shows areas of likely disruption and damage for two return 
periods, actual impact severity depends on which volcano erupts and the wind 
conditions at the time. For example, if Mayor Island erupts when the wind is blowing 
towards the east, no electrical infrastructure will be impacted as tephra will be deposited 
in the ocean; however, if Mt. Taranaki erupts with the same wind conditions, tephra 
could potentially impact all electrical infrastructure in the lower North Island. Using our 
fragility functions and risk assessment methodology, transmission disruption for a 
specific tephra fall scenario can be estimated. This demonstrates the potential 
application of this method as a near real-time predictive impact assessment tool to 
identify areas most at risk and to direct mitigation actions to appropriate locations. The 
methodology would utilise tephra fall hazard layers from forecast models immediately 
prior to or after an eruption or from initial field-mapped tephra thicknesses. 
To illustrate this concept we conducted a risk assessment for the electrical transmission 
network for three historic eruptions (11 October 1995, 14 October 1995 and 17 June 




 of tephra 
over the central and eastern North Island, up to 200 km from source (Cronin et al., 
1998). Figure 6.12 shows the isopach maps for these three eruptions, the modelled 
probability of insulator flashover and ISs for substations and generation sites. Due to the 
thin deposits all substations are at IS0 and one generation site during the 11 October 
1995 and 17 June 1996 eruptions is estimated to experience IS1 (Figure 6.12). During 
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both the 1995 eruptions (Figure 6.12A), there is an increased probability (0.2–0.4) of 
insulator flashover on transmission lines to the east of Mt. Ruapehu, although no 
flashovers were reported during these eruptions. However, during an eruption on 25 
September 1995 (isopach map unavailable but dispersal was similar to the 14 October 
1995 eruption), 3 mm of wet tephra was deposited on 220 kV transmission lines near 
the base of Mt. Ruapehu (Wardman et al., 2012), causing insulator flashover and supply 
disruptions (Johnston et al., 2000; Wardman et al., 2012). This location is consistent 
with the increased likelihood of insulator flashover in Figure 6.12A. 
6.7 Conclusions 
This study presents a probabilistic tephra fall risk assessment for the high voltage 
electrical transmission network in the North Island, New Zealand. The probabilistic 
tephra fall hazard model developed in Chapter 5 is used to obtain the tephra thicknesses 
for electrical assets across the North Island for the 500 and 2,500 year return periods. 
To calculate the vulnerability of electricity transmission assets we derive fragility 
functions to describe the probability of an asset being in one of four impact states as a 
function of tephra thickness. Functions are derived for the first time for generation sites 
(hydroelectric, thermal and geothermal), substations and transmission lines. Data from 
post-eruption impact assessments, laboratory experiments and expert judgment are used 
to derive these functions. The derived functions are subject to uncertainty as they are 
derived from a limited number of post-eruption impact assessments of mixed electricity 
asset typology. Given the limited impact data and the spatial scale of the assessment, 
i.e., the whole North Island, our vulnerability assessment is the most appropriate 
approach. 
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Figure 6.12: Risk assessment for electrical transmission assets for three historic eruptions from Mt. Ruapehu (red triangle). A isopach map of 
the 11 and 14 October 1995 tephra falls and corresponding risk to electrical assets. B isopach map of the 17 June 1996 tephra fall and 
corresponding risk to electrical assets. Main towns and cities indicated with circles. Isopach data from Cronin et al. (1998). 
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Combining modelled tephra thickness with the appropriate fragility function, the risk to 
the electricity transmission network is estimated. For a given tephra thickness, an 
electrical asset can be in one of four impact states governed by the probabilities given 
by the fragility functions. Therefore, for each tephra thickness a weighted average of 
1,000 randomly generated impact states is taken to find a discrete impact state for each 
asset for each return period. For both the 500 and 2,500 year return periods, the highest 
risk and potential impact is to electrical sites immediately east of Mt. Ruapehu and 
Tongariro in the central North Island. In this region transmission lines are likely to 
suffer insulator flashover (IS1) and substations and generation sites will be in IS3. There 
is also an elevated risk of impact (≥IS2) further east towards the east coast and in the 
Napier and Gisborne regions. The risk is highest in these regions because Mt. Ruapehu 
and Tongariro are the most active (i.e., highest annual eruption probabilities) volcanoes 
and because the predominant wind direction is towards the east, therefore tephra 
dispersal is most common to the east. As the return period increases to 2,500 years, 
there is increased risk to the east of Mt. Taranaki, as larger and infrequent eruptions 
from this volcano contribute to the tephra fall hazard. The lowest risk to the electricity 
transmission network is towards the north and south of the North Island, where tephra 
thicknesses likely to cause impacts are less probable. However, electricity supply to 
these regions could be disrupted, as any occurrence of insulator flashover can disrupt 
electricity supply on entire transmission circuits. Over a 500 year return period, the high 
probability of insulator flashover in the central North Island leads to a high likelihood of 
disruption of critical north-south transmission lines between Palmerston North and 
Whakamaru, leading to possible widespread disruption. 
This assessment helps to identify locations where mitigation could be implemented to 
reduce potential impacts from future eruptions and tephra falls. Mitigation actions could 
include increasing insulation on transmission lines, changing insulator designs, moving 
substations inside and developing plans and methods for the clean-up of tephra 
immediately after an eruption. Our assessment shows that mitigation should be 
considered on the transmission lines between Palmerston North and north of the TVC, 
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and lines in the Napier region as there is a high risk of insulator flashover on these lines. 
However, mitigation actions should be trialled before implementation and a cost-benefit 
analysis should be undertaken first. Overall risk reduction will depend on the level of 
mitigation used and where it is implemented. 
Our risk assessment can be used for specific eruption scenarios, for example during a 
future eruption. Utilising tephra fall hazard layers from tephra fall forecast models 
immediately prior to or after an eruption or from initial field-mapped tephra thickness, 
we can use our model as a near real-time predictive impact assessment tool. The utility 
is that it will direct end-users to locations likely to be impacted by tephra and locations 
where mitigation, such as cleaning, should be prioritised. Using our model in 
conjunction with electricity network analysis, disruption to the network can be 
minimised during a volcanic eruption. 
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 – Conclusions and future research Chapter Seven
7.1 Thesis overview 
The aim of this thesis is to quantitatively assess the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure sectors to volcanic hazards. This aim is addressed through six key thesis 
objectives: 
1. Review and identify known impacts to critical infrastructure sectors from 
volcanic eruptions within the last 100 years (Chapter 2). 
2. Identify volcanic hazard impact mechanisms and categorise infrastructure 
disruption and damage into standardised impact intensity classes (Chapter 2). 
3. Develop a database to store volcanic impact data and facilitate the collection 
of standardised post-eruption impact data for future eruptions (Chapter 3). 
4. Establish a methodological framework for the quantification of infrastructure 
vulnerability to volcanic hazards using vulnerability and fragility functions 
(Chapter 4). 
5. Derive vulnerability and fragility functions for tephra fall impacts to critical 
infrastructure using the volcanic vulnerability framework (Chapter 4). 
6. Utilise fragility functions to assess the tephra fall risk to the electrical 
transmission network in the North Island of New Zealand using a new 
probabilistic tephra fall hazard model (Chapters 5–6). 
7.2 Synthesis 
The ultimate goal of volcanic risk management is to reduce consequences of volcanic 
eruptions, first by saving lives and next by minimising societal impacts. Through a 
comprehensive study quantifying volcanic impacts to critical infrastructure, this thesis 
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provides a pathway and catalyst for volcanic risk scientists to achieve this goal. This 
thesis has demonstrated that a range of complex, and at times widespread and 
cascading, consequences can occur to critical infrastructure impacted by volcanic 
hazards (Chapter 2). The majority of available volcanic impact data for critical 
infrastructure is qualitative, precluding its application in probabilistic risk assessments 
models currently being used by practitioners for volcanic disaster risk management, 
particularly for loss estimation and infrastructure management. 
This thesis contributes to the improvement of volcanic vulnerability assessment in three 
ways. 
First, this thesis provides an extensive review of volcanic impacts to critical 
infrastructure sectors for all volcanic hazards using all available literature and post-
eruption impact assessments (Chapter 2). This is the first such review since Blong 
(1984) and further advances the volcanic research community’s understanding of 
volcanic hazard impacts to critical infrastructure sectors. 
Second, using the review of volcanic impacts to critical infrastructure, and more 
robustly analysing the range and type of impacts which critical infrastructure sustain 
during volcanic eruptions. This thesis provides a volcanic impact classification system 
which can be used to categorise infrastructure impacts from future eruptions based on 
impact and volcanic hazard intensity. 
Third, this thesis provides a methodological framework to quantitatively assess the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure sectors to volcanic hazard impacts (Chapter 4)—
until now there has been no such standardised method to assess infrastructure 
vulnerability in volcanology. This framework draws on more advanced vulnerability 
assessment approaches from other natural hazard fields and outlines a method to 
classify infrastructure impacts, such that volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions 
can be derived to quantitatively relate impact intensity to volcanic hazard intensity. 
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While I use the framework to derive fragility functions for some infrastructure sectors 
impacted by tephra fall (Chapter 4) and utilised them in a risk assessment (Chapter 6), a 
key contribution of this thesis is the framework itself. 
There are two main benefits of developing this volcanic vulnerability framework. 
First, this framework is needed to advance quantitative volcanic vulnerability 
assessments to the same level of detail as volcanic hazard assessment, so both can be 
used in quantitative probabilistic volcanic risk assessments. The benefit of conducting 
quantitative volcanic risk assessments is that the vulnerability and risk at different 
infrastructure sites can be readily compared and uncertainty accounted for. This allows 
infrastructure operators to make informed risk-based decisions about the most 
appropriate volcanic risk reduction treatments for a particular situation. Cost-benefit 
analyses, which back these decisions, are greatly improved with robust quantitative 
vulnerability and risk data. In addition, these quantified volcanic risk assessments feed 
into wider governmental and international policies regarding sustainable development 
and infrastructure performance, a priority of the United Nations Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR, 2015). 
Second, the development of this framework provides a pathway for volcanic risk 
scientists to improve critical infrastructure vulnerability assessments such that 
infrastructure vulnerability is more robustly understood and ultimately progress towards 
quantitative volcanic risk assessments. Using the framework, including data collection 
guidelines (Chapter 3), researchers can continue to refine infrastructure impacts based 
on volcanic hazard intensities; provide volcanic preparedness and response advice to 
infrastructure operators; and derive infrastructure vulnerability and fragility functions, 
further advancing the capabilities of volcanic vulnerability and risk assessments. 
Feeding this advanced vulnerability knowledge into volcanic risk assessments for 
infrastructure, such as that conducted in Chapter 6 or more integrated assessments 
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which consider all infrastructure in a city (e.g., the DEVORA project; DEVORA, 2015), 
will greatly benefit volcanic disaster risk reduction. 
7.3 Future research 
Future research should further explore the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to 
volcanic hazards to develop a comprehensive understanding which can be utilised for 
volcanic risk reduction. Areas of potential future research are highlighted below. 
Volcanic vulnerability assessment for critical infrastructure 
 Continued quantitative vulnerability research for critical infrastructure sectors 
and components impacted by volcanic hazards. The focus should be on 
utilising the vulnerability framework outlined in Chapter 4 to derive and 
improve suites of vulnerability and fragility functions for all critical 
infrastructure sectors and all volcanic hazards. Advances in volcanic 
vulnerability assessment leads to improved volcanic risk assessment and 
reduction. 
 Link physical vulnerability (damage and disruption) to economic loss and/or 
functional downtime. This provides infrastructure operators with a broader 
representation of likely impacts from volcanic hazards. This information is a 
vital input for volcanic risk reduction, cost-benefit analyses, and prioritisation. 
 Consideration of multiple (concurrent and sequential) volcanic hazards in 
vulnerability assessments. Currently the influence that multiple volcanic 
hazards have on vulnerability and resilience is poorly understood and further 
research is needed. This could be achieved by thoroughly investigating multi-
hazard impacts from field investigations or through the combination of 
different volcanic hazard-based fragility functions. This information will allow 
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more realistic vulnerability assessments to be conducted which account for 
multiple volcanic hazards, typical of volcanic eruptions. 
 Investigation of vulnerability changes over the course of prolonged eruptions. 
Long-lasting eruptions are likely to cause ongoing impacts which cumulatively 
may lead to higher vulnerability than discrete eruptions. Infrastructure 
operator actions (e.g., ongoing clean-up) should also be considered in the 
modification of vulnerability as well as remobilisation of unconsolidated 
tephra deposits. 
 Conducting site specific volcanic vulnerability assessments for infrastructure 
sectors. Because each infrastructure site has unique design, operational and 
functional requirements, site specific vulnerability assessments are required to 
account for how these factors influence vulnerability to volcanic hazards. 
These site specific assessments will provide more appropriate vulnerability 
information with which to base mitigation treatment on, than would regional 
or global volcanic vulnerability assessments. 
Volcanic vulnerability data for critical infrastructure 
 Continued and ongoing post-eruption impact assessments for any future 
eruptions will increase the availability of impact data for volcanic 
vulnerability assessments. These assessments should not only focus on general 
observations of impacts, but should forensically document all impacts, 
specifically recording volcanic hazard and impact intensities for use in 
quantitative vulnerability assessments. These assessments must investigate 
volcanic impacts to all infrastructure assets, systems and components while 
also balancing between assessment scale, available time and researcher 
expertise. Post-eruption impact assessments must document impact tolerance 
(i.e., where detrimental impact did not occur), so a representative sample of all 
volcanic hazard-infrastructure interactions for each eruption is obtained. Post-
eruption assessments should follow the standardised impact assessment 
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guidelines and populate the Critical Infrastructure Volcanic Impacts Database 
presented in Chapter 3. 
 Continued laboratory experimentation of critical infrastructure components 
and systems to systematically investigate vulnerability over a range of 
volcanic hazard intensities. These experiments should focus towards informing 
infrastructure sector design guidelines, operational codes and mitigation 
approaches such that infrastructure operators can prepare for and restore their 
systems efficiently and effectivity after volcanic eruptions. 
 Increased use of expert knowledge to derive volcanic fragility and 
vulnerability functions. Larger expert elicitation processes which include 
experts from the volcanology community and infrastructure operators and 
follow standard procedures should be undertaken. Using a larger number of 
experts from both fields should result in more appropriate volcanic 
vulnerability estimates. 
Volcanic hazard assessment 
 Continued improvement of probabilistic volcanic hazard models such that they 
output multiple hazard intensity metrics (e.g., tephra grainsize, tephra particle 
soluble salt chemistry, hazard duration). These additional parameters are 
useful for assessing infrastructure vulnerability as multiple volcanic hazard 
properties commonly combine to cause impacts. 
 Development of numerical volcanic hazard models which consider multiple 
volcanic hazards over various timeframes, i.e., models should consider whole 
eruption sequences. These types of models will allow the use of volcanic 
vulnerability assessments which consider multiple volcanic hazards and 
impact duration to be used in volcanic risk assessments, further refining these 
assessments. 
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Critical infrastructure interdependencies 
 The inclusion of critical infrastructure interdependencies in volcanic 
vulnerability and risk assessments. Interdependency influences vulnerability 
because cascading failures can cause disruption to other sectors (Rinaldi et al., 
2001). Interdependencies can be complex and collaboration between volcanic 
risk scientists and infrastructure operators is required to understand them and 
deliver appropriate volcanic risk assessments. 
Critical infrastructure operator volcanic hazard awareness 
 Increasing infrastructure operator’s awareness of volcanic hazards and their 
impacts. Volcanic risk scientists should also demonstrate the value of volcanic 
risk management by providing useful and understandable volcanic 
vulnerability, preparedness and response resources. For example, a 
continuation of the volcanic ashfall infrastructure preparedness poster series of 
Wilson et al. (2014). This should be achieved through collaborative 
partnerships between volcanic scientists and infrastructure operators. 
 
Such future research avenues follow the pathway envisaged by this thesis towards a 
more thorough and rigorous assessment of volcanic vulnerability leading towards 
comprehensive volcanic risk assessment, management and reduction. 
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Appendix A – Volcanic fragility function review 
 Fragility functions A.1
In volcanology there are fewer existing vulnerability and fragility functions than other 
natural hazard fields. There are a number of reasons for this: (1) volcanic hazards are 
not often considered in infrastructure hazard assessments; (2) volcanic hazards are 
rarely considered in catastrophe modelling; (3) there are no building or infrastructure 
design codes for volcanic impacts which would prompt the derivation of functions; and 
(4) volcanic eruptions are infrequent events on human and infrastructure timeframes 
(Douglas, 2007; Wilson et al., 2012). Despite the challenges, several vulnerability and 
fragility functions have previously been developed (in addition to those derived in 
Chapter 4) for volcanic hazards (Table A.1) which are reviewed below. In addition, 
hazard intensity thresholds for critical infrastructure impacts have been derived for 
tephra fall (Chapter 2; Jenkins et al., 2014) and for pyroclastic density currents (Spence 
et al., 2004a). 
Table A.1: Existing critical infrastructure fragility and vulnerability functions developed 
for different volcanic hazards. No published peer-reviewed fragility functions for water 
supply, communication networks or lava flows were found. Table repeated from Chapter 2. 
 
Infrastructure sector Tephra fall PDC Lahar 
Electrical supply a   
Wastewater networks b   
Transportation networks b   
Buildings b, c, d, e, f d, g, h g 
Critical components i   
a
 Wardman et al. (2012); 
b
 Kaye (2007); 
c
 Spence et al. (2005); 
d
 Zuccaro et al. (2008); 
e
 Jenkins and Spence (2009); 
f
 Maqsood et al. (2014); 
g
 Zuccaro and De Gregorio (2013); 
h
 Spence et al. (2007); 
i
 Wilson et al. (2012). 
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A.1.1 Buildings 
A.1.1.1 Tephra fall impacts 
Fragility functions for tephra fall induced roof collapse have been developed by Paton et 
al. (1999); Spence et al. (2005), Kaye (2007), Zuccaro et al. (2008), Jenkins and Spence 
(2009) and Maqsood et al. (2014); reviewed below in chronological order. Paton et al. 
(1999) estimated the mean damage ratio of building damage for New Zealand buildings 
based on two roof categories. Damage ratios for lightweight roofs were based on roof 
damage from Rabaul (Blong and McKee, 1995) and while those for concrete roofs were 
based on interpretation of gravity collapse loads from the New Zealand building codes. 
Spence et al. (2005) reviewed failure calculations, mechanical experiments and post-
eruption impact assessment observations from a number of studies (e.g., Schriever and 
Hansen, 1964; Spence et al., 1996; Pomonis et al., 1999; Blong, 2003) to inform tephra 
load fragility functions for Neapolitan (Italy) roofs. For these roofs, Spence et al. (2005) 
established five vulnerability classes with mean collapse probabilities derived from 
calculations and experiments, and standard deviations based on expert judgment. 
Spence et al. (2005) modified these functions for more general European roof 
typologies by developing collapse limits for four European roof vulnerability classes. 
Zuccaro et al. (2008) refined the Neapolitan roof fragility functions with mechanical 
load experiments, numerical analysis and statistical calculations (Figure A.1B). Jenkins 
and Spence (2009) developed fragility functions for roof damage for five African and 
Asian roof typologies. Kaye (2007) assessed the vulnerability of New Zealand roofs to 
tephra fall using two vulnerability classes, long (>15 m) and short (<15 m) roof spans. 
Kaye (2007) vulnerability functions are linear and relate thickness of wet ash to a 
damage ratio of cost of repair relative to cost of replacement. Maqsood et al. (2014) 
derived vulnerability functions for tephra fall induced damage of buildings for the 
United Nations Global Assessment Report 2015 (GAR15). Functions were derived for 
32 global building typologies using an expert judgment process. Functions plot tephra 
load as a function of damage index, the ratio of repair cost to replacement cost. All of 
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these functions consider the probability of roof collapse and do not consider other 
damage states, as collapse limits are easier to establish than limits for lesser damage 
states. 
A.1.1.2 Pyroclastic density current (PDC) impacts 
Fragility functions for PDC induced building damage have been derived by Jenkins and 
Spence (2009) and Zuccaro and De Gregorio (2013). These functions have been derived 
by reviewing and refining previous works which document vulnerability using 
analytical techniques, comparison with nuclear explosions (Valentine, 1998) and from 
post-eruption impacts (Spence et al., 2004a; Spence et al., 2004b; Spence et al., 2005; 
Zuccaro et al., 2008). Given that vulnerability depends on building structure and design, 
Zuccaro et al. (2008) defined six structural and eight non-structural vulnerability classes 
applicable to Neapolitan buildings. For each structural class, fragility functions were 
defined for five damage states using mechanical and numerical models, experimental 
data, post eruption observations, updated hazard models and the Spence et al. (2004b) 
derived fragility functions for non-structural damage. Resulting fragility functions gave 
the probability of exceedance for each damage state as a function of PDC dynamic 
pressure (Figure A.1C). Jenkins and Spence (2009) derived fragility functions for the 
probability of failure (i.e., the highest damage state) for four African and Asian building 
typologies as a function of dynamic pressure based on previous studies. 
A.1.1.3 Lahar impacts 
Zuccaro and De Gregorio (2013) derived fragility functions for lahar impacts to 
Neapolitan buildings. Six structural vulnerability classes are defined based on building 
strength and six non-structural vulnerability classes for infill walls and openings 
(windows and doors). Functions were derived for different combinations of structural 
and non-structural vulnerability classes by numerically and experimentally assessing 
impacts at given lahar velocities (Figure A.1A). These functions differ from others; a 
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damage state scale on the y-axis is used instead of the more common probability of 
exceedance. As a result there are no probabilities associated with the damage 
occurrence for these functions; despite this, these functions provide a quantitative 
estimate of sustained building damage resulting from lahars. 
A.1.2 Electricity transmission 
Laboratory experiments by Wardman et al. (2012) and Wardman (2013) produced data 
to evaluate the probability of tephra induced flashover of electrical insulators in dry and 
wet conditions. Experimental, post-eruption impact assessments and expert judgment 
data were used to develop a fragility function for the probability of flashover as a 
function of wet tephra thickness. Dry tephra is less electrically conductive than wet 
tephra; therefore all dry tephra thicknesses have no probability of flashover. Wardman 
et al. (2012) acknowledges that there are a number of other factors that influence 
flashover probability and further research should be conducted to understand these 
factors. 
A.1.3 Other infrastructure 
Kaye (2007) developed vulnerability functions for stormwater and road networks for 
New Zealand’s RiskScape assessment tool. For stormwater pipes, the damage ratio 
increases linearly as tephra thickness increases until 100 mm when the damage ratio 
equals 1 (i.e., repair cost is greater than replacement cost). The road function is based on 
expected clean-up costs and assumes a linear increase in vulnerability until 1,000 mm 
tephra thickness were the damage ratio equals 1. Kaye (2007) notes that these functions 
have been developed in the absence of detailed vulnerability data and that new data can 
assist to refine the functions. 
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Figure A.1: Examples of common volcanic fragility functions. A damage state function; B probability of exceeding highest damage state; 
and C probability of damage state exceedance. 
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A.1.4 Electronic equipment 
Laboratory experiments conducted by Wilson et al. (2012) subjected laptop computers 
to semi-continuous tephra fall for seven days while assessing computer performance. 
Throughout all experiments no laptops completely failed and only three had minor 
problems (overheating, minor abrasion). Using the difference between pre- and post-
tephra performance and user input (keyboard, mouse) usability tests, the decrease in 
usability as tephra thickness increases was used as a proxy for function loss. A 
vulnerability function is fit to the data using a power function (Figure A.2). The method 
used to derive this function is different to that of Chapter 4 as it does not consider 
different impact states. 
 
Figure A.2: Vulnerability function for computer systems showing changes in functionality 
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Appendix B – Post-eruption impact assessment 
guidelines 
Additional guidelines, questions and data for airports, road transportation, buildings, 
water supply and wastewater networks which can be used to guide and conduct post-
eruption impact assessments. These guidelines are based on the experience of the New 
Zealand Volcanic Impacts Study Group researchers. See Chapter 3 for further 
discussion. 
Table B.1: Data to be documented for source volcano and eruption. 
 
Aspect Assessed item 
Source volcanoes Volcano number. 
 Primary volcano name. 
 Latitude, longitude, sub-region, region, country. 
 Primary volcano type. 
 Last known eruption. 
Eruptions Eruption code – 3 letters from volcano name followed by 2 digit year. 
 Eruption start and end dates, or indicate if ongoing. 
 Environmental conditions at time of eruption (rain, wind direction). 
 Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI), magnitude and plume height. 
 Which hazards were produced? 
 Which infrastructure were impacted? 
 
Table B.2: Recommended post-eruption impact assessment questions and data for general 
airport and aircraft characteristics and impacts. 
 
Aspect Assessed item 
Airport site Name of company operating airport. 
 Town airport is located within. 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Is the airport for domestic, international, cargo or military flights? 
 Number of domestic, international, cargo or military flights per day. 
 Number of passengers per day. 
 Number of runways and what are their surfaces? 
 Airport’s normal operating hours. 
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Aspect Assessed item 
 Number of terminal buildings, support buildings (hangers). 
 What communication systems are used at the airport? 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this 
time? 
 Describe any volcanic hazard contingency or preparedness plans that were in place 
pre-eruption. 
 Describe any contingency plans that been developed since the eruption. 
 Have any volcanic specific mitigation actions been implemented to reduce impacts? 
Airport impacts Was a warning received before the eruption? Who provide the warning? How much 
warning time? 
 Describe any steps that were taken to prepare for the eruption. 
 Was airport tolerant to eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List the impacts observed at the airport. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 How were airport communication systems impacted? 
 How was the runway and/or paved surfaces impacted? 
 Did the airport close? How long was the airport closed? What caused the closure? 
How many flights disrupted? Estimated lost revenue? 
 Did all airlines return after closure, if so how long after closure? 
 Time to return to pre-eruption passenger and plane numbers? 
 Describe how any impacts were managed (closure, repair, additional maintenance, 
clean up). 
 Describe any repair undertaken. 
 Describe clean-up operations undertaken. 
 Describe any interactions with other agencies. 
 Are there any lessons learnt or procedures that would help future eruption response? 
Aircraft impacts If aircraft were damaged, were they in flight or at an airport? 
 What type of aircraft? 
 Time into flight when impacts occur. 
 List observed impacts. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 How were impacts sustained in-flight and on the ground managed? 
 If aircraft were on the ground, were they protected from tephra fall? If so, how were 
they protected? 
 How were aircraft repaired or cleaned? How long did repair take? What was the 
cost of the repair? 
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Table B.3: Recommended post-eruption impact assessment questions and data for general 
road network and vehicle characteristics and impacts. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
Road network Is this assessment for a small road section, a whole road or the whole network? 
 Name of road? 
 Name of company who owns road? 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Total length of roads in network or section of interest. 
 What type of road is it (motorway, highway, surface street) and what materials is it 
made from? 
 What is the condition of the road surface? 
 Grade/slope of road 
 If there are bridges, what type of bridges are they? 
 What type of drainage is there on the road? 
 Are there painted lines on road? 
 What type of street lights, traffic lights and signs are there? 
 Number of vehicles per day on road and predominant vehicle type. 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this 
time? 
 Describe any volcanic hazard contingency or preparedness plans that were in place 
pre-eruption. 
 Describe any contingency plans that been developed since the eruption. 
 Have any volcanic specific mitigation actions been implemented to reduce impacts? 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this 
time? 
Road impacts Was a warning received before the eruption? Who provide the warning? How much 
warning time? 
 Describe any steps that were taken to prepare for the eruption. 
 Was the road network tolerant to eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List of impacts to the road network. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 Was road closed, what caused the closure, how long was the closure? 
 What was the level of reduced traction? 
 Were there any vehicle crashes related to the eruption and/or hazard(s)? 
 Number of vehicles on road during the eruption. 
 What was the behaviour of drivers driving during eruption? 
 Distance to furthest object which can be seen? 
 Are vehicles causing tephra remobilisation? 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Are there any impacts to lights, signs or painted road markings? 
 Were the roads cleaned, if so, how? 
 Are there any lessons learnt or procedures that would help future eruption response? 
Vehicle impacts Is this assessment for an individual vehicle or multiple vehicles? 
 Location of the vehicle. 
 Was the vehicle stationary or driving at the time of impact? 
 Type of vehicle? 
 List impacts to vehicle. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 Additional comments about vehicle impact. 
 How were impacts repaired, how long did repair take and what was the repair cost? 
 Was there any increased maintenance of vehicles? 
 Describe any increases in maintenance of vehicles. 
 Are there any lessons learnt or procedures that would help future eruption response? 
 
Table B.4: Recommended post-eruption impact assessment questions and data for general 
building characteristics and impacts. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
Building site Town or city were building is located. 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Orientation of building with respect to north. 
 Description what the building is used for (use classification). 
 Building typology (structure, roof, walls) description and age. 
 Number, size and materials of openings (windows, doors). 
 Roof pitch in degrees from horizontal. 
 Description of guttering (size, material). 
 Floor height above ground level. 
 Footprint area. 
 Condition of building prior to eruption (if known). 
Building Impacts List of impacts to non-structural elements. 
 List of impacts to structural elements. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 Description of both non-structural and structural impacts. 
 Description of any roof corrosion including severity, and percentage corroded. 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Description of any ballistic damage to roof including hole diameter, percentage of 
roof with holes. 
 Description of any damage to guttering. 
 Is there any abrasion of windows, window frames, wall cladding? 
 Is the building habitable? 
 Description of any repair or clean-up undertaken including methods and costs. 
 
Table B.5: Recommended post-eruption impact assessment questions and data for general 
pipe network characteristics and impacts. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
Pipe network What sector does pipe network belong (water supply, wastewater)? 
 Is this assessment for an individual section, multiple sections or the whole network? 
 Name of the site. 
 Operating company. 
 Town or city site is located within. 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Area serviced by pipe network. 
 Total length of pipes in network or section of interest. 
 Pipe materials, diameter, thickness, depth below ground or above ground support. 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this time? 
 Describe any volcanic hazard contingency or preparedness plans that were in place pre-
eruption. 
 Describe any contingency plans that been developed since the eruption. 
 Have any volcanic specific mitigation actions been implemented to reduce impacts? 
Pipe impacts Was a warning received before the eruption? Who provide the warning? How much 
warning time? 
 Describe any steps that were taken to prepare for the eruption. 
 Was the pipe network tolerant to eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List of impacts to the pipe network. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 Where pipes blocked? Percentage decrease in pipe throughput? How long were pipes 
blocked for? 
 Thickness of tephra material in catchpits. How did material enter the pipe network? 
 Was there flooding as a result of pipe damage and/or blockage? 
 How were impacted pipes repaired or cleaned, how long did repair take, what was the 
repair cost? 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Are there any lessons learnt or procedures that would help future eruption response? 
 
Table B.6: Recommended post-eruption impact assessment questions and data for general 
water supply network characteristics and impacts. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
Water supply site Is this assessment for an individual site, multiple sites or all sites? 
 Name of the site. 
 Operating company. 
 Town or city site is located within. 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Number of people the treatment plant serves. 
 Describe relationship with other treatment plants in the area. 
 Water production rate of treatment plant. 
 How much storage capacity does the system have? 
 What are the water sources used? 
 Is there an automatic shutdown for water intake structures? And what level is it 
shutdown? 
 What is the depth of water intake structure (if in reservoir)? 
 What is the normal turbidity range of the raw water and what is the operating 
turbidity level of the plant and what other raw water parameters are monitored? 
 Description of the pre-screening process including intake filters. 
 Do treatment plant and/or pumping stations have back up power supply and water 
storage capacity? 
 How is water transported to treatment plant (gravity or pumps)? 
 Number, type, capacity of pumps. 
 Are pumps and/or well heads of groundwater systems covered or exposed? 
 Is plant equipment housed indoors or outdoors? 
 Description of treatment process. 
 Is there an initial coagulation and/or flocculation addition step? 
 Number of treatment units used and residence time through them. 
 What monitoring of final water is undertaken? 
 Describe the normal maintenance schedule. 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this 
time? 
 Describe any volcanic hazard contingency or preparedness plans that were in 
place pre-eruption. 
 Describe any contingency plans that been developed since the eruption. 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Have any volcanic specific mitigation actions been implemented to reduce 
impacts? 




Was a warning received before the eruption? Who provide the warning? How 
much warning time? 
 Describe any steps that were taken to prepare for the eruption. 
 Was the site tolerant to eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List of impacts to the water treatment site. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 Was there any disruption to water treatment? What caused the disruption and how 
long did the disruption last? 
 Were water intakes shutdown? 
 Where there changes in turbidity, did the eruption affect turbidity removal, how 
was turbidity removed? Was coagulation and flocculation addition adjusted? 
 Description of changes in water chemistry or biological growth. 
 Did public report any unusual taste and/or discolouration of treated water? What 
advice was given to the public? 
 Comments about changes in coagulation/flocculation. 
 Did material arrive at the treatment plant, how much material and how did it enter 
the plant (pipes or direct air fall)? 
 Which part of the plant did material primarily accumulate? 
 How were filters maintained, repaired or cleaned? 
 Did any uncovered equipment experience any problems? 
 Did power remain at water treatment plant? How long was power unavailable? 
 Did power remain at pump stations? How long was power unavailable? 
 Was pumping able to continue throughout the eruption? 
 Was there any abrasion to pump impellers, if so, when did it occur, what was the 
severity and how was it repaired? 
 Percentage decrease in pumping efficiency due to pump damage. 
 Was there any corrosion to metal surfaces, if so, when did it occur, what was the 
severity and how was it repaired? 
 Was additional maintenance required? 
 What additional maintenance was required? 
 Was there any changes in water demand and how was it managed? 
 Was emergency water supply used (e.g., tankers)? 
 Describe how any impacts were managed (closure, repair, additional 
maintenance, clean up). 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Describe clean-up operations undertaken. 
 Describe any interactions with other agencies. 
 Are there any lessons learnt or procedures that would help future eruption 
response? 
 
Table B.7: Recommended post-eruption impact assessment questions and data for general 
wastewater characteristics and impacts. 
 
Sub-sector Assessed item 
Wastewater site Is this assessment for an individual site, multiple sites or all sites? 
 Name of the site. 
 Operating company. 
 Town or city site is located within. 
 Latitude, longitude, distance from volcano. 
 Number of people the treatment plant serves. 
 Describe relationship with other treatment plants in the area. 
 Capacity of treatment plant, normal throughout and does throughput change with 
seasons? 
 Is the wastewater network combined with the stormwater network? 
 Does foreign material (e.g., sand) enter treatment plant, if so, what volume? 
 What is the incoming suspended solid load in wastewater during normal conditions 
and rain storm conditions? 
 Do treatment plant and/or pumping stations have back up power supply? 
 Describe the treatment process including pre-screening, primary, secondary and 
tertiary treatment. 
 Percentage of plant open to the atmosphere. 
 What monitoring of treated waste is undertaken? 
 Number, type, capacity of pumps. 
 Describe the normal maintenance schedule. 
 Has the site experienced volcanic hazards before and did that experience help this 
time? 
 Describe any volcanic hazard contingency or preparedness plans that were in place 
pre-eruption. 
 Describe any contingency plans that been developed since the eruption. 
 Have any volcanic specific mitigation actions been implemented to reduce impacts? 




Was a warning received before the eruption? Who provide the warning? How much 
warning time? 
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Sub-sector Assessed item 
 Describe any steps that were taken to prepare for the eruption. 
 Was the site tolerant to eruption and hazard(s)? 
 List of impacts to the wastewater treatment site. 
 What is the impact level (using Tables 2.11-2.14)? 
 What hazard caused the impact and what was the HIM value? 
 Was there any disruption to wastewater treatment? What caused the disruption and 
how long did the disruption last? 
 Was the treatment plant shutdown at any point and for how long? 
 Did material arrive at the treatment plant, how much material and how did it enter 
the plant (pipes or direct air fall)? 
 Which part of the plant did material primarily accumulate? 
 Change in solid load in raw wastewater after the eruption. 
 How was material removed from pipes and tanks? 
 Did any material enter drains and/or catchpits? 
 Did power remain at water treatment plant? How long was power unavailable? 
 Did power remain at pump stations? How long was power unavailable? 
 Were there any overflows at pump stations? 
 Was there any abrasion to pump impellers, if so, when did it occur, what was the 
severity and how was it repaired? 
 Percentage decrease in pumping efficiency due to pump damage. 
 Was there any corrosion to metal surfaces, if so, when did it occur, what was the 
severity and how was it repaired? 
 What additional maintenance was required? 
 Was any untreated (or slightly treated) waste discharged into the environment, how 
long did discharge last, what volume was discharged and where there any 
environmental issues or public concern? 
 Describe how any impacts were managed (closure, repair, additional maintenance, 
clean up). 
 Describe clean-up operations undertaken. 
 Describe any interactions with other agencies. 





Page | 321 
Appendix C – Impacts of the 2014 eruption of Kelud 
volcano, Indonesia, on infrastructure, 
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